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AUTHOR: 


TITLE: 


THE  GREATEST 

QUESTION  IN 
THEOLOGY... 

PLACE: 

EDIN. 


DA  TE : 

1842 


Master  Negative  U 


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lUlHJOGRArHIC  MICROFORM  TAKGR  1 


Oiij^iMcil  Maleiial  as  rihiuxi  -  ILxisling  iJibliugiaphic  Reiuni 


^    i-  The    gi-€ate5i   question   m    theolcgy   completely 

diocuBsed;   iiFLTiely   the    Arf/oment    a  prion    fo^'   the   beirig 
and    attributeo    of'  God,    by   7im.    Gillespie    and   A    ref^ita- 
1 1 0 n    tb  e  t'C  o  f  *  .  ♦    b  y    An  H  t  b  e  o  3 . 
Edin.    1842.  0.  ^8  j   +  6?   +  87p. 

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THE 


GREATEST  QUESTION  IN  THEOLOGY 


COMPLETELY  DlSf  "^SED ; 


NAMELY, 


lENT  A  PRIOEI  lOR  THE  BEING 
AND  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD, 


BY  WM.  GILLESPIE, 


AND 


A  REFUTATION  THEREOF, 


UNDERTAKEN  IN  CONSEQUENCE  OF  A  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  ABOVE 

NAMED  AUTHOR, 


( 


BY  ANTITHEOS. 


» • 


PUBLISHED  BY  W.  6c  li. 


^  *,  '^^  »•■'  -»■  —  ■ 


MDCCCXLII. 


ERRATA  IN  THE  REFUTATION. 


h^ 


i 


Page  20, 

21, 
39, 
42, 
43, 
44, 
45, 

47, 
49, 
65, 
66, 
69, 
69, 
74, 
78, 
78, 


line  23,  for  obscurifi/,  read  absurdity. 
19,  for  HI  formed^  read  i//,  c^-c. 

10  for  reasonings  read  reasoni?igs. 
13  from  bottom,  for  omnipoience^  read  omniscience. 

7  from  bottom,  for  representation^  read  representative. 

15,  after  reasoning,  insert  6^^^  before  ^e. 
17^  for  Jrill,  read  Jails. 

7  from  bottom,  for  existence^  read  extension. 

11  from  bottom,  before  rvhether^  delete  or. 
9,  for  of  subject y  read  //«e  subject. 
6  from  bottom,  for  /o  ^e  ufider,  read  /o  /;e?,  4'c. 

13,  for  z**,  read  a*. 

1 7,  after  objection,  insert  it  should. 

22,  delete  ca^^. 

16,  after  matter,  insert  ? 
5  from  bottom,  for  censorium,  read  sensorium. 


I  CD 


ICO 


V     ■">,     '*  >.    K  \ 


X. 


\ 


AN 


ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI, 


FOR 


THE  BEING  AND  ATTRIBUTES 


OF  GOD. 


BY 


WM.  GILLESPIE. 


Spiritui  iutus  alit ;  totamq  ;  infusa  per  artus 

Alent  agitat  molem,  &  magno  se  corpore  miscet. — JEs.  vi. 

Deum  namq  ;  ire  per  oinnes 
Terrasq  ;  Tractusq  ;  Maris,  Coelumq;  profundum. — Geor.  iV. 

Did  it  plainly  appear  that  Space  and  Duration  were  Properties  of  a  Substance,  we 
should  have  an  ixitie  way  with  the  -Atheists  :  For  it  woidd  at  once  prove  demonstrably 
an  EUrrtal,  yecetsary,  Sdf-existent  Being  ;  that  there  is  but  One  such;  and  that  he  is 
ttefdful  in  order  to  the  existence  of  all  other  Things. — BUTLKR. 


EDINBURGH : 
PRINTED  FOR  WAUGH  &  INNES; 

M.  OGLE,  GLASGOW;  W.  CURRY,  JUN.  &  Co.  DUBLIbf; 


WHITTAKER  &  CO. 


AND  SMITH  ELDER  &  CO.  LONDON. 
MDCCCXXXIII. 


CONTENTS. 


LNTRODUCTION. 


Division  I.    An  Inquiry  into  the  defects  of  mere  a  posteriori  arguments  for 
the  being  of  a  Deity  .... 

CHAP.  I. 

Of  the  arg-ument  from  Experience.        .  .  .  ,      " 

CHAP.  II. 

Of  the  argument  from  Miracles.  .... 

Division  II.    A  Review  of  Dr.  SI.  Clarke's  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God.  ..... 

Division  III.  Necessary  existence  implies  infinite  Extension. 

ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI. 
BOOK  I. 

PART  I. 

Proposition  I.        Infinity  of  Extension  is,  necessarily,  existing.  .        ^ 

II.  Infinity  of  Extension  is,  necessarily,  indivisible. 

Corollary  from  Prop:  II.     Infinity  of  Extension  is 
necessarily  immoveable.  .... 

III.  There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 

IV.  The  Being  of    Infinity  of  Extension,  is,  necessarily,  of 

unity  and  simplicity.        ..... 

Scholium  I.        .....  . 

Scholium  II. 


Page 

3 


11 

15 
26 


37 
38 

40 
41 


43 
45 

46 


V.      There  is,  necessarily,  but  otic  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion.    47 


Proposition  I. 
II. 


PART  II. 

Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  existing.                .  48 

Infinity  of  Duration,  is,  necessarily,  indivisible.         .  50 
Corollary    from  Prop:    II.    Infinity  of  Duration  is 

necessarily  immoveable.          ....  50 


IV 


CONTENTS. 


Proposition  III.    There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 

IV,  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  is,  necessarily,  of  unity 

and  simplicity.         ...... 

Scholium  I.  .....  . 

Scholium  II.         . 

V.  There  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 


31 

hi 
53 
55 
57 


Proposition  I. 


II. 


III. 


PART  III. 

There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion, 

and  Infinity  of  Duration.  ....  59 

The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion, is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity.  .  61 

There  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan- 
sion, and  Infinity  of  Duration.  61 


BOOK  II. 


PARTI. 

Proposition.     The  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Dura- 

tion,  is,  necessarily.  Intelligent  and  AlUknoiring.  .  63 

PART  II. 

Proposition.  The  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Dura- 
tion, that  is  of  Intelligence,  or  is  All-knowing,  is,  necessarily, 
All-powerful.  65 


INTRODUCTION. 


PART  III. 
Proposition.    The  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Dura- 
tion,  that  is   of  Intelligence,  or,  is  All-knowing,  and  All- 
powerful,  is,  necessarily  Free. 


m 


APPENDIX. 


67 


INTRODUCTION. 


DIVISION    I. 

AN  INQUIRY    INTO    THE   DEFECTS    OF  MERE  ^  P05r£iJ/0i?/ AR- 
GUMENTS, FOR  THE  BEING  OF  A  DEITY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  argument  from  Experience, 

§.  1.  But  two  ways  of  proving  the  being  of  God:  a  priori  and 
a  posteriori. — *Tis  evident,  on  the  slightest  reflection, 
that  there  can  be  no  more  than  two  ways  of  proving 
the  being"  and  attributes,  or  any  of  the  attributes,  of 
God.  If  it  be  possible  to  establish  his  existence  at  all ; 
'tis  possible  to  prove,  either,  merely,  that  he  is  :  or, 
that,  besides  being,  he  must  he.  The  reasonings  which 
would  demonstrate  his  being,  are  called  a  priori :  Those 
which  give  probable  evidence,  only,  for  his  being,  a  pos- 
teriori, 

§.  2.  Nature  of  the  latter  argument, — The  more  com- 
mon a  posteriori  argument  may  be  called,  the  argument 
from  experience.  Not  that  experience  can  discover  a 
God;  but  this  argument  infers  the  existence  of  a  God, 
by  a  process  similar  to  that  by  which  we  conclude,  that 
certain  appearances  have  been  preceded  by  a  cause, 
which  we  have  discovered  almost  as  often  as  we  have 
set  out  in  the  search.  This  argument  takes  a  survey 
of  the  universe, — and  examines,  more  minutely,  one  of 


/  * 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

Its  parts;  asserts,  it  there  iWscover^  marks  of  design ;  ^ 
and,  from  these  marks  of  design,  infers  the  existence  of 
a   designer,   or   an   intelligent  cause.      It  is  level  to  all 
men's  capacities.    And  unless  men  resolve  to  shut  their 
eyes,  and  stop  the  operation  of  their  understanding,  they 
cannot  avoid  coming  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  pheno- 
mena of  nature  imply  the  existence  of  a  cause  of  them. 
§.  3.  It  is  attended  ivith  difficulties.— But,  though  the 
a  posteriori  argument  he  good,  so  far  as  it  goes,  yet  its 
discoveries  reach  only  a  little  way.     If  we  confine  our- 
selves merely  to  its  evidence,  we  shall,  inevitably,  find 
ourselves  surrounded  by  many  serious  difficulties, — dif- 
ficulties which  will  oppress,  if  they  do  not  discourage, 
the  minds  of  the  more  inquisitive. 

§.  4.  But  before  taking  notice  of  the  disadvantages 
attending  this  argument,  if  the  aid  of  the  other  sort  of 
reasoning  is  nowise  introduced,  let  it  be  premised,  that 
we  are  not,  in  any  way,  to  enter  upon  the  merits  of 
that  argument,  but  shall  take  the  validity  of  it,  so  far  as 
its  evidence  reaches,  entirely  for  granted:  the  object, 
here,  being  only  to  point  out  the  defects  it  labours  under, 
admitting  its  inference  to  be  irresistible. 

§.  5.  Assumes,  that  the  succession  and  order  of  things 
have  not  been  eternal. — And  since  the  validity  of  a  poste- 
riori reasoning,  is  to  be  taken  for  granted,  we  must, 
also,  assume  the  truth  of  those  things  which  the  very 
entering  upon  such  reasoning  plainly  pre-supposes. 

§.  6.  We  must  assume,  therefore,  that  the  succession  and 
order  of  all  the  things  that  the  material  universe  con- 
tains, have  not  existed  from  all  eternity.  For  be  it  re- 
membered, that  the  a  posteriori  argument  says,  it  dis- 
covers marks  of  a  particular  design  in  the  phenomena 


DIVISION  I.  ^ 

of  nature ;  and  a  particular  design,  surely,  implies  the 
existence  of  a  previously  existing  designer. 

§.  7.  Indeed,  unless  it  be  possible,  that  the  succession 
and  order  of  things  in  the  material  universe  mag  have 
had  a  designing  cause,  it  cannot,  of  course,  be  ever 
shown  that  they  had  a  designing  cause.  And  it  is  not 
possible,  one  would  think,  that  the  succession  and  order 
of  these  things  may  have  had  a  designing  cause,  if  such 
order  and  succession  have  existed  from  all  eternity. 

§.  8.  The  phenomena  of  nature  cognizable  bg  us,  finite 
in  extent.— ^oi  to  insist  that,  because  the  a  posteriori 
argument  takes  for  granted  the  non-eternity  of  those 
pirenomena  of  nature,  which  exhibit  marks  of  design, 
these  phenomena  must  be  held  to  be  only  of  finite  extent : 
(A  point  beyond  all  question  :)  Nothing  is  plainer  than 
that  the  marks  of  design  which  we  can  discover,  must  be 

finite  in  their  extent. 

§.  9.  FIRST,  One  class  of  disadvantages  attending 
this  argument,  it  cannot  show  infinitg  belongs  to  God.— 
First,  One  of  the  disadvantages,  then,  or,  rather,  a 
class  of  disadvantages,  attending  mere  a  posteriori  rea- 
sonings, is,  that  they  can  never  make  it  appear,  that 
infinitg  belongs,  in  any  way,  to  God. 

§.  10.  First,  It  onlg  entitles  us  to  infer  the  existence  of 
a  being  of  finite  extension.-Yiv^i,  The  a  posteriori 
argument  can  only  entitle  us  to  infer  the  existence 
of  a  Being  of  finite  extension:  for  by  what  rule 
known  in  philosophy,  can  we  deduce,  from  the  existence 
of  an  eff'ect  finite  in  extent,  the  existence  of  a  cause  of 
infinity  of  extension  ? 

§.  11.  The  Deity  cannot  be  every  iclierc  present  bg  mere 
energy.— \Nh'^t  becomes,  then,  of  the  omnipresence  of 
the  Deity,  according  to  those  who  are  content  to  rest 


INTRODUCTION. 


satisfied  witli  the  reasonings  from  experience  ?  Those 
who  seek  not  the  aid  of  the  other  species  of  reasoning 
iiuist  let  their  system  of  Theism  preserve  a  cautious 
silence  upon  so  unaccountahle  a  matter.  It  will  he  vain 
to  talk  of  the  Deity  hcing  present  by  his  energy,  al- 
though he  may  not  be  present  by  his  substance,  to  the 
whole  universe.  For,  'tis  natural  to  ask,  not  so  much 
how  it  is  proved,  that  God  can  be  virtually  present, 
though  not  substantially  present,  in  every  part  of  nature, 
as  what  can  be  meant  by  being  every  where  present  by 
If  re  energy  ? 

§.  12.  Add  to  this,  that,  even  admitting  the  foolish 
distinction  in  question,  a  posteriori  reasoning  can  no 
more  make  out,  that  the  Deity  is  omnipresent  by  his 
virtue,  than  that  he  is  omnipresent  as  to  his  substance. 
Admit  the  distinction:  'tis  of  no  service. 

§.  13.  This  argument  cannot  prove  the  wisdom  and 
power  of  God  more  than  finite,  nor  that  he  is  entirely 
free, — And  from  the  inaptitude  of  the  reasoning  under 
consideration,  to  show  that  immensity  or  omnipresence 
belongs  to  God,  it  will  be  found  to  follow,  directly 
and  immediately,  that  his  wisdom  and  power  cannot 
be  shown  to  be  more  than  finite,  and  that  he  can  never 
be  proved  to  be  a  free  agent. 

§.  14.  First,  It  is  very  plain,  that  omnipresence,  (let  it 
be  only  by  energy,)  is  absolutely  necessary  in  a  Being 
of  infinity  of  wisdom.  And,  therefore,  the  a  posteriori 
argument  is  unable  to  evince  that  the  Deity  is  in  pos- 
session of  this  attribute. 

§.  15.  Secondly,  It,  likewise,  plainly  follows  from  the 
iinptitude  of  this  argument,  to  show  that  God  is  omni- 
present, that,  thereby,  we  cannot  prove  infinity  of  power 
to  belong  to  him.     For,  if  the  argument  cannot  make 


DIVISION    I.  ' 

out  that  the  Being  it  discovers  is  every  w^here  present, 
how  can  it  ever  make  out  that  he  is  every  where  power- 
ful ?  By  careful  reflection,  too,  we  may  perceive,  that 
omnipotence  of  another  kind  than  power  which  can 
exert  itself  in  all  places,  requires  the  existence  of  im- 
mensity. 

§.  16.  Thirdly,  Without  calling  in  the  aid  of  subtle 
reasoning  to  prove,  that  if  the  argument  a  posteriori 
cannot  show  that  God  is  omnipresent,  it  can  never 
evince  that  he  is  a  free  agent ;  let  those  who  may  con- 
tend that  by  the  reasonings  from  experience,  it  can  be 
made  to  appear,  the  Deity  is  a  free  agent,  be  pleased  to 
tells  us,  what  is  that  logical  process  by  which  they  de- 
duce, from  the  premises  they  have  obtained,  such  a  con- 
clusion. Of  what  nature  is  the  middle  term,  which 
puts  beyond  doubt  the  agreement  of  subject  and  predi- 
cate in  the  proposition,  that  the  God  whom  the  argument 
from  experience  doth  reveal  is  entirely  free? 

§.  17.  If  we  cannot  show  the  Deity  is  of  infinity  in  a 
certain  respect,  cannot  show  he  is  of  infinity  in  any, 
—But,  indeed,  without  having  been  at  pains  to 
show,  that,  if  we  cannot  prove  the  immensity  or 
omnipresence  of  the  Deity,  we  can,  for  that  reason, 
never  show  that  he  is  omniscient — that  he  is  omnipo- 
tent—that he  is  entirely  free :  It  had  been  sufficient 
simply  to  say,  that  if  the  Deity  cannot  be  proved  to  be 
of  infinity  in  any  given  respect,  it  would  be  nothing 
less  than  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  could  be  proved  to 
be  of  infinity  in  any  other  respect. 

§.  18.  Secondly,  TJiis  argument  cannot  male  out  that 
God  was  from  eternity.— Secondly,  Not  to  lay  any  weight 
on  the  truth  just  announced,  that  if  we  cannot  prove 


8 


INTRODUCTION. 


God  to  have  a  particular  infinite  attribute,  we  can  never 
show  that  infinity  of  any  kind  whatever  belongs  to  him : 
or,  not  here  to  insist  on  this  point,  that  we  shall  never 
be  able  to  make  out  that  there  is  an  eternal  being-,  if  we 
be  not  able  to  make  out  that  there  is  an  immense  be- 
ing ;  the  eternity  of  a  being  as  much  implying  his  im- 
mensity, as  his  immensity  would  evidently  infer  his 
eternity:  (Truths  these  most  unquestionable:)  The 
a  posteriori  argument  can  do  no  more  than  prove,  that, 
at  the  commencement  of  the  phenomena  which  pass 
under  its  review,  there  existed  a  cause  exactly  sufficient 
to  make  the  effects  begin  to  be.  That  this  cause  existed 
from  eternity,  the  reasonings  from  experience  can,  by 
no  means,  show.  Nay,  for  aught  they  make  known,  the 
designer  himself  may  not  have  existed  long  before  those 
mnrks  of  design  which  betoken  his  workmanship. 

§.19.  Or,  iciU  he  to  cterniti/.— And,  because  reason- 
mir  of  the  kind  in  question  cannot  prove,  that  the  God 
u  hum  it  reveals,  has  existed  from  all  eternity,  therefore, 
for  any  thing  it  intimates,  God  may,  at  sometime,  cease 
to  be ;  and  the  workmanship  may  have  an  existence 
when  the  workman  hath  fallen  into  annihilation.  For, 
of  that  being  only,  who  never  had  a  beginning,  the  non- 
existence implies  a  contradiction. 

§.  20.  Concerning  the  topics  alluded  to,  the  argu- 
ment leaves  us  quite  at  a  loss.  It  gives  some  little  in- 
formation, and  then  is  found  inadequate  to  extend  our 
knowledge  the  least  way  farther. 

§.21.  And,  lastly,  it  cannot  show  God  is  infinitely 
good,  just,  Sfc.~lt  would  be  worse  than  useless  to  ex- 
pend many  words  in  showing,  that  the  argument  a  pos- 
teriori, cannot  prove  that  God  is  of  infinite  goodness. 


DIVISION  I. 


9 


and  justice,  and  all  other  infinite  moral  perfections. 
Without  insisting  that  there  must  be  infinite  natural  at- 
tributes as  a  foundation  whereon  to  build  infinite  moral 
attributes:  (A  thing  certain:)  'Tis  evident,  that  the  same 
reason  that  prevents  us  from  proving  the  first,  will  for 
ever  prevent  us  from  proving  the  second. 


§.  22.  SECONDL  Y,  The  reasonings  from  experience 
cannot  prove  the  unity  af  God, — Secondly,  Another 
defect  that  mere  a  posteriori  reasonings  labour  under,  is, 
perhaps,  still  weightier  that  their  inability  to  prove  that 
infinity,  in  any  way,  belongs  to  God.  How  can  such 
reasonings  ever  assure  us  of  the  iinify  of  the  Deity  ? 
'Twill  be  granted  that  the  question,  as  to  the  unity  of 
God,  involves  a  point  of  much  importance :  the  point, 
perhaps,  of  greatest  moment  connected  with  our  specu- 
lations as  to  his  existence.  But,  whether  there  be  but 
one  God,  or  not,  the  argument  from  experience  doth,  by 
no  means,  make  clear.  It  discovers  marks  of  design  in  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  and  infers  the  existence  of  at  least 
one  intelligent  substance  sufficient  to  produce  them* 
Farther,  however,  it  advances  not  our  knowledge. 
Whether  the  cause  of  the  phenomena  be  one  God,  or 
many  gods,  it  pretends  not  to  determine,  past  all  doubt. 

§.  23.  The  contrivances  we  observe  in  nature,  may 
establish  a  unity  of  counsel :  how  can  they  establish  a 
unity  of  substance  ? 

§.  24.  They  cannot  evince  matter  was  created, — In  the 
phenomena  that  surround  me,  I  see  certain  means  adap- 
ted to  certain  ends.  Without  hesitation,  I  conclude, 
there  was  a  designer.  But  did  this  designer  create  the 
matter  in  which  the  design  appears  ?     Of  this,  the  ar- 


10 


INTRODUCTION. 


DIVISION  I. 


11 


gument  a  postei-iori  cannot  convince  us.  For  that  ar- 
gument does  no  more  than  infer  a  designing  cause  from 
certain  appearances ;  in  the  same  way  as  we  wouhl  in- 
fer, from  finding  some  well  contrived  machine  in  a  de- 
sert, that  a  human  heing  had  left  it  there.  But  point 
out  marks  of  design,  certain  means  adapted  to  certain 
ends,  in  gross,  untractable  matter  itself? 

§.  25.    Therefore^  cannot  evince  there  is  not  a  plurality 
of  the  causes  of  things. — Now,   because   this  reasoning 
cannot   convince  us  of  such  a  creation,   it  cannot  con- 
vince us  that  there  is  not  a  plurality  of  deities,  or  of 
the  causes  of  things.     As  thus :  If  the  designer  whom 
this  argument  discovers,  did  not  create  the  matter  con- 
taining the  design,  but  that  was  created  by  some  supe- 
rior agent,  then  here  is  a  complete  destruction  of  the 
unity  of  God.     If  matter  was  not  created  at  all,  then 
we  are  involved  in  the  supposition  of  that  strange  plu- 
rality of  gods,  in   which  there  is,  at  least,  one  physical 
substance,  and  that,  it  may  be,  the  more  ancient  mem- 
ber of  the  Ditheism. 

§.  26.  Though  ice  hold  part  of  the  universe  was  cre- 
ated, no  nearer  a  proof  of  the  unity  of  God. — But  even 
though  we  hold,  that  the  designing  cause  of  the  pheno- 
mena we  see,  created  the  matter  in  which  they  appear, 
(an  opinion  for  which  the  argument  in  question  gives  us 
no  evidence,)  what  the  nearer  are  we  to  a  real  proof  of 
the  unity  of  God  ?  Did  he  who  created  and  fashioned 
an  inconsiderable  part  of  the  universe,  create  and  fashion 
universal  nature?  Perhaps  he  did  not.  Then,  we 
have  no  proper  evidence  for  the  doctrine  of  his  unity. 

§.  27.  Cannot  prove  unity,  because  cannot  prove  eternity. 
— Besides,  to  insist  on  no  other  topic,  if  we  cannot  prove 
the  eternity  of  God,  it  is  not  possible  that  we  can  prove 


the  unity  of  Gcd.  To  say  that,  for  any  thing  we  know 
to  the  contrary,  he  may  not  have  existed  from  all  eter- 
nity, being  much  the  same  thing  as  saying,  that,  for  any 
thing  we  know  to  the  contrary,  there  may  be  another 
god  or  many  gods,  besides. 


§.  28.  Summary. — We  see,  then,  what  the  argument 
a  jwsteriori  amounts  to.  That,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  phenomena,  or  designs  which  do  appear,  there 
existed  as  the  cause,  an  intelligent  substance,  or  seve- 
ral intelligent  substances,  of  sufficient  extension,  wis- 
dom, power,  and  freeness,  goodness,  justice,  and  other 
moral  qualities,  to  make  the  effects  begin  to  be :  this  is 
all  that  that  species  of  reasoning  can  make  known.  And 
if  we  think  that,  without  assistance  from  another  source 
than  the  reasonings  from  experience,  we  shall  be  en- 
abled to  ascend  higher  in  our  investigations,  we  but 
weakly  impose  upon  ourselves,  and  mistake,  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  understanding,  the  uncertain  flights  of  the 
fancy. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Argument  from  Miracles. 

§.  1.  Some  would  "prove  a  God  from  miracles. — There 
are  some  that  would  prove  the  existence  of  God,  by 
showing  that  rniracles  have  happened :  a  miracle  affords 
evidence  that  there  is  a  God. 


/ 


12 


INTRODUCTION. 


§.  2.  Tivo  kinds  of  Atheists,  First,  Those  who  con- 
tenil  it  is  imjwssihle  there  can  he  a  God. — There  are  two 
distinct  kinds  of  Atlieists.  First,  Those  who  contend 
that  it  is  impossible  there  can  he  a  God.  And,  secondly, 
those  who  only  go  the  leng-th  of  saying,  that  there  is  no 
God.  Perhaps,  this  latter  class  of  Atheists  may  be  pro- 
perly sunk  in  another  class,  namely,  those  who  do  but 
maintain  that,  as  yet,  they  have  seen  no  proper  evidence 
adduced  to  establish  the  existence  of  a  Deity. 

§.  3.  All  the  s2/st('nts  oftliejirst  kind  of  Atheists  resolvahle 
into  the  opinion  of  infinite  succession, — The  system  of 
Epicurus,  in  ancient  times ;  in  modern,  the  system  of 
Spinoza,  fall  to  be  ranged  along  with  those  of  the  first 
sort.  And  many  other  species  of  Atheism,  by  how^  few 
shades  soever  they  differ  from  the  systems  specified,  or 
from  eacli  other,  might  be  pointed  out  as  belonging  to 
the  same  class.  All  the  systems  of  Atheism  which  w^ould 
go  to  show,  it  is  impossible  there  can  be  a  God,  may 
be  reduced  to  the  following  opinion,  that  there  has  been 
a  succession,  or  rather,  have  been  successions,  from  eter- 
nity, of  dependent  beings,  in  which  are  included  all 
things  that  are,  or  ever  were,  in  the  universe. 

§.  4.  A  miracle  presupposes  Deiti/, — Now,  a  miracle 
pre-supposes  a  God  :  at  least,  if  a  miracle  prove  the 
existence  of  God,  it  must,  beyond  all  contradiction,  also 
pre-suppose  that  existence.  Does  it  not,  indeed  estab- 
lish, by  first  assuming,  the  being  of  a  Deity  ? 

§.  5.  Not  lo(fical,  therefore,  to  attempt  proving  a  God 

from  miracles,  in  a  question  icith  this  sort  of  Atheists, — What 

sort  of  an  error,  then,  in  logic,  do  they  commit  who 

would  ask  an  Atheist,  -of  the  first  class,  to  believe  in  a 

miracle :  that  is,  to  believe  in  a  thing  which  would  pre- 


DIVISION  I. 


13 


suppose  the  existence  of  what  he  reckons  an  impossi- 
bility ? 

§.  6.  If  chance  or  necesslti/  can  account  for  all  other 
things,  it  can  account  for  a  miracle  also, — Besides,  if 
chance,  or  necessity,  or  any  other  word,  can  account 
for  so  much,  what  hinders  it  to  account  for  a  little  more  ? 
If  it  sustain,  whether  or  not  it  caused,  the  universe  and 
all  things  therein,  is  it  incapable  of  making  the  further 
slio-ht  exertion  of  bringing  an  uncommon,  or  hitherto 
unknown,  event  to  pass,  suppose  the  visible  antece- 
dent to  be  any  thing  whatever  ? 

§.  7.  Secondlg,  Those  who  maintain  they  have  not  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  a  God, — With  regard  to  the  other  kind 
of  Atheists,  or  those  who  have  not  yet  seen  evidence  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  compel  them  to  admit  there  is  a  God :  ^ve 
may  demand  of  him  who  hopes  to  convert  such  men  by 
adducing  the  testimony  in  favour  of  miracles.  Does  the 
whole  visible  creation,  contain  no  evidence,  or  not  as 
good  evidence,  as  it  is  possible  there  should  be,  of  the 
existence  of  a  Deity,   that  you  resort   to   miracles,   in 
search  of  proof  for  this  ?     What  is  the  ground  of  the 
preference  ?     None  is  apparent.     'Tis  granted,  that  a 
miracle  affords  evidence  of  a  being  much  superior  to 
man:  but  do  not  the  works  of  nature  afford  proof  equally 
worthy  of  being  relied  on,  to  the  same  purpose  ?     Do 
you  throw  the  permanent  phenomena  of  nature  aside,  as 
utterly  insignificant ;  and  pause  till  you  can  establish  a 
miracle,  before  you  venture  to  assert  the  existence  of 
Deitv  ? 

§.  8.  He  ivill  not  he  convinced  from  miracles  who  is  not 
convinced  hg  the  phenomena  of  nature, — After  all,  we 
may  despair  of  bringing,  by  miracles,  to  the  belief 
of  a  Deity,  the  man   who  is  incapable  of  being  con- 


14 


INTRODUCTION. 


vinced  of  the  bein^  of  Deity,  by  the  phenomena  that 
surround  him.  If  in  these,  he  see  no  marks  of  a  de- 
signer, think  you,  that  an  event  with  a  new  and  unex- 
pected antecedent,  must  force  him  into  the  belief  of  a 
being  endowed  with  power  and  other  excellencies,  far 
beyond  the  human  ?     Why  should  this  be  so  ? 

§.  9.  Miracles,  too,  attended,  {'tissaid,)  with  difficulties  of  a 
pecidiar  description, — But  there  is  another  consideration, 
which  should  be  carefully  kept  in  mind.  Miracles  are 
thought  to  be  clogged  with  difficulties  of  a  most  pecu- 
liar character.  The  proof  against  miracles  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  ('tis  argued,)  is  as  complete  as  any 
proof,  from  testimony,  in  their  favour,  can  possibly  be. 
Then,  would  you  have  men  suspend  their  belief  in  a 
God,  till  they  get  past  this  preliminary  difficulty? 
This  were  any  thing  but  making  the  road  to  Theism 
shorter  and  less  difficult. 

§.  10.  Ttiis  metliod  of  proof  labours  under  all  the  dis- 
advantages of  the  argument  from  experience, — Even  let 
it  be  supposed  that  miracles  answer  the  purpose  for 
which  they  are  thus  brought  forward  :  the  proof  by  this 
method  of  the  being  of  a  God,  is  attended  with  all  the 
defects  and  disadvantages  which  attend  that  argument 
a  posteriori,  which  is  in  more  general  use. 

§.  1 1.  Which  of  the  two, — the  argument  in  general  use, 
or  the  one  drawn  from  miracles,  for  the  existence  of  a 
Deity,  gives  us  the  more  enlarged,  exalted,  and  correct 
ideas  of  that  Being,  would  constitute  a  question,  which, 
if  it  be  as  important  as  it  is  difficult,  should  be  followed 
out  by  the  exclusive  supporters  of  either  method  of 
proving  so  fundamental  a  doctrine. 


DIVISION  II. 


15 


DIVISION    II. 


A  REVIEW  OF  DR.  SAMUEL  CLARKE  S  DEMONSTRATION  OF  THE 
BEING  AND  ATRIBUTES  OF  GOD. 


§.  1.  If  there  be  a  necessary  Being,  that  must  be  capable 
of  proof  The  proof  must  be  a  priori. — Nothing  appears 
to  be  more  unaccountable,  than  that,  if  there  be  a  neces- 
sarily existing  Being,  there  can  be  no  way  of  proving  it. 
To  say  so,  seems  absurd.  And  if  there  beany  wi>y  of  prov- 
ing, there  is  a  necessarily  existing  Being,  that  must,  of 
course,  be  by  arguments  drawn  from  the  necessity  of 
the  thing.  Reasonings  from  experience,  can  show  what 
may  be,  or,  is :  they  cannot  show  what  must  be.  To 
say,  therefore,  that  a  priori  reasoning  in  the  matter  can 
never  turn  to  any  account,  is  to  say,  that  we  can  never 
prove  a  necessarily  existing  Being.  Indeed,  if  a  priori 
reasoning  in  the  matter  can  never  turn  to  any  account, 
what  does  this  show  but  that  it  is  impossible,  there  can 
be  a  necessarily  existing  Being?  And  for  one  to  be- 
lieve what  he  can  have  no  proof  for,  and  what  isimpos- 
ble,  is  surely  extravagant. 

§.  2.  A  necessary  Being,  a  sine  qua  non  of  every 
thing.  Therefore,  the  proof  easily  reached, — Nay,  must 
we  not  suppose,  that  if  there  be,  indeed,  a  neces- 
sary Being,  the  demonstration  of  this  existence  must  be 
very  easily  reached,  and,  when  set  down,  irresistible  ? 
If  a  necessarily  existing  Being  is  not  one  whose  being 
is  a  sine  qua  non,  and  must  be  supposed  as  a  sine  qua 
NON,  of  every  thing  else,  what  can  be  understood  by 


16 


INTRODUCTION. 


such  ?  And  if  wc  must  suppose  that  Being'  as  a  sine 
QUA  NON  of  every  other  thing",  surely,  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  that  Being  is  not  difficult  to  he  attained  to, 
or  rather,  is  impossible  to  he  avoided. 

§.  3.  Bat  one  waij  of  exhibiting  the  proof.  For 
a  necessary  Being  known  only  hy  his  modes, — And, 
as,  if  there  be  a  necessary  Being,  it  would  appear,  that 
the  proof  must  be  close  within  our  reach,  so,  there  can 
be,  substantially,  but  one  way  of  exhibiting  the  demon- 
stration. For  a  necessarily  existing  Being  is  one  whose 
being  is  a  sine  qua  non  of  every  other  thing.  We 
can  know  of  his  existence  only  by  his  modes :  His 
modes,  therefore,  of  existing  must  be  the  sine  qua 
NON  of  all  else  :  We,  surely,  may  easily  see  what 
things  are  the  sine  qua  non  of  every  other  existence. 
We  know  of  two  things,  and  two  only,  that  are  the 
sine  qua  non  of  every  other  existence.  And  'tis  at- 
tempted to  be  demonstrated,  that,  from  these  two,  we 
must  infer  the  existence  of  a  necessarily  existing  Being, 
the  int(dligent  cause  of  all  things. 

§.  4.  J)r.  Clarke  has  not  attended  to  this  in  his  "  De- 
monstration"  Tlierefore  that  faulty, — T>r,  Clarke^  in  his 
"  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God," 
hath  not  attended  to  this,  that  if  there  be  a  necessary 
Beinir,  his  existence  must  be  deduced,  if  deduced  at  all, 
from  those  things  that  are  the  sine  qua  non  of  all  else; 
those  things  being  the  modes  of  his  existing.  And, 
accordingly,  his  Demonstration  is  no  more  than  a  pre- 
tended one.     It  is  wholly,  and  evidently,  inconclusive. 

§.  5.  His  whole  Demonstration  hangs  on  the  second 
proposition.  If  therefore^  that  sophistical^  the  whole 
must  he  so, — The  whole  of  that  Demonstration  hangs 
\ipun  the  second  proposition.    This  Dr,  Clarke  ackuow- 


division  II. 


17 


ledges : — "  Either  there  has  always  Existed  some  one 
Unchangeable  and  Independent  Being,  from  which  all 
other  Beings  that  are  or  ever  were  in  the  Universe, 
have  received  their  Original ;  or  else  there  has  been  an 
infinite  Succession  of  changeable  and  dependent  Beings 
produced  one  from  another  in  an  endless  Progression, 
without  any  Original  Cause  at  all.  Now  this  latter 
Supposition  is  so  very  absurd,  that  tho'  all  Atheism 
must  in  its  Account  of  most  things  (as  shall  be  shown 
hereafter)  terminate  in  it,  yet  I  think  very  few  Atheists 
ever  were  so  weak  as  openly  and  directly  to  defend 
it."  Here  he  confesses  that  all  Atheism  must,  in  its 
account  of  most  things,  terminate  in  the  supposition  of 
an  infinite  succession  of  dependent  beings.  It  is  in- 
cumbent on  him,  therefore,  to  get  over  that  barrier. 
And  this  he  has,  in  the  place  in  question,  undertaken 
to  do.  So  that,  if  the  reasoning  in  this  second  propos- 
ition  be    sophistical,   the   whole    fabric    must  fall   to 

pieces,  of  itself. 

§.  6.  Wotdd  make  out  his  point  by  disproving  the  second 
member  of  his  dilemma, — How,  then,  does  this  Author 
attempt  to  prove  his  proposition,  that  there  has  existed 
from  eternity,  some  one  unchangeable  and  independent 
Being  ?  Let  us  admit  the  goodness  of  his  dilemma : 
Let  us  observe  how  he  establishes  the  first  member, 
and  disproves  the  second.  This  he  does  not  do  by  de- 
monstrating the  existence  of  a  Being  with  whose  exist- 
ence the  supposition  of  an  infinite  succession  of  depen- 
dent beings,  is  utterly  incompatible :  But  he  attempts 
to  do  it  hj first  considering  and  demolishing  infinite  suc- 
cession ;  and  the  second  member  of  the  dilemma  being, 
(he  thinks,)  removed  out  of  the  way,  the  first  remains 
to  be  true. 


B 


18 


INTRODUCTION. 


§.  7.  An  infinite  succession,  an  eternal  succession,  and  this 
a  necessar//  succession, — We  must,  then,  carefully  exam- 
ine how  he  proceeds  to  demolish  infinite  succession.  And 
to  be  enabled  to  weigh  accurately  the  validity  of  the  pro- 
cess of  reasoning  which  he  uses,  it  must  be  premised,  that 
an  infinite  succession  is  an  eternal  succession,  and  an 
eternal  succession  is  a  necessary  succession  of  dependent 
h Pings.  An  infinite  succession  means  a  succession  of 
intinity  of  duration,*  and  this  is   convertible  with  an 

*  Indeed,  an  infinite  succession  is  an  expression  most  improper.  This 
may  be  drawn  from  the  following  passage  in  Afr.  Locke.  The  Author  is 
more  particularly  considering  one  of  the  kinds  of  infinity,  but  the  spirit 
of  the  remarks  is,  of  course,  as  applicable  to  infinity  of  duration,  or 
what  is  of  infinity  of  duration,  as  to  infinity  of  expansion.— 

''Difference  between  iufinil'/ (f  space,  and  space  infmUe.— Though  out 
idea  of  infinity  arise  from  the  contemplation  of  quantity,  and  the  end- 
less increase  the  mind  is  able  to  make  in  quantity,  by  the  repeated  ad- 
ditions  of  what  portions  thereof  it  pleases  ;  yet  I  guess  we  cause  great 
confusion  in  our  thoughts,  when  we  join  infinity  to  any  supposed  idea 
of  quantity  the  mind  can  be  thought  to  have,  and  so  discourse  or  reason 
about  an  infinite  quantity,  viz.,  an  infinite  space,  or  an  infinite  duration. 
For  our  idea  of  infinity  being,  as  I  think,  an  endless  growing  idea,  by 
the  idea  of  any  quantity  the  mind  has,  being  at  that  time  terminated  in 
that  idea  (for  be  it  as  great  as  it  will,  it  can  be  no  greater  than  it  is,) 
to  join  infinity  to  it,  is  to  adjust  a  standing  measure  to  a  growing  bulk  j 
and,  therefore,  I  think  it  is  not  an  insignificant  subtilty,  if  I  say,  that 
we  are  carefully  to  distinguish  between  the  idea  of  the"  [Strictly,  perhaps 
even  the  the  should  not  be  here.]  "  infinity  of  space,  and  the  idea  of  a 
space  infinite.     The  first  is  nothing  but  a  supposed  endless  progression 
of  the  mind,  over  what  repeated  ideas  of  space  it  pleases ;  but  to  have 
actually  in  the  mind  the  idea  of  a  space  infinite,  is  to  suppose  the  mind 
already  passed  over,  and  actually  to  have  a  view  of  all  those  repeated 
ideas  of  space  which  an  endless  repetition  can  never  totally  represent 
to  it;  which   carries  in  it  a  plain  contradiction."     Essai/  concerning 
Human  Understanding,  B.  2.  chap.  xvii.  §.  7. 

When,  therefore,  an  infinite  succession,  or  series,  or  similar  phrases  are 
here  used ;  the  use  being  improper,  'tis  in  compliance  merely  with  the 
language  of  the  proposition  which  is  analysed. 


DIVISION  II. 


19 


eternal  succession.  If  an  eternal  succession  be  not  a 
necessary  succession,  what  is  a  necessary  succession? 
or,  why  is  an  eternal  not  a  necessary  succession  ?  Let 
it  just  be  added,  it  is  plain  enough,  that  an  eternal  or  a 
necessary  succession,  is  one  that  has  not,  that  cannot 
have,  a  cause. — We  are,  now,  prepared  to  inquire  into 
the  justness  of  Dr.  darkens  reasoning. 

§.  8.  Examination  of  the  reasoning  in  Dr.  ClsLrke^  s  second 
proposition, — "  If  we  consider,'*  says  he,  "  such  an  in- 
finite Progression,  as  Orie  eniirel^ndless  Series  oi  Depend- 
ent Beings  ;  'tis  plain  this  whole  Series  of  Beings  can  have 
no  Cause  from  without,  of  its  Existence ;  because  in  it 
are  supposed  to  be  included  all  Things  that  are  or  ever 
were  in  the  Universe."  We  may  add  another  reason 
why  an  infinite  progression  can  have  no  cause  from 
without :  Simply,  because  it  can  have  no  cause  at  all. 
Ex  hypothesi,  it  is  without  a  cause, 

§.  9.  Dr.  Clarke  goes  on:  "  And  'tis  plain  it  can  have  no 
Reason  ivithin  itself  of  its  Existence ;  because  no  one 
>  Being  in  this  Infinite  Succession  is  supposed  to  be  Self- 
existent  or  Necessary,  (which  is  the  only  Ground  or 
Reason  of  Existence  of  any  thing,  that  can  be  imagined 
within  the  thing  itself,  as  will  presently  more  fully  ap- 
pear,) but  every  one  Dependent  o\\  the  foregoing."  Here 
an  especial  reason  is  given,  why  an  endless  series  can 
have  no  reason  within  itself  of  its  existence :  as  if  it 
were  not  enough  to  say,  that  an  endless  series  can  have 
no  cause  within  itself,  because  it  can  have  no  cause  at  all. 
That  succession  must  sink  its  pretensions  to  bemg  m- 
finite,  which  has,  which  can  have,  a  cause,  let  the  cause 
be  from  without,  or  within  itself.* 

*  Does  any  meaning  lie  in  the  words,  A  thing  has  the  cause  of  its  exist- 
ence within  itself,  other  than  this,  The  thing  is  its  own  cause  ?  And 


20 


INTRODUCTION. 


DIVISION  II. 


21 


§.  10.  ''  Where  no  Partis  necessary,  'tis  manifest,"  con- 
tinues Dr  Clarke, "  the  Whole  cannot  be  necessary."  How- 
comes  it  that  we  here  meet  with  the  parts,  with  the 
whole,  of  an  infinite  succession  ?  The  applying^  to  what 
is  infinite  of  these  terms,  of  all  terms  taken  from  the  ca- 
tegory of  quantity^  if  they  are  used  otherwise  than  as 
moro  figures  of  speech,  is  absurd,  in  the  last  degree: 
unless,  (for  we  must  limit  the  assertion,)  what  is  in- 
finite can  be  finite.  It  may  be  safely  allowed,  that  the 
words.  Where  no  part  is  necessary  the  whole  cannot 
be  necessary,  w^ould  be  to  the  purpose  were  the  question, 
IsiXie  succession  infinite  or  necessary,  or  is  it  not?  For, 
'tis  certain,  no  such  reasoning;  'tis  certain,  no  reasoning 
whatever,  can  prove  a  necessary  succession  is  not  a  ne- 
cessary succession ;  else,  a  thing  might  both  be  and 
not  be  at  once. 

§.11.  An  explanation,  of  absolute  necessity  succeeds  : 
"  Absolute  Necessity  of  Existence,  not  being  an  ex- 
trinsicli,  relative,  and  accidental  Denomination ;  but  an 
imvard  and  essential  Property  of  the  Nature  of  the  Thing 
which  so  Exists."  Could  it  be  supposed,  after  what  has  been 
urged,  that  these  words  lay  in  the  way,  the  first  labour 
would  properly  be  confined  to  the  humble  task  of  discover- 
ing fully  their  meaning.  But  wiiatever  they  are  intended  to 
bring  out  concerning  absolute  necessity,  they  cannot 
lie  in  the  way  :  for  as  long  as  it  holds  good,  that  what- 
ever is,  is,  a  necessary  succession  must  continue  a  neces- 
sary succession. 

§.  1*2.  Then  follows  the  conclusion,  at  w^hich  Dr,  Clarke 
arrives  by  virtue  of  the  foregoing  reasoning :  "  An  infinite 
Succession  therefore  of  merely  Dependent  Beings,  with- 

that  which  is  the  cause  of  itself,  existed  before  it  existed.     And  that 
a  thing  should  be  while  it  is  not,  contradicts,  Whatever  is,  is. 


out  any  Original  Independent  Cause;  is  a  Series  of  Be- 
ings, that  has  neither  Necessity,  nor  Cause,  nor  any  Rea- 
son or  Ground  at  all  of  its  Existence,  either  within  itself 
or  from  icithout:'*  That  it  required  any  proof,  (as 
the  illative  particle  intimates,)  to  show,  that  a  succes- 
sion or  series  which  can  have  no  cause,  has  no  cause, 
must,  under  leave,  be  altogether  denied.  With  the  il- 
lative particle,  or  without  it,  the  passage,  by  itself,  is 
faultless;  unless  an  identical  proposition  be  something 

faulty. 

§.  13.  Having  proved,  as  he  thinks,  that  an  infinite  suc- 
cession of  dependent  beings  has  no  cause :  "  That  is,"  he 
adds,  "'tis"  (to  wit,  an  infinite  series  is,)  "  an  express 
Contradiction  and  Impossibilty ;"  [why?]  "'tis  a  sup- 
posing Something  to  be  caused,  (because  'tis  granted  in 
every  one  of  its  Stages  of  Succession,  not  to  be  necessari- 
ly and  of  itself;  J  and  yet  that,  in  the  whole,  'tis  caused 
absolutely  by  Nothingr  So  that  the  whole  of  this  argu- 
mentation at  last  resolves  itself  into  this,  that  a  suc- 
cession which  has  no  cause  is  an  impossibility,  for  the 

reason  that  it  has  no  cause  ! 

§.14.The  next  sentence  proceeds  thus:  "Which"  (name- 
ly, a  supposing  something  to  be  caused  thatis  not  caused,) 
"  every  Man  knows  is  a  Contradiction  to  imagine  done  in 
Tm^;"  [Nothing more  certain.]  "and, because  Duration 
in  this  Caso  makes  no  Difference,  'tis  equally  a  Contradic- 
tion to  suppose  it  done  from  Eternity r  Was  it  not 
unnecessary  to  assign  a  reason,  why  it  is  a  contradic- 
tion, supposing  something  to  be   caused  from  eternity, 

*  Wherein  is  the  cause  of  a  thing  a  whit  behind  the  reason  or  the 
ground  of  it  ?     Let  this  be  pointed  out. 

And  IB  an  infinite  or  a  necessary  series,  in  truth  a  series  that  has  m 

necessity  ? 


\i 


22 


INTRODUCTION. 


tiiat  is  not  caused  ?  A  reason,  ncvortlieless,  is  given  : 
Because  supposing  something  to  be  caused  that  is  not 
caused,  is  a  contradiction  in  relation  to  time. 

§.  15.  No  wonder,  that  by  such  close  and  exact  rea- 
soning, this  Author  should  have  succeeded  so  well  in  de- 
molishing an  infinite  succession  of  dependent  beings ! 

§.  16.  JV/ierein  (shortly)  the  sophistry  contained  in  that 
proposition  lies, — In  a  v/ord,  the  sophistry,  the  plain  so- 
phistry, lies  in  assuming  that  a  succession  which  can  have 
no  cause,  must  have  a  cause.  If  we  but  remember  what 
infinite  succession  means,  Dr,  Clarke's  reasoning  will  ap- 
pear nothing  more  than  ingenious  trifling.  How 
far  one  might  succeed  in  showing,  that  a  succession  of 
dependent  beings  cannot  be  infinite,  just  because  it  is 
a  succession  of  dependent  beings,  needs  not  here  to 
be  inquired.  'Tis  certain,  that  once  grant,  a  suc- 
cession is  infinite,  eternal,  necessary,  it  will  never  do 
to  retract  the  admission,  and  argue  as  if  the  succession 
were  not  infinite,  or  eternal,  or  necessary :  which  you 
do,  most  effectually,  by  assuming  that  it  must  have  a 
cause. 

§.  17.  To  the  same  purpose  as  the  preceding  examina- 
tion of  what  Z)r.  Clarke  advances  in  his  second  proposition, 
are  the  following  remarks  of  Mr,  Hume  :  "  In  tracing 
an  eternal  succession  of  objects,  it  seems  absurd  to  in- 
quire for  a  general  cause  or  first  author.  How  can 
any  thing,  that  exists  from  eternity,  have  a  cause,  since 
that  relation  implies  a  priority  in  time,  and  a  beginning 
of  existence  ? 

"  In  such  a  chain,  too,  or  succession  of  objects,  each 
part  is  caused  by  that  which  preceded  it,  and  causes 
that  which  succeeds  it.  Where  then  is  the  difficulty  ? 
But  the  WHOLE,  you  say,    wants  a  cause.     I  answer, 


DIVISION  II. 


23 


that  the  uniting  of  these  parts  into  a  whole,  like  the  unit- 
ing of  several  distinct  countries  into  one  kingdom,  or 
several  distinct  members  into  one  body,  is  performed 
merely  by  an  arbitrary  act  of  the  mind,  and  has  no 
influence  on  the  nature  of  things.  Did  I  show  you  the 
particular  causes  of  each  individual  in  a  collection  of 
twenty  particles  of  matter,  I  should  think  it  very  un- 
reasonable, should  you  afterwards  ask  me,  what  was  the 
cause  of  the  whole  twenty.  This  is  sufficiently  explain- 
ed in  explaining  the  cause  of  the  parts."  Dialogues 
concerning  Natural  Religion^  Part  IX. 

§.  18.  Dr,  Clarke  was  not  so  well  satisfied  with  the 
manner  in  which  he  had  succeeded  in  destroying  infinite 
succession,  but  that  he  twice  renews  the  attack ;  but 
what  has  been  offered  will  furnish  a  key  to  open  up 
the  secrets  of  the  sophistry  which  may  be  contained  in 
what  he  farther  advances. 

§.  19.  As  we  are  considering  the  Demonstration  of  the 
Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  let  us,  before  leaving  the 
subject,  attend  to  the  proposition  by  virtue  of  which 
the  Author  was  entitled  to  advance  to  the  one  which  has 
been  examined.  The  faulty  reasoning  which  we  have 
observed,  is  an  essential  defect;  a  defect,  therefore, 
for  which  no  correctness  throughout  the  rest  of  the 
argument  could  atone:  And  yet,  there  is  something 
more  that  is  objectionable. 

§.  20.  Consideration  of  the  reasoning  in  Dr.  Clarke's 
first  proposition,— h\  his  first  proposition,  Dr,  Clarke 
undertakes  to  prove,  that  something  always  was,  from 
the  postulate,  something  is.  He  does  not  lay  it  down 
as  an  axiom,  Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause : 
by  which  proceeding  he  might  have  demonstrated,  most 


24 


INTRODUCTION. 


strictly,  that  something  always  was.  But  without  the 
help  of  this  axiom  he,  magnanimously,  sets  about  prov- 
ing, that  something  always  was,  if  he  is  but  granted 
the  premiss,  something  is.  He  is  cautious  enough,  how- 
ever, to  say,  that  there  is  little  need  of  he'mg particular 
in  the  proof. 

§.  21.  "For  since  Something  now  Is,  'tis  evident"  (it 
is  thus  he  argues,)  "that  Something  always  Was* 
Otherwise  the  Things  that  Now  Are,  must  have  been 
produced  out  of  Nothing,  absolutely  and  without 
Cause  :  Which  is  a  plain  Contradiction  in  Terms.  For, 
to  say  a  Thing  is  produced,  and  yet  that  there  is  no 
Cause  at  all  of  that  Production,  is  to  say  that  Some- 
thing is  Effected,  when  it  is  Effected  hy  Nothing ;  that  is 
at  the  same  time  when  it  is  not  Effected  at  alU* 

§.  22.  There  cannot  be  a  better  reply  to  this  way 
of  speaking  than  what  Mr.  Hume  furnishes :  "  What 
ever  is  produced  without  any  cause  is  produced  by 
nothing  ;  or,  in  other  words,  has  nothing  for  its  cause. 
But  nothing  can  never  be  a  cause,  no  more  than  it  can 
be  something,  or  equal  to  two  right  angles.  By  the 
same  intuition,  that  we  perceive  nothing  not  to  be 
equal  to  two  right  angles,  or  not  to  be  something,  we 
perceive,  that  it  can  never  be  a  cause  ;  and  consequently 
must  perceive,  that  every  object  has  a  real  cause  of  its 
existence. 

"I  biiieve  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  employ  many 

words  in  showing  the  weakness  of  this  argument. 

'Tis  sufficient  only  to   observe,  that  when 


we  exclude  all  causes,  we  really  do  exclude  them,  and 
neither  suppose  nothing  nor  the  object  itself  to  be  the 
causes  of  the  existence ;  and  consequently  can  draw  no 
argument  from  the  absurdity  of  these  suppositions  to  prove 
the  absurdity  of  that  exclusion.  If  every  thing  must  have 


DIVISION  II. 


25 


a  cause,  it  follows,  that,  upon  the  exclusion  of  other 
causes,  we  must  accept  of  the  object  itself  or  of  no- 
thing as  causes.  But  'tis  the  very  point  in  question, 
whether  every  thing  must  have  a  cause  or  not;  and 
therefore,  according  to  all  just  reasoning,  it  ought  never 
to  be  taken  for  granted."  Treatise  of  Human  Nature, 
Book  L  Part  UL  Section  HI. 

§.  23.  In  short,  it  is  impossible  ever  to  set  about 
proving,  that  whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause, 
without  being  guilty  of  taking  for  granted  the  very 
thing  to  be  proved.  If  we  do  not  lay  down  that  pro- 
position as  an  axiom,  there  is  no  alternative  but  univer- 
sal scepticism:  Tho',  His  true,  that  very  scepticism 
destroys  itself. 


26 


INTRODUCTION. 


DIVISION^III. 


NECESSARY  EXISTENCE  IMPLIES  INFINITE  EXTENSION. 


§.  1.  But  three  hypotheses  as  to  the  extension  of  a  ne- 
cessary substance, — Supposing,  that  there  is  a  ne- 
cessarily existing  substance,  the  intelligent  cause  of 
all  things,  it  may  be,  easily,  shown,  that  that  substance 
is  infinitely  extended. 

§.  2.  For  there  are  but  three  hypotheses  which  can 
possibly  be  framed  in  reference  to  the  extension  of  the 
necessarily  existing  substance.  The  Jirst  is:  That  that 
substance  is  of  no  extension  whatever.  The  second:  That 
that  substance  is  of  finite  extension  only.  The  third  : 
Tluit  that  substance  is  infinitely  extended.  And,  as  these 
hypotheses  are  all  that  can  be  made  upon  the  subject ; 
therefore,  one  of  them  must  be  true. 

§.  3.  First  hypothesis.  Impossible  to  conceive  it  to  he 
true, — As  to  the  first  hypothesis,  that  the  necessarily 
existing  substance  has  no  extension  whatever  :  Can 
there  be  conceived  a  greater  absurdity  than  the  asser- 
tion, that  a  substance,  cogitative  or  incogitative,  neces- 
sarily existing  or  not  necessarily  existing,  may  be  with- 
out any  extension  whatsoever  ?  To  believe  this  indeed 
defies  human  nature.  If  reason  can,  Avith  certainty, 
pronounce  any  thing,  it  may  pronounce  this  decision, 
that  extension  and  existence  are  so  necessary  to  each 
other,  that  there  can  be  no  existence  without  exten- 
sion. Talk  of  a  substance  which  has  no  extension:  you 
present  us  with  words  of  amusement. 


division  III. 


27 


§.  4.  If  there  be  a  subject  on  which  authority 
should  be  of  weight,  such  a  subject,  'tis  plain,  is  the 
debate,  whether  we  must  conceive,  that  to  deny  exten- 
sion is  to  deny  existence.  And,  'tis  well,  that,  in  be- 
half of  the  position,  that  existence  cannot  be  without 
extension,  there  are  two  as  great  authorities,  in  specu- 
lations of  this  nature,  as  can  any  where  be  found. 

§.   5.  ''  Perhaps," (says  Mr,  Locke,)  "it  is 

near  as  hard  to  conceive  any  existence,  or  to  have  an 
idea  of  any  real  being,  with  a  perfect  negation  of  all 
manner  of  expansion ;  as  it  is  to  have  the  idea  of  any 
real  existence,  with  a  perfect  negation  of  all  manner  of 
duration."  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  B, 
II.  ch,  15.  §.  11.  And  to  have  the  idea  of  any  real  exis- 
tence with  a  perfect  negation  of  all  manner  of  duration 
is,  surely,  impossible. 

§.  6.  The  Cartesians  make  mind  and  matter  to  be 
different  in  their   essence;  and  make  extension,    (the 
correction  of  Des  Cartes" s  opinion  is,  solid  extension,*) 
to  be  the  essence  of  matter  :  Consequently,  with  them, 
a  thinking  substance  cannot  be  extended.     Mr.  Locke 
wrote  at  a  time   when  these  Cartesian  opinions   were 
generally  received.     But  yet,  (we  see,)  he  held,  that, 
without  extension,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  existence. 
§.  7.  "Extension  does  not  belong  to  Jliought"  (these 
are  the  words  of  Z)r.  Samuel  Clarke,)  "because  Tliought 
is  not  a  Being  ;  But  there  is  Need  of  Extension  to  the 
Existence  of  every  Being,  to  a  Being  which  has  or  has 
not  Thought,  or  any  other  Quality  whatsoever."    Second 
Letter  to  Joseph  Butler,  of  terwards  Bishop  of  Durham. 

§.  8.  'Tis  true,  that,  in  these  words.  Dr.  Clarke  does 
not  say,  that  he  cannot  conceive  the  existence  of  a  bemg 
without  extension,  but  that, 'tis  certain,  is  what  he  means. 

♦  This  correction  is  by  Dr.  Isaac  Watts.    See  Philosophical  Essays. 


28 


INTRODUCTION, 


§.  9.  But  not  to  rest  the  decision  of  the  present  affair, 
on  the  necessity  we  are  under  of  conceiving,  that  there 
can  be  no  existence  without  extension :  is  there  no  de- 
cisive argument,  to  put  beyond  all  doubt,  that  extension 
is  necessary  to  a  substance, — whether  or  not  necessa- 
rily existing,  no  matter  ? 

§.  10.  The  subjects  of  geometry  can  have  no  real  exist- 
ence.— A  mathematical  point  has  no  magnitude.  If  a 
point  can  have  external  existence,  mathematical  demon- 
stration would  vanish :  geometry  would  be  destroyed 
by  giving  external  existence  to  its  subjects.  We  must 
suppose  that  a  mathematical  point  has  an  external  ex- 
istence, if  no  reason  be  assigned  why  it  can  have  none. 
And  having  such  existence,  all  that  we  call  mathemati- 
cal demonstration  is  but  a  vain  parade,  and  utterly  false. 
A  conclusion,  that,  of  itself,  sufficiently  overthrows  the 
premiss  from  which  it  follows. 

§.  11.  Now,  a  mathematical  point  can  have  no  real 
existence,  because  it  has  no  magnitude.  This  is  com- 
pletely proved  by  the  following  reasoning. 

§.  12.  Unless  lines  be  considered  as  finite,  geometry 
can  have  no  foundation.  And,  what  terminates  a  line 
is  the  absence  of  all  qualities.  For,  unless  the  absence 
of  all  qualities  be  that  which  ends  a  mathematical  line, 
how  can  a  mathematical  line  have  an  end  ?  This  is  per- 
fectly decisive. 

§.  13.  That  which  has  no  magnitude  is  the  termina- 
tion of  a  line.  How  can  a  line  not  be  ended,  being 
met  by  what  has  no  farther  extension?  This  is  en- 
tirely satisfactory. 

§.  14.  The  conclusion  from  the  whole  is,  that  what 
is  of  no  magnitude  is  nothing.  For  the  reasoning  be- 
ing brought  into  regular  logical  form  stands  thus : — 


DIVISION  III. 


29 


What  terminates  a  line  is  nothing.  But  what  has  no 
magnitude  terminates  a  line.  Therefore,  what  has  no 
magnitude  is  nothing. 

§.  15.  Because  a  point  is  non-extension,  it  is  nothing, — 
Then,  because  a  mathematical  point  terminates  a  line,' 
it  is  nothing.  Because  it  has  no  magnitude,  it  termi- 
nates a  line.     Therefore,  because  it  has  no  magnitude, 

it  is  nothing. 

§.  16.  And,  so,  cannot  have  real  existence, — Is  any 
reasoning  required  to  show,  that  nothing,  or  the  absence 
of  all  qualities,  can  have  no  external  existence  ?  Then, 
a  mathematical  point,  being  the  absence  of  all  qualities, 
or,  nothing,  cannot  exist  externally.  Again,  it  is  no- 
thing, for  the  reason,  that  it  has  no  magnitude.  There- 
fore, because  a  mathematical  point  has  no  magnitude,  it 
cannot  have  an  external  existence. 

§.  17.  And  the  reason  why  a  mathematical  point  can 
have  no  external  existence,    being  because  it  has  no 
magnitude  or  extension,  'tis  therefore,  true,  that  what- 
ever has  no  extension  can  have  no  external  existence. 
For  these  two  propositions :  a  mathematical  point  has 
no  extension :  therefore,  a  mathematical  point  has  no 
external  existence:   compose  an  enthr/meme,  of  which 
the  suppressed  premiss,  according  to  the  laws  of  Dialec- 
tics, is,  what  has  no  extension,  has  no  external  existence. 
§.  18.  A  jwint  cannot  have  position  in  space,-— La,ter 
mathematicians  say,  that  though  a  point  has  no  magni- 
tude, it  has  position  in  space.     But  how  that  which  has 
no  extension  whatsoever  can  have  position  in  extension, 
any  relation  whatever  to  extension,  is  what  can  never 

be  made  intelligible. 
§.19.  Indeed,ifamathematicalpointhavepositionin  space, 

then,  it  has  a  real  existence ;  and,  so,  there  can  be  no 


30 


INTRODUCTION. 


truth  in  geometry.  A  consideration  which  singly  suf- 
fices to  show,  that  a  mathematical  point  has  no  relation 
to  space. 

§  20.  Upon  the  whole,  one  can  have  no  hesitation  in 
saying  of  those  who  contend  that  the  necessarily  exist- 
ing substance  has  no  extension  whatsoever,  or  no  rela- 
tion whatever  to  space,  (having  relation  to  space,  and 
having  extension,  being  the  same  thing;)  that,  if  they 
be  not  but  uttering  words  all  but  incomprehensible  ; 
they  deny  not  so  much  the  existence,  as  the  possibility 
of  the  existence,  of  such  a  substance. 


§.  21.  Second  hijpothesis.  From  this  it  follows,  first, 
that  the  necessary  substance  has  form. — As  to  the  second 
hypothesis,  that  the  necessarily  existing  substance  is  of 
finite  extension  only :  From  this  it  follows,  in  the  first 
place,  that  that  substance  has  a  figure,  for  figure  is  just 
extension  with  limits. 

§.  22.  Shape  inconsistent  loith  necessary  existence, — 
But  shape  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  necessary  exis- 
tence. Can  any  one  hope  to  be  thought  knowing  who 
shall  contend,  that  the  necessarily  existing  substance  is 
sjfjnnre  or  circular,  or  of  what  other  figure  soever  you 
chuse?  We  shall  search  the  world  in  vain,  for  a 
greater  absurdity  than  what  such  a  position  sets  forth. 

§.  23.  Virtue  cannot  he  without  substance, — It  may  be 
laid  down  as  one  of  those  truths  which  admit  of  no  con- 
tradiction, that,  with  regard  to  the  uncreated  substance, 
at  least,  virtue  cannot  be  without  substance.  Speaking 
of  this  substance,  Sir  Isaac  Newton  hath  these  words  : 
"  OmniprcBsens  est  non  per  Virtutem  solam,  sedetiam  per 
substantiam  :  nam  virtus  sine  substantia  subsistere  non 


DIVISION  III. 


31 


potest,''     Newton.  Princip.   Mathemat.  Schol.  general. 

sub  finem. 

S.  24.  Tlierefore  the  necessary  substance  must  be  of 
equal  extent  with  matter,— li,  then,  the  necessarily  exist- 
ing substance  created  the  material  universe ;  (and  to 
deny  this,  were  just  to  deny  there  is  a  necessary  sub- 
stance, the  cause  of  all  things;)  as  without  substance 
virtue  cannot  subsist,  the  necessarily  existing  substance, 
must  be,  at  the  least,  of  equal  extension  with  the  material 
universe :  (for  matter,  if  created,  can  be  of  no  more  than 
finite  extension.) 

§.  25.  It  follows,  secondly,  that  the  necessary  substance 
is  divisible,— Then,  from  this  hypothesis  it  follows,  in 
the  second  place,  that  the  necessarily  existing  substance 
is  divisible :  for  a  limited  substance,  a  substance  of  as 
great  extension  as  the  material  universe,  at  least,  may 
be  conceived  divided,  to  wit,  the  parts  of  it  removed  to 

different  parts  of  space. 

§.  26.  But  divisibility  incompatible  icith  necessary  ex- 
istence.—l^ow,  to  predicate  divisibility  of  a  substance, 
is  equal  to  saying,  it  has  no  necessary  existence.     For, 
'tis  as  clear  as  any  truth  can  be,  that  to  suppose  a  sub- 
stance divided,  is  no  less  than  to  suppose  it  annihilated 
as  one  substance.     And  nothing  is  so  impossible  as  this, 
that  the  necessarily  existing  substance  should  be  anni- 
hilated.    For  that  this  substance  may  be  made  to  cease 
to  be,  is  a  position  which  amounts  to  this,  that  a  sub- 
stance, to  suppose  the  non-existence  of  which  is  a  con- 
tradiction, may  yet  be  supposed  non-existent.     Which 
absurdity  following  from  the  hypothesis,  that  the  necess- 
arily existing  substance  is  of  finite  extension  only ;  'tis 
plain,  that  hypothesis  must  be  absurd. 


32 


INTRODUCTION. 


§,27.  21ie  very  supposition  of  a  necessary  substance 
being  onhj  of  finite  extent  as  absurd  as  aught  implied  in  it, 
— But  indeed,  it  were  needless  to  show,  by  all  that  is 
implied  in  the  existence  of  a  substance  of  finite  exten- 
sion only,  that  the  supposition  of  such  a  substance  ne- 
cessarily being,  is  an  absurdity.  For  the  supposition, 
without  the  least  regard  to  what  it  implies,  is,  itself,  as 
absurd  as  any  thing  can  be.  This  cannot  be  better 
shown  than  in  Dr,  Samuel  Clarke's  words  :  "  To  suppose 
Matter,  or  any  Other  Sul)stance,  Necessarihj-existing  in 
a  Finite  determinate  Quantity ;  in  an  Inch-Cube,  for  in- 
stance ;  or  in  Any  certain  number  of  Cube-Inches,  and 
no  more;  is  exactly  the  same  Absurdity,  as  supposing  it 
to  exist  Necessarily,  and  yet  for  a  Finite  Duration  only: 
Which  every  one  sees  to  be  a  plain  Contradiction." 
Third  Letter  to  Joseph  Butler,  afterwards  Bishop  of 
Durham* 

•  The  system  of  the  Anthropomorphites,  which  gives  to  the  neces- 
sarily existing  substance  the  figure  of  a  man,  because  it  is,  somehow, 
supposed,  that  substance  must  be  of  some  form,  and  a  human  figure  is 
esteemed  the  most  perfect,— at  least,  the  best  adapted  for  a  necessary 
substance ;  this  system,  besides  that  it  is  chargeable  with  all  the  ab- 
surdities which  follow  from  the  hypothesis,  that  the  necessarily  existing 
substance  is  of  finite  extension  only;  is  attended  with  absurdities  which 
seem  peculiar  to  itself.  These  not  being  consequences  of  that  hypo- 
thesis ?rierelt/t  they  with  no  propriety  fall  to  be  considered  here. 

The  absurdities  which  are  alluded  to,  some,  at  least,  of  these  ab- 
surdities, are,  Jirst,  That  the  necessarily  existing  substance  is  material. 
For  how  can  pure  spirit  have  the  form  of  a  man  ?  And  new  absurdities 
follow  from  the  absurdity  which  makes  the  necessary  substance,  a  ma- 
terial substance  in  human  form.  But  to  what  purpose  the  labour  of 
bringing  them  to  light  ?  Secoiidbj,  It  seems  to  be  urged  with  force, 
that  the  human  form  evinces  marks  of  design.  And,  'tis  a  good  infer- 
ence, surely,  that  because  man  exhibits,  in  his  shape,  marks  of  designi 


DIVISION  III. 


33 


§.  28.  Third  hypothesis  must  therefore  he  true, — The 
third  hj-pothesis,  then,  must  be  true  :  to  wit,  that  the 
necessarily  existing  substance,  the  intelligent  cause  of 
all  things,  is  infinitely  extended.*  To  deny,  therefore, 
that  there  is  an  infinitely  extended  substance,  is  to  de- 
ny, that  there  is  a  necessarily  existing  substance.  And 
to  deny  this  were  downright  Atheism. 

§.  29.  We  may  push  the  matter  a  little  farther. 
Have  we  any  idea  of  a  necessarily  existing  substance 
beyond  what  is  implied  by  an  eternal  substance  ?  If  we 
have,  to  what  doth  that  farther  idea  amount  ? 

§.  30.  So  that  if  to  deny  there  is  an  infinitely  ex- 
tended substance,  be  to  deny  there  is  a  necessarily 
existing  substance ;  to  maintain,  there  is  no  infinitely 
extended  substance,  is  to  maintain  there  is  no  eternal 

substance. 

§.  31.  Since  these  are  the  sad  consequences  of  de- 
nying that  the  necessarily  existing  substance,  the  intel- 
ligent cause  of  all  things,  is  infinitely  extended,  is  there 
not  good  reason  that  men  should  pause  before  they 
express  a  doubt  upon  the  matter  ?    Strange  things  may, 

therefore  a  substance,  not  a  man,  but  like  a  man,  contains  also  marks 
of  design.  This  inference  valid,  a  substance  of  that  nature,  so  far  from 
being  the  first  cause,  would  afford  evidence  that  itself  was  created;  and 
we  might  rationally  set  about  inquiring  into  the  cause  of  the  existence. 
*  The  common  sentiment  of  Theologians,  that  the  necessary  sub- 
stance, is,  at  the  same  time,  in  every  point  of  space,  and  every  atom  of 
matter,  entire,  is,  so  far  as  the  opinion  is  intelligible  at  all,  just  this  third 
hypothesis,  that  the  necessary  substance  is  infinitely  extended  :  Though, 
'tis  true,  all  extension  is  denied  to  that  substance.  For  to  say  that  the 
same  substance  is  in  different  parts  of  extension,  at  once,  without  being 
extended,  is  no  more  absurd  than  to  say,  extension,  itself,  is  not 
extended. 


34 


INTRODUCTION. 


at  first,  be  thought  to  attach  themselves  to  the  doctrine : 
But  nothhicv  tends  so  effectually  to  destroy  a  prejudice 
as  inquiring  into  its  foundation. 


ARGUMENT,  &c. 


» 


AN  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI, 


FOR 


THE  BEING  AND  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD. 


BOOK  I. 
PART  I. 


Proposition   I.     Infinity   of  Extension   is  necessarily 

existing* 

§.  1.  For  even  when  the  mind  endeavours  to  re- 
move from  it  the  idea  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  it 
cannot,  after  all  its  efforts,  avoid  leaving  still  there, 
the  idea  of  such  infinity.  Let  there  he  ever  so  much 
endeavour  to  displace  this  idea,  that  is,  conceive  Infi- 
nity of  Extension  non-existent ;  every  one,  hy  a  review, 
or  reflex  examination  of  his  own  thoughts,  will  find,  it 
is  utterly  heyond  his  power  to  do  so. 

§.  2.  Now,  since  even  when  we  would  remove  In- 
finity of  Extension  out  of  our  mind,  we  prove,  it  must 
exist  by  necessarily  leaving  the  thought  of  it  behind, 
or,  by  substituting,  (so  to  speak,)  Infinity  of  Extension 
for  Infinity  of  Extension  taken  away ;  from  this,  it  is 
manifest,  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  existing : 


/ 


38 


ARGUMENT 


PART  I. 


For,  every  thing  the  existence  of  which  we  cannot  hut 
believe,  which  we  alwaijs  suppose,  even  though  we 
2vould  not,  is  necessarily  existing. 

§.  3.  To  deny  that  Infinity  of  Extension  exists,  is, 
therefore,  an  utter  contradiction.  Just  as  much  a  con- 
tradiction as  this,  1.  is  equal  to  1.  therefore,  1.  is  not 
equal  to  1.  but  to  2.:  2.  not  being  identical  with  1.* 
As  thus :  Infinity  of  Extension  is  ever  present  to  the 
mind,  though  we  desire  to  banish  it ;  therefore,  it  can 
be  removed  from  the  mind.  This  is  just  an  application 
of  the  greatest  of  all  contradictions,  A  thing  can  be, 
and  not  be,  at  the  same  time. 


Proposition  II.      Lifinitij  of  Extension  is  necessarily 

indivisible, 

§.  1.    That  is,    its  parts  are  necessarily  indivisible 

from  each  other. 

§.  2.  Indivisible  in  this  proposition  means  indivisible 
either  really  or  mentally :  For  there  can  be  no  objection 
to  a  real,  which  does  not  apply  to  a  mental  divisibility; 
and  a  mental  divisibility,  we  are  under  the  necessity  of 
supposing,  implies  an  actual  divisibility,  of  Infinity  of 

Extension. 

§.  3.  The  parts,  then,  of  Infinity  of  Extension 
are  necessarily   indivisible  from  each    other  really  or 

mentally. 

§.  4.  For  that   which  is   divisible  really,  may  be  di- 

•  A  contradiction  which  we  can  no  more  believe  than  that  1.  is  equal 
to  1.  therefore  1.  is  not  equal  to  1.  &c. 


PROP.  II. 


BOOK   I. 


39 


vided   really:  and   a  thing  which  is  actually  divided 
from  another  must  have   superficies  of  its  own,  every 
way,   and   be    removed   or    separated  from   that    other 
thing,  be  it  by  ever  so  little  a  distance.     If  any  one 
should  say  that  things  really  divided  from  each  other 
have  not  real  superficies  of  their  own,  every  way ;  to 
be  able   to  believe  him,   we   must  first  be  able  to  be- 
lieve this,  that  a  thing  can  be,  and  not  be,  at  the  same 
time  :    And  if  any   one  should  say  that  things  which 
are  really  divided  from  each  other,  which  have  real 
superficies  of  their  own  every  way,    can  possibly   be 
conceived  without  a  certain   distance,  however  little, 
being  between  them ;  as  this,  it  could  as  soon  be  be- 
lieved that  "in  a  good  syllogism  of  the  first  figure,  the 
conclusion    does  not  necessarily  follow  from   the  pre- 
mises.     Being  really  divided,   and  being  really  separ- 
ated, mean,  thus,  the  same  thing.* 

§.  5.  Now,  divisibility  meaning  possibility  of  separa- 
tion: As  it  is  an  utter  contradiction  to  say,  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension can  be  separated  ;  that  is,  a  part  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  separated,  by  a  certain  distance, /ro/w  Infinity 
of  Extension;  there  remaining  Infinity  of  Extension  after 
part  of  it  is  taken  away :  the  part  of  Infinity  of  Extension 
so  removed,  being  removed  from  the  remaining  parts 
to  these  very  same  parts ;  the  part,  thus,  being  at  rest  ivhile 
it  is  taken  away ;  the  part  so  moved  away,  being  moved 

•  A  division  by  mathematical  lines,  (which  are  lines  of  length  with- 
out  breadth,)  of  the  real  existence  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  does  not  in- 
fer a  greater  absurdity  than  a  division  of  a  mathematical  line  by  some- 
thing really  existing:  if  the  division  by  mathematical  lines  mean  any 
thing  more  than  a  partial  apprehension  or  consideration  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension :  which  is  allowed  to  be  possible,  just  as  it  is  possible  to  con- 
sider length  without  breadth,  or  depth  without  breadth  or  length. 


i 


/ 


40 


ARGUMENT 


PART  I. 


SLwajfrom  itself;  it  still  remaining,  inasmuch  as  there  is 
necessarily  Infinity  of  Extension  ;*  that  is,  though  moved 
awai/y  being  not  moved  away :  Which  could  not  be,  unless 
it  be  false,  that  ivhatever  is^  is  :  As  it  is,  thus,  an  utter 
contradiction  to  say  Infinity  of  Extension  can  be  sepa- 
rated, so  it  is  an  utter  contradiction  to  say  it  is  not 
indivisible. 

§.  6.  The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being  ne- 
cessarily indivisible  from  each  other ;  it  is  a  necessary 
consequence^  that  that,  the  parts  of  which  are  divisible  from 
each  other,  is  not  Infinity  of  Extension;  nor  any 
part  of  it :  part,  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration 
only,  for  otherwise  Infinity  of  Extension  can  have  no 
parts.^ 

§.  7.  Indeed,  that  divisibility  implies  Jiniteness  in 
extension,  in  the  very  notion  of  it,  will  be  evident  to 
every  one  who  considers  the  relations  of  his  clear  ideas. 


Corollary /rom  Proposition  II.     Infinity  of  Extension 

is  necessarily  immoveable, 

§.  1.  Tliat  is,  its  parts  are  necessarily  immoveable 
among  themselves. 

§.  2.  For,  motion  of  parts  supposes,  of  necessity, 
separation  of  the  parts.  He  who  does  not  see  that  mo- 
tion of  parts  supposes,  of  necessity,  separation  of  the  parts, 
need  never  be  expected  to  see  that  because  every  A.  is 
equal  to  B.  therefore  some  B.  is  equal  to  A.  And  In- 
finity of  Extension  being  necessarily  incapable  of  sc- 


^  Prop.  L  §.  2. 


§.5. 


PROP.   III. 


BOOK  r. 


41 


paration,*  is,  therefore,  necessarily  immoveable,  that  is, 
its  parts  are  necessarily  immoveable  among  themselves. 
§.  3.  The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being  ne- 
cessarily immoveable  among  themselves ;  it  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence,  that  that,  the  parts  of  which  are 
moveable  among  themselves,  is  not  Infinity  of  Extension ; 
nor  any  part  of  it :  part,  in  the  sense  of  partial  con- 
sideration only,  for  otherwise  Infinity  of  Extension  can 

have  no  parts.* 

§.  4.  Indeed,  if  this,  that  divisibility  im^Xies  finiteness 
in  extension,  in  the  very  notion  of  it,  will  be  evident  to 
every  one  who  considers  the  relations  of  his  clear 
ideas  ;^  motion  implying  divisibility,''  it  is  evident  that 
motion  must  imply  finiteness  in  extension,  in  the  very 
notion  of  it,  to  every  one  who  considers  the  relations 
of  his  clear  ideas. 


Proposition    III.      Tliere  is  necessarily   a   Being    of 

Infinity  of  Extension. 

§.  I.  For,  either,  Infinity  of  Extension  subsists,  or, 
(which  is  the  same  thing,)  we  conceive  it  to  subsist, 
without  a  support  or  substratum :  or,  it  subsists  not,  or 
we  conceive  it  not  to  subsist,  without  a  support  or  sub- 
stratum. 

§.  2.  First,  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist  without 
a  substratum,  then,  it  is  a  substance.  And  if  any  one 
sliould  deny,  that  it  is  a  substance,  it  so  subsisting ;  to 
prove,  beyond  contradiction,  the  utter  absurdity  of  such 

'^  Prop.  II.  §.  5.         Prop.  II,  §.  7.        '  §.  2. 


4-2 


ARGUMENT 


TART  r. 


denial,  we  have  but  to  defy  him  to  show,  ivhy  Infinity  of 
Extension  is  not  a  substance,  so  far  forth  as  it  can  sub- 
sist by  itself,  or  without  a  substratum, 

§.  3.  As,  therefore,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  deny  that 
Infinity  of  Extension  exists,*  so  there  is,  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  its  being  able  to  subsist  without  a  substratum, 
a  substance  or  beiny  of  Infinity  of  Extension  necessarily 
existing:  Tho'  Infinity  of  Extension  and  the  being  of 
Infinity  of  Extension,  are  not  different,  as  standing  to 
each  other  in  the  relation  of  mode  and  subject  of  the 
mode,  but  are  idc7iticaL 

§.  4.  Secondly,  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist  not 
without  a  Substratum,  then,  it  being  a  contradiction  to 
deny  there  is  Infinity  of  Extension,""  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  deny  there  is  a  Substratum  to  it. 

§.  5.  Whether  or  not  men  will  consent  to  call  this 
Substratum  Substance  or  Beiny,  is  of  very  little  con- 
sequence. For,  'tis  certain  that  the  word  Substance  or 
Beiny,  has  never  been  employed,  can  never  be  employ- 
ed, to  stand  for  any  thing  more,  at  least,  than  the  Sub- 
stratum of  Infinity  of  Extension.  But  to  refuse  to  give 
such  Substratum  that  name,  beiny  a  thing  obviously  most 
unreasonable,  let  us  call  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension,  by  the  name  Substance  or  Being, 

§.  6.  There  is,  then,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Extension. 

*  Prop:  I.  §.  3. 


PROP.   IV, 


BOOK  I. 


43 


Proposition  IV.   The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension 
is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity, 

§.  1.  Because  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  in- 
divisible,^ therefore  it  is  of  the  truest  unity.  For  to 
affirm  that  tho'  it  is  necessarily  indivisible,  even  so  much 
as  by  thought,  vet  it  is  not  of  the  truest  unity,  is  to  af- 
firm what  is  no  more  intelligible  than  would  be  the  as- 
sertion, that  a  circle,  this  being  a  figure  contained  by 
one  line,  with  every  part  of  that  line  or  circumference 
equally  distant  from  a  certain  point,  is  not  round, 

§.  2.  And  as  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  of  the 
truest  unity,  so  it  is  necessarily  of  the  iitmost  simplici- 
ty. What  more  can  be  included  in  simplicity  than  is 
implied  in  unity  caused  by  a  thing  being  necessarily  in- 
divisible, we  can  have  no  conception. 

§.  3.   And  as,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension subsists  by  itself,  there  is  necessarily  a  being  of 
Infinity  of  Extension,^  so,  this  supposed,  that  being  is 
necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§.  4.  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist  not  without  a 
Substratum;  that  we  cannot,  without  an  express  con- 
tradiction, deny,  that  the  Substratum  is  of  the  truest 
unity,  and  utmost  simplicity,  may  be  most  easily  de- 
monstrated. 

§.  5.  For  it  is  intuitively  evident,  that  the  Substratum 
of  Infinity  of  Extension  can  be  no  more  divisible  than 
Infinity  of  Extension  itself.  If  any  one  should  affirm 
that  tho'  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  indivisible, 
yet  that  its  Substratum  can  be  considered  as  divisible, 


■  Prop  ■.  II.  §.  5. 


^  Prop  :  III.  §.  3. 


44 


ARGUMENT 


PART  I. 


we  could  no  more  assent  to  the  proposition  than  we 
could  believe  that  a  subject  can  never  be  truly  predi- 
cated of  itself.  And,  therefore,  as  Infinity  of  Extension 
is  necessarily  indivisible,^  so  is  its  Substratum. 

§.6.  A'  ^  I  niiity  of  Extension  being  necessarily  of 
unity  and  simplicity  because  necessarily  indivisible,'*  it8 
Substratum  is  so  likewise,  for  the  same  reason. 

§.  7.  And  as,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension subsists  not  without  a  Substratum,  there  is  ne- 
cessarily a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension,*^  so,  this  sup- 
posed, that  Being  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§.  8.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessari- 
ly, then,  of  unity  and  simplicity, 

§.  9.  The  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being 
necessarily  indivisible,^  that  is,  its  parts  being  neces- 
sarily indivisible  from  each  other  :  It  is  a  corollary, 
that  its  parts  {parts^  in  the  sense  of  partial  consid- 
eration only,**)  are  necessarily  immoveable  among  them- 
selves :  For  the  same  reason  that  Infinity  of  Extension 
is  necessarily  immoveable  because  necessarily  indivisible. 

§.  10.  Therefore,  that,  the  parts  of  which  are  divisi- 
ble from  each  other,  is  not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension,  nor  any  part  of  it :  And,  that,  the  parts  of 
which  are  moveable  among  themselves,  is  not  the  Sub- 
stratum, nor  any  part  of  it :  Part  in  the  sense  of  par- 
tial consideration  only.^ 

»  Prop  :  II.  S.  ^'     "  §.  I.  &  2.     "  Prop  .  lU.  §  4.  &  5.    *"  §•  5. 


PROP.   IV. 


BOOK.  I. 


45 


Scholium  L— §.  1.  If,  then,  it  should  be  maintained, 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  tlie  Substratum  of  Infinity 
of  Extension ;  (which  will  be  maintained,  as  is  most  evi- 
dent, if  it  be  contended  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
of  Infinity  of  Extension;)  to  put  to  the  proof,  whether 
or  not  the  Material  Universe  can  be  such  Substratum, 
we  have  but  to  ask.  Are  the  parts  of  the  Material  Uni- 
verse divisible  from  each  other  ?  and.  Are  they  move- 
able among  themselves  ?  For,  if  they  be  so  divisible,  if 
so  moveable,  then  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension.^ 

§.  2  Now,  we  know,  of  a  certainty,  that  some  parts  of 
the  Material  Universe  are  divisible  from  each  other;  and, 
as  far  as  we  know,  every  part  of  it  to  which  our  mind 
could  be  directed  is  as  divisible,  as  are  the  parts  which 
we  certainly  know  are  divisible :  and  this  is  the  conclu- 
sion to  which,  by  the  rules  of  philosophy,  we  are  en- 
titled to  come. 

§.  3.  Therefore,  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 

§.  4.  Again,  we  are  certain,  that  some  parts  of  the 
Material  Universe  are  moveable  among  themselves  ;  and, 
that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our  mind  could  be  direct- 
ed is  as  moveable,  as  are  the  parts  which  we  certainly 
know  are  moveable,  is,  (here,  as  in  the  other  case,) 
what  we  are  entitled  to  conclude. 

§.  5.  Therefore,  again,  the  Material  Universe  cannot 
be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 

§.  6.  And,  if,  because  the  parts  of  the  Material  Uni- 
verse are  divisible  from  each  other,  it  is  proved  that  it  is 


Prop  :  IV.  §  10. 


46 


ARGUMENT 


PART    I. 


not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  ;  then,  be- 
cause the  parts  of  the  Material  Universe  are  divisible 
from  each  other,  and  moveable  among  themselves,  it  is 
proved,  much  more,  (if  that  were  possible,)  that  the 
Material  Universe  is  not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension.  It  is  proved  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension ;  nor  any 
part  thereof,  for  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Exten- 
sion can  have  no  parts  but  in  the  sense  of  partial  con- 
sideration :*  that  is,  that  the  Material  Universe  is  finite 
in  extension.  For  were  it  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  it 
would  be  the  Substratum  thereof.  But  it  being  not  that 
Substratum  :  Therefore,  it  is  not  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension. 

§.  7.  The  Material  Universe,  then,  is  finite  in  ex- 
tension. 


Scholium  II. — §.  1.  The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Exten- 
sion, or  of  its  Substratum,  if  it  have  a  Substratum,  be- 
ing" necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other,^  and  im- 
moveable among  themselves  :*^  and  the  parts  of  the  Ma- 
terial Universe  being  divisible  from  each  other,  and 
moveable  among  themselves  :  and  it,  therefore,  following 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  not  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Extension,  but  is  finite  in  extension  :  Here 
are  two  sorts  of  extension.  The  one  sort,  that 
which  the  Material  Universe  has :  And  the  other,  the 
extension  of  Infinity  of  Extension.  And  as  Infinity  of 
Extension  is  necessarily  existing,'^  and  as  the  extension 

=»  Prop  :   IV.  §.  5.       f  Prop  :  II.  §.  5.  &  Prop :  IV.  §.  5.  •  CoroU  : 
from  Prop:  II.  §.  2.  &  Prop  •.  IV.  §.  9.     ^  p^op  :  I.  §.  2. 


PROP.  v. 


BOOK  I. 


47 


of  the  Material  Universe  must  exist,  if  it  exist,  in  the 
extension  of  Infinity  of  Extension ;  a  part  of  this,  or  of 
its  Substratum,  if  it  have  a  Substratum,  (part,  but  in 
the  sense  of  partial  consideration;^)  must  penetrate  the 
Material  Universe,  and  every  atom,  even  the  minutest 

atom,  of  it. 

§.  2.  It  will  be  proper,  therefore,  to  distinguish  be- 
tween these  two  kinds  of  extension.  And,  according- 
ly, let  us  confine  to  matter,  namely,  to  the  distance  of 
the  extremities  of  matter  from  each  other,  the  name  ex- 
tension ;  and  apply  to  the  extension  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension, a  part  of  which,  (part,  but  in  the  sense  of  par- 
tial consideration,^)  penetrates  all  matter  to  the  minutest 
atom,  the  name  Expansion, 

§.  3.  And,  therefore,  every  thing  which  hath  been 
proved  to  be  true  in  relation  to  that  extension  which 
matter  has  not,  must  be  true  with  regard  to  Expansion. 


Proposition  V.   There  is  necessarily  but  one  Being  of 

Infinity  of  Expansion, 

§.  1.  For  Infinity  of  Expansion  either  subsists  by  it- 
self, or  it  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum.''  In  both 
cases  there  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan- 
sion.'* Now,  we  are  under  a  necessity  of  inferring  from 
the  existence  of  such  a  Being,  that  there  is  but  one  such 
Being, 

^  Prop:  II.  §.  5.  &  Prop  :  IV.  §.  5.  ^  Prop:  II.  §.  5.  '  Prop  :  III.  §. 
1.  compared  with  Schol:  II.  §.  3.  '^  Prop:  III.  §.  3—4.  5.  &  Schol ; 
II   §.  3. 


48 


ARGUMENT 


PART  I. 


§.  2.  For,  as  *tis  evident,  there  can  he  but  one  Infinity 
of  Expansion^  so,  on  the  supposition  that  it  subsists  by 
itself,  and  so  is  a  being,*  there  can  be  but  one  being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion.  And,  as  'tis  evident  there  can 
no  more  be  more  than  one  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
pansion, (whatever  that  Substratum  is,)  than  there  can 
be  more  than  one  Infinity  of  Expansion;  and  as,  there- 
iuiL,  'tis  evident,  there  can  be  but  one  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion:  so,  on  the  supposition  that  In- 
finity of  Expansion  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum, 
or  Being,^  there  can  be  but  one  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion. 

§.  3.  And,  therefore,  any  one  that  asserts  he  can 
suppose  two  or  more  necessarily  existing  beings,  each 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  is  no  more  to  be  argued  with 
■^vm  one  that  denies.  Whatever  is,  is.  The  denying  of 
this  proposition  cannot,  indeed,  be  regarded  as  more 
curious  than  the  afiirming  of  the  other. 

§.  4.  There  is  then,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Expansion. 

•  Prop:  III.  §.  3.  &  Schol :  II.  §.  3.    ^  Prop:  III.  §.  *.  a.  & 

Schol :  II.  §.  3. 


PART.  II. 


BOOK  I. 


49 


PART  II. 


Proposition  I.     Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily 

existing, 

§.  1  The  truth  of  this  is  evident  from  the  same  sort 
of  consideration  as  shows  there  is  necessarily  Infinity  of 
Extension ;  to  wit,  that  even  when  we  endeavour  to 
remove  from  our  mind  the  idea  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
we  cannot,  after  all  our  efforts,  avoid  leaving  this  idea 
still  there.  Endeavour  as  much  as  we  may  to  displace 
the  idea,  that  is,  conceive  Infinity  of  Duration  non-ex- 
istent, we  shall  find,  after  a  review  of  our  thoughts,  that 
to  do  so  is  utterly  beyond  our  power. 

§.  2.  And  since,  even  when  we  would  remove  In- 
finity of  Duration  from  the  mind,  we  necessarily  leave 
the  thought  of  it  behind,  or  substitute,  (as  it  were,)  In- 
finity of  Duration  for  Infinity  of  Duration  taken  away ; 
'tis  manifest  that  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  ex- 
isting :  Because,  (as  already  said,)  every  thing  the  ex- 
istence of  which  we  cannot  Z>m#  believe,  which  we  ahvays 
suppose^  even  though  we  would  not,  is  necessarily  exist- 
ing. 


D 


50 


ARGUMENT 


rAUt  II. 


Proposition  II.   Injinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily/ 
•  indivisible, 

§.  1.  To  wit,  its  parts  are  necessarily  indivisible  from 
each  other  :  indivisible  really  or  mentally. 

§.  2.  For,  (as  laid  down  before,)  what  is  divisible 
may  be  divided  ;  and  that  which  is  divided  from  some- 
thing else  must  have  superjicies,  every  way,  and  be  se- 
parated from  the  other  thing,  be  the  distance  ever  so 
small :— There  is  no  difference  between  being  divided 
and  being  separated. 

§.  3.  Then  divisibility  meaning  possibility  of  separa- 
tion :  Because  the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Duration  are  ne- 
cessarily inseparable,  they  are  necessarily  indivisible. 


Corollary  from  Proposition  11.  Jjifinity  of  Dura- 
tion is  necessarily  immoveable, 

§.  1.  To  wit,  its  parts  are  necessarily  immoveable 
among  themselves. 

§.  2.  For  motion  of  the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
necessarily  supposes  separation  of  its  parts.  And  its 
parts  being  necessarily  incapable  of  separation,^  are, 
therefore,  necessarily  immoveable  among  themselves. 

«  Part  n.  Prop.  II.  §.  3. 


PROP.  III. 


BOOK  I. 


51 


Proposition  III.      There  is  necessarily  a  Being  of 

Infinity  of  Duration, 

§.  1.  For,  either^  Infinity  of  Duration  exists,  or  is  con- 
ceived to  exist,  without  a  substratum :  or,  it  exists  not, 
or  is  conceived  not  to  exist,  without  a  substratum. 

§.  2.  And  if  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  not  without  a 
substratum,  this,  itself,  exists  without  a  substratum  : 
For  which  no  other  reason  need  be  assigned  but  this, 
that  what  can  be  meant  bv  the  substratum  of  the  Sub- 
stratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  is  quite  beyond  our 
comprehension. 

§.  3.  First,  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  by  itself,  it  is 
a  substance.  For  should  any  one  deny  that  it  is  a  su))- 
stance,  if  it  so  exist ;  we  shall  prove,  past  contradiction, 
the  absurdity  of  the  denial  by  just  demanding,  what  is 
the  reason  why  Infinity  of  Duration  is  not  a  substance 
if  it  exist  without  a  substratum^  or  by  itself 

§.  4.  And,  therefore,  as  there  is  necessarily  Infinity 
of  Duration,"^  there  is,  supposing  it  to  exist  by  itself,  a 
substance  or  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  necessarily  ex- 
isting :  Infinity  of  Duration  and  the  being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  being  identical^  not  different, 

§.  5.  Secondly,  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  not  with- 
out a  Substratum,  there  is  a  Substance  or  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Duration.  For  the  word  Substance  or  Being 
can  never,  it  is  certain,  stand  for  any  thing  more,  at  least, 
than  such  Substratum. 

§  6.  And  as  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  exist- 
ing,*  so   there  is  necessarily  a   Substance  or  Being  of 

"Part  II.  Prop.  1.  §.  2. 


52 


ARGUMENT 


PART  II. 


Infinity  of  Duration,  on  the  supposition  that  it  exists 
not  without  a  Suhstratum. 

§  7.  There  is  necessarily,  then,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration. 


Proposition  IV.    The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is 
necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity, 

§  1.  As  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  indivisi- 
ble,* so  it  is  necessarily  of  the  truest  unity.  For,  if 
what  is  necessarily  indivisible,  even  by  thought,  be  not 
of  the  truest  unity,  what  unity  consists  in  is  altogether 

unintelligible. 

§  2.  And  because  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily 
of  the  truest  unity,  it  is,  also,  of  the  utmost  simplicity. 
We  can  have  no  conception,  (as  has  been  already  said,) 
of  what  is  in  simplicity  that  is  not  in  unity  caused  by 
a  thing  being  necessarily  indivisible. 

§  3.  And  as  there  necessarily  is  a  being  of  Infinity 
of  Duration,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion exists  without  a  substratum,^  so,  this  supposed,  the 
being  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  4.  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  not  without  a  Sub- 
stratum ;  that  the  Substratum  is  of  the  truest  unity  and 
utmost  simplicity,  is  a  thing  not  difficult  to  be  demon- 
strated. 

§  5.  For  that  the  substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration 
is  no  more  divisible  than  Infinity  of  Duration,  is  a  self- 

«  Part  II.  Prop  :  II.  §  3.  ^  Part  II.  Prop.  III.  S  4. 


PROP.   IV, 


BOOK  I. 


53 


evident  truth.  Therefore,  because  Infinity  of  Duration 
is  necessarily  indivisible,*  so  is  the  substratum. 

§  6.  And  Infinity  of  Duration,  because  necessarily 
indivisible,  being  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity,^  its 
substratum,  for  the  same  reason,  is  so  likewise. 

§  7.  And  as  there  necessarily  is  a  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Duration,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion exists  not  without  a  Substratum,*^  so,  this  supposed, 
the  Being  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  8.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  then,  ne- 
cessarily of  unity  and  simjMcity, 

§  9.  The  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration  being 
necessarily  indivisible,'*  that  is,  its  parts  being  neces- 
sarily indivisible  from  each  other,  it  is  a  necessary  conse- 
quence, that  the  thing,  the  parts  of  which  are  divisible  from 
each  other,  is  not  such  Substratum,  nor  any  part  thereof. 

§  10.  It  is  a  corollary  from  the  proposition.  The 
parts  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration  are  ne- 
cessarily indivisible  from  each  other,  that  they  are  ne- 
cessarily immoveable  among  themselves  :  For  the  same 
reason  that  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  immove- 
able, because  necessarily  indivisible. 

§  11.  And  the  parts  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  being  necessarily  immoveable  among  them- 
selves; it  is  a  necessary  consequence,  that  the  thing,  the 
parts  of  which  are  moveable  among  themselves,  is  not  such 
Substratum,  nor  any  part  thereof. 


Scholium  I. — §  1.  If,  then,  it  should  be  contended, 


Part  II.  Prop  .  II.  §  3.  ^  §  1  &  2.   '  Part  II.  Prop.  III.  §  6.    ^  §  5. 


54 


ARGUMENT 


TART    II. 


that  a  Succession  of  Beings  finite  in  extension ;  finite  in 
extension,  for  a  Succession  of  Beings  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
tension were  we  know  not  what ;  is  the  Substratum  ot 
Infinity  of  Duration,  or  any  part  thereof;  (which  will 
be  contended,  if  it  be  maintained  that  any  Succession 
of  Beings  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration.     For,  if  any  Suc- 
cession of  Beings  be  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  then,  Infi- 
nity of  Duration  cannot  he  without  the  succession.     And, 
'tis  utterly  impossible  to  conceive  any  reason  why  we 
can  have  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion cannot  be  without  a  Succession  of  Beings,  but  this, 
because  the  Succession  is  the  Substratum  thereof,  or,  at 
least,   a  part  of  the  Substratum.)      If  it  be  contended 
that  a  Succession  of  Beings  is  the  Substratum  of  Infinity 
of  Duration,  or  a  part  thereof;  to  put  to  the  proof 
whether   or  not  such  a  Succession   can  be  that  Sub- 
stratum, or  any  part  of  it,  we  have  but  to  ask.  Are  the 
parts  of  the  Succession  divisible  from  each  other  ?  and. 
Are  they  moveable  among  themselves  ?    For  if  they  be 
so  divisible  and  moveable,  then  the  Succession  cannot 
be  the  substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any  part 
thereof,*   the  Substratum  having  no  parts  in  the  sense 
of  capability  of  separation.^ 

§  2.  Now,  'tis  as  clear  as  any  thing  can  be,  that  the 
parts  of  a  succession  of  beings  are  not  only  divisible, 
but  are  divided,  from  each  other, 

§  3.  Then,  no  succession  of  beings  can  be  the  Sub- 
stratum of  Infinity  of  Duration,  or  any  part  of  it. 

§  4.  Again,  'tis  clear,  that  the  parts  of  a  succession  of 
beings  are  not  only  moveable,  but  moved,  among  them- 
selves. 

»  Part  II.  Prop   IV.  §  0  &  11.        ''  Part  II,   Prop,  \\ .  §  5. 


PROP.  IV. 


BOOK.  I. 


55 


§  5.  Then,  no  succession  of  beings  can  be  the  Sub- 
stratum of  Infinity  of  Duration,  or  any  part  of  it. 

§  6.  That  is,  no  succession  of  beings  is  of  Infinity  of 
Duration.  For  were  a  succession  of  beings  of  Infinity 
of  Duration,  it  would  be  the  substratum  thereof,  or,  at 
least,  a  part  of  the  substratum.  But  it  being  not  that 
Substratum,  nor  any  part  of  it :  Therefore,  it  is  not  of 
Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  7.  Every  succession,  then,  of  beings  is  finite  in 
duration. 


Scholium  II. — §  1.  Again,  should  it  be  contended 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum  of  Infi- 
nity of  Duration,  or  any  part  thereof;  (which  will  be 
contended,  if  it  be  maintained  that  the  Material  Uni- 
verse is  of  Infinity  of  Duration :  For  the  same  reason  that 
it  will  be  contended,  that  a  Succession  of  Beings  is  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  or  a  part  thereof,  if 
it  be  maintained  that  any  Succession  of  Beings  is  of 
Infinity  of  Duration.)  Should  it  be  contended  that  the 
Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Du- 
ration, or  a  part  thereof;  to  put  to  the  proof  whether 
or  not  the  Material  Universe  can  be  such  Substratum, 
or  a  part  thereof,  we  have  but  to  ask,  Are  the  parts  of 
the  Material  Universe  divisible  from  each  other  ?  and. 
Are  they  moveable  among  themselves  ?  For  if  they  be 
so  divisible  and  moveable,  the  Material  Universe  can- 
not be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any 
part  thereof,*  the  Substratum  having  no  parts  in  the 
sense  of  capability  of  separation.^ 


Part  II.  Prop.  IV.  §  9&  11. 


Part  II.  Prop.  IV.  §  5. 


56 


ARGUMENT 


PART  II. 


§  2.  Now,  we  know^  certainly^  that  some  parts  of  the 
Material  Universe,  are  divisible  from  each  other ;  and 
that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our  mind  could  he  di- 
rected is  as  divisible,  as  are  the  parts  which  we  cer- 
tainly know  are  divisible,  is,  (as  already  said,)  the  con- 
clusion to  which  the  rules  of  philosophy  entitle  us  to 
come. 

§.  3.  Then,  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any  part 
thereof. 

§  4.  Again,  we  know,  certainly,  that  some  parts  of  the 
Material  Universe  are  moveable  among  themselves ;  and 
that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our  mind  could  be  di- 
rected is  as  moveable,  as  are  the  parts  which  we  cer- 
tainlv  know  are  moveable,  is,  (in  this,  as  well  as  in  the 
oiiicr  case,)  the  conclusion  to  which  we  are  entitled  to 
come. 

§  5.  Then,  again,  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be 
the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any  part 
thereof. 

§  6.  That  is,  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  dura- 
tion. For,  were  it  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  it  would  be 
the  substratum  thereof,  or,  at  least,  a  part  of  the  sub- 
stratum. But  it  being  not  that  Substratum,  nor  any  part 
of  it :   Therefore,  it  is  not  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  7.  The  Material  Universe  is,  then,  finite  in  dura- 
tion. 


I 


PROP.   v. 


BOOK  I. 


57 


Proposition  V.   There  is,  necessarily,  butoneBeingof 

Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  1.  For,  Infinity  of  Duration  either  exists  without 
a  substratum,  or,  it  exists  not  without  a  Substratum, 
which  itself  exists  without  a  substratum  :^  And  in  either 
case,  there  necessarily  is  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion, which  exists  without  a  Substratum.^  And  we  are 
under  the  necessity  of  inferring  from  the  existence  of 
such  a  Being,  that  there  can  be  no  more  than  one  such 
Being, 

§  2.  For,  because,  'tis  manifest  there  can  be  but  one  In- 
finity of  Duration,  therefore,  on  the  supposition,  that  it 
exists  without  a  substratum,  and,  so,  is  a  being, *^  there 
can  be  but  one  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration.  And 
because  'tis  as  manifest  there  can  be  but  one  Sub- 
stratum of  Infinity  of  Duration,  as  that  there  can  be  but 
one  Infinity  of  Duration,  and  because,  therefore,  'tis 
manifest  there  can  be  but  one  such  Substratum  :  there- 
fore, on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of  Duration  exists 
not  without  a  Substratum,  or  Being,^  there  can  be  but 
one  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  3.  But,  suppose,  that  from  the  truth,  that  there  is 
one  necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
which  exists  by  itself,  or  without  a  Substratum,  it  did 
not  follow,  that  there  can  be  but  one  such  Being.  Now, 
this  supposition  would  amount  to  this;  that  there  is 
one  necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration 


'^  Part  II.   Prop.  III.   §  1  &  2. 
"  Part  11.  Prop.  III.  §  4. 


*'  Part  II.  Prop.  III.  §  4  8:  6. 
'^  Part  II.  Prop.  III.  §  5. 


58 


ARGUMENT 


TAilT  II. 


which  exists  without  a  Substratum,  to  wit,  without 
any  other  Being  as  a  substratum — and  if  without  any 
other  Being  as  a  Substratum,  then,  much  more,  (if 
that  be  possible,)  without  any  other  Being,  if  this  be 
not  the  substratum  :  that  is,  without  any  other  Being 
at  all:  to  wit,  without  the  necessitij  o{  dxvj  other  Being 
at  all :  But,  that  there  may  be  another  necessarily  ex- 
isting Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  which  exists  with- 
out a  Substratum,  to  wit,  without  any  other  Being  as  a 
substratum— and  if  imthout  any  other  Being  as  a  sub- 
stratum, then,  much  more,  (if  that  be  possible,)  with- 
out any  other  Being,  if  this  be  not  the  substratum  :  that 
is,  without  any  other  Being,  at  all:  to  wit,  without  the 
necessitij  of  any  other  Being  at  all:  And  so  on:  Which 
would  be,  in  effect,  saying,  there  is  not  a  necessarily 
existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  at  all; — tho' 
there  is  a  necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Dura- 
tion. And  this  contradiction  following  from  the  sup- 
posing, that  from  the  proposition,  there  is  one  neces- 
sarily existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  which  ex- 
ists by  itself,  or  without  a  substratum,  it  did  not  fol- 
low, that  there  can  be  but  one  such  Being;  it  is 
proved,  that  the  supposition  is  absurd. 

§  4.  There  is,  then,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Duration. 


TART.  II r. 


BOOK  I. 


59 


PART  III. 

Proposition  I.    Tlicre  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  ofLifi- 
nity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration, 

§  1.  This  will  be  made  out,  if  it  be  proved,  that  the 
necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and 
the  necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
are  not  different  Beings,  but  are  identical. 

§  2.  Now,  either,  first,  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists 
by  itself,  and,  then,  it  is  a  being  :^  and.  Infinity  of  Du- 
ration subsists  by  itself,  and,  then,  it  is  a  being.^ 

§  3.  Or,  secondly.  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  not 
without  a  Substratum,  or  Being :  ^  and.  Infinity  of  Du- 
ration subsists  not  without  a  Substratum,  or  Being.'^ 

§  4.  First.  Every  part  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is  in 
every  part  of  Infinity  of  Duration  :  That  is,  every  part 
of  the  being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is  in  every  part 
of  the  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration :  Part^  in  all  the 
cases,  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration  only. 

§  5.  To  wit,  the  whole  of  the  being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  is  in  the  whole  of  the  being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  :  whole,  but  as  ^figure, 

§  6.  And  this  being,  most  manifestly,  impossible,  if 
the  being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  the  being  of  In- 


"  Part  I.  Prop.  III.  §  1  &  3.  compared  with  Schol.  II.  §  3.  ^  Part 
II.  Prop.  III.  §  1  &  4.  '  Part  I.  Prop.  III.  §  1  &  5.  &  Schol.  II.  §  .3. 
<"  Part  11.   Prop,  III.  §  I  k  b. 


60 


ARGUMENT 


PART  III. 


PROP.  II. 


BOOK  I. 


61 


finity  of  Duration  be  different ;  it  necessarily  follows, 
that  they  are  identical. 

§  7.  That  is,  on  this  supposition,  Infinity  of  Expan- 
sion is  Infinity  of  Duration,  and  Infinity  of  Duration  is 
Infinity  of  Expansion.  Which  conclusion  being  plainly 
absurd  ;  and  it  necessarily  following  from  the  supposi- 
tion, that  Injiniti/  of  Expansion  subsists  hxj  itself,  and, 
that  Infinity  of  Duration  subsists  by  itself  it  is  proved, 
that  the  supposition  itself  is  absurd.  Therefore,  Infi- 
nity of  Expansion  camiot  exist  by  itself,  and  Infinity  of 
Duration  cannot  exist  by  itself. 

§  8.  Then,  secondly,  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists 
not  without  a  Substratum  or  Being:  and  Infinity  of 
Duration  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum  or  Being. 

§  9.  And,  as  every  part  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is 
in  every  part  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  therefore,  every 
part  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  is  in 
every  part  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration : 
part,  but  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration. 

§  10.  That  is,  the  whole  of  the  Substratum  of  Infi- 
nity of  Expansion  is  in  the  whole  of  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Duration  :  ichole,  but  as  n  figure. 

§  11.  And  this  being^most  manifestly  impossible,  if 
the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and 
the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  be 
different,  it  follows  necessarily,  that  they  are  identical : 
To  wit,  the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
pansion is,  also,  the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity 
of  Duration. 

§  12.  And  this  being  proved,  it  is  made  out,  there  is. 


§  1. 


I 


necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and  In- 
finity of  Duration.* 

§  13.  There  is,  then,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 


Proposition  II.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and 
simplicity, 

§  1.  For  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is,  ne- 
cessarily, of  unity  and  simplicity.^  And,  the  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and  sim- 
plicity.^ And  these  two  being  not  different,  but  iden- 
tical,'^ it  follows,  that  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan- 
sion and  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity 

and  simplicity. 

§  2.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity 
of  Duration  is,  then,  necessarily,  of  unity  and  sim- 
plicity. 


Proposition  III.    There  is  necessarily  but  one  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration, 

§  1.  For  there  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  In- 


•  §  1.  ^  Part  I.  Prop.  IV.  §  8.  compared  with  Schol.  II.  §  3. 

^  Part  II.  Prop.  IV,  §  a     «»  Part  III.  Prop.  I.  §  H. 


62 


ARGUMENT 


PART  III. 


TART  I. 


BOOK  II. 


r>.'^ 


finity  of  Expansion.''  And  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
pansion being  also  tlio  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration^  it 
follows,  that  there  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  2.   There  is,  necessarily,  then,  hut  one  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 


Part  I.  Prop.  V.  §  4. 


»>  Part  III.  Prop  I.  §.    H. 


BOOK   II. 


PART  I. 


Proposition.  The  one,  simple,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  Duration  is,  necessarily,  Litelligent,  and 
All-knowing, 

§  1.  For  there  is  Intelligence.  And  Intelligence  either 
began  to  be,  or  it  never  began  to  be. 

§  2.  That  it  never  began  to  be,  is  evident  in  this,  that 
if  it  began  to  be,  it  must  have  had  a  cause ;  for  what- 
ever begins  to  he  must  have  a  cause.  And  the  cause  of 
Intelligence  must  be  of  Intelligence ;  for  what  is  not  of 
Intelligence  cannot  make  Intelligence  begin  to  be.  Now, 
Intelligence  being,  before  Intelligence  began  to  be,  is  a 
contradiction.  And  this  absurdity  following  from  the 
supposition,  that  Intelligence  began  to  be,  it  is  proved, 
that  Intelligence  never  began  to  be :  To  wit,  is  of  In- 
finity of  Duration. 

§  3.  And  as  Intelligence  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
and  it  supposes  a  Being  :  And  no  succession  of  Beings 
is  of  Infinity  of  Duration  :^  It  necessarily  follows  that 
there  is  one  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  which  is  of 
Intelligence,  And  as  there  is  but  one  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Duration  :^  and  this  Being  is  of  simplicity  :^  and  is 
also  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  '.^  It  follows,  that  the  one, 

^  Book  I.  Part  II.  Schol.  I.  §  7.         ^  Book  I.  Part  II.  Prop.  V.  §  4. 
■^  Book  I.  Part  II.  Prop.  IV.  §  8.     <"  Book  I.  Part  III.  Prop.  I   §  11. 


64 


ARGUMENT 


PART  I. 


simple,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration  is 
necessarily  of  Intelligence. 

§  4.  And  that  this  Being  is  All-knowing^  is  no  inference 
from  the  proposition,  that  the  one,  simple,  Being  of  In- 
finity of  Expansion  and  Duration  is  necessarily  of  In- 
telligence, for  it  is,  indeed,  implied  by  such  proposition  : 
A  Being  of  Intelligence  who  is  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  is  conv^ertible  with  an  All-knowing,  or 
All-wise  Being. 

§  5.  The  one,  simple  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  is,  then,  necessarily  Intelligent,  and  All- 
knoiving. 


PART  II. 


BOOK  II. 


65 


PART  II. 


Proposition.      The  one,  simple,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  Duration,  that  is  of  Intelligence,  oris  All- 
knowing,  is,  necessarily.  All-powerful. 

§.  1.  This  will  be  made  out,  if  it  be  proved,  that  the 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration  has  some 
poicer,  and  if  there  can  be  nothing  external  to  this  Be- 
ing to  restrain  his  acting. 

§  2.  It  will  be  proved,  that  that  Being  has  some 
power,  if  it  be  proved,  that  he  made  matter  begin  to  be. 

§  3.  Then,  as  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  dura- 
tion,^ or  began  to  be,  it  must  have  had  a  cause  :  for, 
Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause.  And  as  this 
cause  must  be  the  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Ex- 
pansion and  Duration,  that  is  of  Intelligence,  or  is  All- 
knowing  :  Therefore  it  is  proved,  this  Being  has  some 
power.^  And,  it  is  most  clear,  there  can  be  nothing 
external  to  that  Being  to  restrain  his  acting. 

§  4.  And  this  being  clear,  and  it  being  proved  that 
the  one,  simple,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Du- 
ration, that  is  of  Intelligence,  or  is  All-knowing,  has 
some  power  ;  it  is  made  out,  that  this  Being  is,  neces- 
sarily. All-powerful.*^ 

§  5.  The  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  is,  then,  necessarily,  All-powerful. 


=•  Book  I.  Part  II.  Schol :  II.  S  6. 


§2.        ^  §  I. 


66 


ARGUMENT 


PART  III. 


BOOK   II. 


Proposition.      The  one,  simple,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  Duration,  that  is  of  Intelliyence,  or  is  All- 
knowing,  and  All-powerful,  is,  necessarily.  Free, 

§  1.  This  will  be  made  out,  if  it  be  proved,  that  the 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration  made  mo- 
tion begin  to  he, 

§  2.  Motion  implies  a  substance  moved.  Now,  'tis 
obvious  that  a  substance  of  Infinity  of  Extension  is  im- 
moveable. Therefore,  a  substance  which  is  moved 
nmst  be  finite  in  extension.  There  are  substances  now 
in  motion  :  Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause:  No 
Succession  of  Substances  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration  -.^ 
The  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  duration  :^  There- 
fore, the  moving  substances  began  to  be ;  and  so,  must 
have  had  a  cause.  And  this  cause  must  be  the  one, 
simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration, 
that  is  of  Intelligence,  or  is  All-knowing,  and  All- 
powerful  :  And,  therefore,  this  Being  made  moving 
substances,  or  motion,  begin  to  be. 

§  a  And  this  being  proved,  it  is  made  out,  that  that 
Being  is,  necessarily,  Free.^ 

§  4.  The  one,  simple.  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  that  is  of  Intelligence,  or  is  All-knowing, 
and  All-powerful,  is,  then,  necessarily,  Free. 

=•  Book  I.  Part  II.  Schol :  I.  §  6.     ^  Book  I.  Part  II.  Schol :  II.  §  6. 


67 


APPENDIX. 


«  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  existing."  Pro- 
position. (Page  37.) 

Let  the  extension  be  of  space  merely,  or  of  .natter  n^ely, 
or  of  space  and  matter  together.  The  proposition  affirms 
that  there  is  Infinity  of  Extension,  but  affirms  nothmg  more. 


"  What  is  not  of  Intelligence  cannot  make  Intelligence  begin 

to  be  "     In  S  2.  (P.  63.) 

This  is  laid  down  as  an  axiom.  But  it  will  not  be  true  rf 
Intelligence  be  the  result  of  figure  and  motion.  And  will 
this  be  true  if  matter,  as  matter,  be  intelligent  ? 

Even  supposing  Intelligence  to  be  the  result  of  figure  and 
motion ;  and  that  all  matter,  thinks  :  If  matter,  and  figure 
and  motion,  be   not  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  they  must 
themselves,  have  had  a  cause,  for.  Whatever  beg,ns  to  be  mnU 

have  a  cause. 


Glasgow  : 
Printed  by  J.  Young. 


REFUTATION 


OF  THE 


m 

If 


:> 


ARGUMENT    A    PRIORI 


FOR  THE 


BEINa  AND  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD ; 


SHOWING 


THE  IRRELEVANCY  OF  THAT  ARGUMENT, 


AS  WELL  AS  THE 


FALLACIOUS   REASONING 


OF 


»Ax?JliJi 


m^ 


ESPECIALLY   OF 


MR   GILLESPIE, 


IN  SUPPORT  OF  IT. 


BY 


ANTITHEOS. 


(* 


AUDI  ALTERAM  PARTEM. 

"  A  man  that  is  first  in  his  own  cause  seemeth  right,  but  his  neighbour  cometh 
after  him  and  searcheth  him." 

"  In  the  present  instance,  as  in  all  others,  there  is  not  a  single  position  taken  in 
hostility  to  antitheistical  principles,  that  will  not  also  be  found  hostile,  either  to 
physical  science  or  sound  philosophy." 


GLASGOW: 
PRINTED  AND  PUBLISHED  BY  H.  ROBINSON  &  CO., 

7,   BRUNSWICK  PLACE, 

For  the  Glasgow  Zetetic  Society, 
AND  SOLD  BY  THE  BOOKSELLFF«2. 

1838. 


PREFACE. 


The  circumstance  which  has  unexpectedly  called  forth  the 
following  refutation  is  somewhat  remarkable.  A  gentle- 
man who,  in  1833,  published  a  volume,  entitled,  "  An 
Argument  a  priori  for  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God," 
sent  a  challenge^  a  few  months  ago,  to  a  society  of  free- 
thinkers in  this  city,  "  to  refute  the  reasoning  contained  in 
the  aforesaid  work."  The  tone  of  the  communication  is 
rather  fierce  than  gallant ;  haughty  and  cavalier  rather  than 
courteous.  Perhaps  the  author,  in  his  zeal  of  God,  does  not 
conceive  any  great  civility  to  be  due  to  those  who  do  not 
subscribe  to  his  ow^n  creed.  If  so,  it  is  only  another  in- 
stance among  the  many  that  occur,  of  men,  even  men  of 
learning  and  talents,  allowing  a  morose  religion  to  hold  the 
sway  over  their  better  nature. 

Mr  Gillespie,  the  author  of  the  argument  all%ided  to,  had 
been  disappointed,  it  seems,  in  finding  an  antagonist  else- 
where, notwithstanding  his  anxious  endeavours  to  provoke 
opposition.  The  gauntlet  was  thrown  down,  but  no  one  was 
fully  prepared  to  take  it  up.  Tiiis  may  have  been  the 
ground  of  his  confidence,  and  of  his  almost  triumphant  anti- 
cipations of  submission  in  all  against  whom  he  might  think 
proper  to  assume  a  hostile  bearing.  If,  however,  hearty  and 
fair  opposition  be  all  that  he  desires,  that  object  of  his  wishes 
is  now  offered  him  as  some  compensation  for  his  former  dis- 
appointments. 

It  may  nevertheless  of  all  this  be  mentioned,  that  the 
challenge  was  accepted — not  exactly  to  gratify  Mr  Gillespie 
— nor  because  any  of  the  individuals  appealed  to  in  the 
affair,  held  himself  bound  to  lift  the  gage,  or  answer  any  call 
to  refute  opinions  contrary  to  his  own, — but  because  one  of 
them  had  long  since  purposed  to  write  some  time  or  other 
upon  the  subject.  This  was  at  least  the  principal  motive. 
Another  might  be  to  vindicate  openly  avowed  freethinkers 
from  the  charge  (implied  in  the  gentleman's  letter)  of  incom- 


IV 


trt^h 


/I 


li'LftT  iiselt  iiidecd  migiii  here 
iilv  that  a  considerable  pro- 


petency  t 

have  be 

portion  matter,  besides  containing 

pa^.a-v  .^-    c.  aid  by  no      ^^       militate  in  favor  of  the 

writ   1.  but  of  which  his  respondent  wishes  to  take  no  advan- 

tide  might  have  been  restricted  to  the  considera- 
Uon  !r.  Gillespie's  work,   and  to  that  alone.     Indeed,  in 

liii  note  addressed  to  Mr.  G.  intimating  that  his  argument 
would  be  replied  to,  nothing  was  stated  of  any  other  course 
being  contemplated.  But  on  second  thoughts,  it  was  con- 
ceiv  .1  that  this  would  be  to  narrow  the  thing  too  much. 
OLbci  writers  have  signalized  themselves  in  the  treatment  of 
the  greatest  question  in  theology  by  the  argument  a  priori  : 
— and  it  mi^ht  have  been  said  with  justice,  and  without  dis- 
I  u  ment  to  any  one, — that  such  a  reply  would  have  been 
v<  r  ctive,  as  overlooking  the  first  and  greatest  authority 

if]  iliu  case.     A  supplementary  answer,  it  is  true,  might  have 
btcii  mnde  to  follow;  but  this  plan  of  publication  is  both 
awkward  and  inconvenient,  and  moreover,  it  would  not  have 
squared  so  well  with  the  original  intention  already  expressed. 
It  has  further  to  be  noticed,  that  in  replying  to  the  argu- 
ment a  |)riori,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect  every  thing 
to   be  brought   under  consideration  which  the  authors  who 
have  adopted  this  strain  of  reasoning,  have  chosen  to  intro- 
duce.    In  strict  conformity  with  logical  principle,  perhaps, 
thev  oufjht  not  to  be  followed  one  step  "  out  of  the  record," 
1  r never  far  they  may  wander  from  it.     1  shall  as  seldom  as 
possible  deviate  from  this  principle;  yet,  if  on  an  occasion,  a 
I  1  lusible  argument    be  found   thrust  in,   having  no  proper 


place 
alliii 


\i] 


Hi 


ai' 


what  is  going  forward,  I  trust  I  shall  be  excused  for 
\(r  to  it,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  safer  to  do  too  much 

av  than  too  little, — especially  as  it  is  too  commonly 
i)e  supposed,  that  an  argument  unanswered  is  one 
iinanswerable. 


« 


! 


CONTENTS. 


Chapter         I.   Character  and  Irrelevancy  of  the  Argument Page     7 

II.  Fallacies  of  Dr  Clarke's  Demonstration 14 

III.  Same  Subject,  continued 26 

IV.  Fallacies  of  Mr  Richard  Jack 33 

V.   Fallaciousness  of  Mr  Gillespie's  "  Argument" The  Intro- 
duction    88 

Vf.   Fallacies  of  Mr  Gillespie — The  "  Argument" 42 

VII.   Same  Subject,  continued 50 

VIII.    False  Reasoning  of  Mr  Gillespie — Second  Part  of  his  Work  55 

IX.    Fallaciousness  of  the  Third  Part  of  do 59 

X.   Mr   Gillespie's   Second   Book — A  Departure  from  his  own 

Argument ...  g^ 

XI.   Fallacy  of  the  Argument  in  favor  of  a  Supreme  Intelligence  69 
XII.    Impossibility  of  ascribing  Moral  Attributes  to  the  Subject  of 

Mr  Gillespie's  Reasoning 77 

XIII.   Retrospective  and  Concluding  Remarks qi 


Glasgow,  15lh  Dfc.  1837. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Character  and  Irrelevancy  of  the  Argument 

To  hear  of  the  existence  of  a  god  being  made  the  subject 
of  demonstration  by  argument,  is  altogether  astoundmg. 
The  announcement,  on  the  other  hand,  sounds  so  oddly,  as 
to  mitigate  the  effect  of  the  first  impression,  if  not  to  excite 
ridicule   at  the  wonderful  discrepancy  between  the  i 

view,  and  the  means  laid  out  for  the  attainment  of  it.  H  . 
however,  reconciles  people  to  the  greatest  absurdities:  aial 
the  approval  of  the  argument  a /)non  by  a  considerable  pro- 
portion—it might  be  added,  the  most  erudite  and  enlight- 
ened—of the  Christian  world,  compels  us  to  regard  it  with 
more  deference  than  its  intrinsic  merits  deserve. 

The  legitimate  mode  of  effecting  any  demonstration  rela- 
tive to  the  real  existence  of  things,  is  by  an  exhibition  of 
the  thing  itself  whose  existence  is  the  subject  of  proof. 
Now,  a  god,  in  as  far  as  this  point  is  concerned,  must  be 
held  as  a  real  being;  that  is,  his  votaries,  as  a  mail u  of 
course,  maintain  this  to  be  the  fact.  This  granted,  argumt  iii 
appears  quite  out  of  place.  It  would  never  do  to  talk  of 
proving  the  existence  of  the  man  in  the  moon  by  argument; 
neither^'would  it  be  of  any  avail  to  employ  a  syllogism  or  a 
sorites  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  navigable  channel 
between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  through  the  arctic 
regions  of  America  :  yet  if  the  reasoning  under  review  he 
refevant,  these  must  be  so  too.  If  an  a  priori  argument  l)t 
capable  of  proving  the  existence  of  one  thing,  another  n  av 
be  proved  by  the  same,  or  any  other  logical  process. 

It  may  be  accounted  indecorous,  perhaps,  to  refer  such 
similes  to  the  being  of  a  god.  But  the  tenderness  of  parties 
upon  certain  points  whereabout  they  are  apt  to  feel  sore,  is 
not  to  be  taken  as  a  reason  why  they  should  not  be  touched, 
even  in  attempting  a  cure.     It  is  convenient,   I  dare  say,  to 


i:    I 


i  I 


riflet 


M  1  'i 


8 

,  being  pained,  and  to  express  dislike  witl.  respect  to 
J.     oLreducing,  1  was  going  to  say,  but  it  really  .s- 
up,   the   evidence  to  be  admitted    in  proving  the 
:     ^^  of  a  deity,  to  the  level  of  that  which  is  alone  ad- 
in  other  cases  of  the  same  kind.     It  is  even  highly 
cable   to  the   interests  of  religion,  for  its  more  acute 
-...sitive  adherents  to  appear  shocked  themselves,   and 
.-.,.  „e  similar   feelings  in  others,   and    the   passions    conse- 
nuent  upon  them,  at  any  such  proposal  as  that  now  hinted  a  . 
Why  people  should  be  shocked,  however,  why  they  should 
either  be  disgusted  or  pained,  I  cannot  well  P^r"--'  J^^^, 
i,  he  merely  from  prejudice;  for  the  nature  of  the  subject  of 
probation  certainly  requires   some   small   support  from  the 

evidence  of  the  senses.  ,       ,      ,  *■  „\\  the 

This   kind  of  demonstration,   all   the  theology  ot  all  the 
reli..ions  in  the  world,  cannot  afford.     Hut  if  a  god  is  never 
;:.t:een  now.a-days,as  is  pretended  to  have  been  t  e  case  >. 
former  times,  we  are  told  to  look  to  Nature,  where  we  may  s  e 
(  .  .1  in  his  works.     This  is  the  common  and  more  fosh^ 
.,1.  ..,  of  discussing  the  great  <,uest:on  be-e  "s    w    d^ 
has  prevailed  from  Philo's  time  to  the  present.     It  .s  cal  ea 
the  aroument  a  posteriori:    it  relies  on  experience,  and  de- 
ine  arj,uiMt-i.i,     /       ,    .      re    .       Tl.ic  iirocess,  however,  is 
duces  causes  from  their  effects.     This  process,  »  , 

quite  illogical,  and,    although   it   were   otherwise     s   ot  no 
?      t  utility  in  irs  operation.     It  takes  for  granted  the  ex.s^- 
;„ce  of  nn  agent  capable  of  producing  the  eftec  s  contem- 
plated  as   the  source  of  the  argument-which  of  course  . 
begcTin.^  the   principle- and   only    attempts    to    make   out 
p„wer,\nd  Jisdom',  and  goodness,  and  so  forth    to  be  pro- 
per ntiributes  of  that  agent.     As  Mr  Gillespie  himself  ha 
well  observed,  it  cannot  prove  wisdom,  goodness,  power,  or 
any  other   divine   attribute  to  be  unlimited      As--"f  '^^^^ 
■  of  a  .rod,  it  cannot  demonstrate  that  he  has  always 
it  cannot  demonstrate  that  he  must  exist  eternally, 
,,rove  that  that  existence  may  not  have  already  ter- 
„„        ,     '  A  clock  continues  to  indicate  the  lapse  ot  time, 
the  hand  that  set  it  in  motion  has  ceased  to   be 


f\ 


(    •  ( 


"x 


SI 


r 

i    J 


9 

The  idea  of  so  grievous  a  defect  inherently  attaching  to 
evidence  so  much  relied  upon,  was  not  to  be  endured,  and 
some  of  the  consequences,  although  barely  glanced  at,  were 
too  horrid  for  contemplation.  Up  starts  the  logician  of  the 
new  school,  therefore,  with  a  remedy  for  this  great  evil.  A 
scheme  is  devised  of  making  every  point  at  issue  a  nui  r  f" 
rigid  demonstration.  The  most  exalted  view  of  the  tS 
character  is  to  be  taken.  All  the  attributes  of  deity  are  to 
be  drawn  to  the  largest  scale — nay,  magnified  to  infinitude 
itself,  and  borne  out  in  a  manner  the  most  absolute,  as  well 
as  his  eternity  both  past  and  future.  It  is  irrefragably  to  be 
proved,  not  only  that  a  god  does  exist,  but  that  he  must  exist, 
and  that  too  as  necessarily  as  that  two  and  two  make  four  ; — 
that  his  non-existence,  in  short,  cannot  even  be  conceived  ! 

A  vast  project  this  is,  most  undoubtedly :  demanding 
powers  and  ingenuity  equally  vast  to  execute.  Like  the 
dogma  of  all  things  being  created  out  of  nothing,  to  wliich, 
indeed,  this  argument  is  strongly  allied,  the  thing  seems  im- 
possible. Maugre  every  impediment,  however,  the  attempt 
is  boldly  made.  A  being  existing  by  necessity  is  sought  for  ; 
that  is  (according  to  the  new  logic)  one  whose  non-existence 
it  is  not  in  the  power  of  man  to  imagine;  simple  in  its 
essence;  indivisible:  everywhere  present,  and  without  which 
nothinnf  else  can  be  supposed  to  exist.  To  seek  in  nature 
for  such  a  being  ;  to  ransack  the  whole  universe  for  it  were 
vain.  Among  real  and  known  existences  it  was  nowhere  to 
be  found.  But  the  brain  of  the  theologue,  like  the  Ian- 
thorn  of  Diogenes,  was  set  to  discover  what  the  sun  could 
not  reveal;  and  if  equally  honest  with  the  cynic,  his  imitator 
would  have  been  every  whit  as  unsuccessful.  Those  who 
contrive  an  object  for  search,  however,  know  precisely  where 
to  find  it.  Hence,  the  reasoner  of  the  anti-experimental 
sect  having  laid  up  the  thing  cut  and  dry,  in  his  own  con- 
ceptions, brought  it  forth  with  an  air  of  triumph  due  to  a 
great  discovery. 

It  could  not  escape  observation  among  minds  of  an  ab- 
stract and  reflective  turn,  that  space  possesses  some  of  the 
attributes  commonly  ascribed  to  deity,  such  as  infiiiiij,  .1 


/ 


\ 


I  i 


'   course,   <) 


be  w 


1  i  "  >  ;  i  ;, 


10 

mnipresence;  immateriality,  and  so  forth :  tliat 
aut  be  supposed  to  have  had  a  beginning,  or  to 

*   p(v  vn>iHtv  of  ever  coming  to  an  eiu; 


metaphysical  tlieist,    exceedingly 
these  idle  and  unappropriated  attributes 
iijto  n  useful   play,    and   in  a   manner  the   most  advan- 

taat  II  to  the  common  faith.  Clarke  and  Butler,  and 
a!  n  followers,  have  accordingly  talked  much  of  these 
n  1!  ,  and  evinced  a  strong  predilection  for  them  in 
sti  .h  examples  wherewithal  to  illustrate  the  abso- 
lute ,  u  infinite  perfections  of  the  divine  nature.  These 
metaphysicians,  in  short,  have  made  space  and  duration 
usurp  the  station  and  dignity  of  a  divine  being.  They  have 
taken  this  empty  and  inanimate  f\ibrication,  and  set  it  up  ni  a 
newly-erected  shrine  of  curiously  mathematical  construc- 
li, in,    uhJ  fallen  down  to  it  as  the  god  of  their  idolatry. 

li  the  theory  be  vague  and  visionary  which  the  argument 
a  priori  is  introduced  to  support,  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that 
t|j,>    u  itself  should  be  of  a  different  character.     A 

I.I  ,  j  1  iciple  cannot  well  be  maintained  by  reasoning 
,^i  .h  IS  uuu.  The  truth  is,  the  argument  in  question  is 
lu  -nnrr  else  than  an  attempt  to  establish  the  application  of 
i„  uJ  ml  reasoning  to  what  it  has  nothing  in  earth  or 
1,,  ,v  n  ith,— namely,  real  existences;  at  least  what  is 

hi  id  »  be  real  by  those  who  employ  such  argument.  But 
].,  .,  ,,,     preposterous  the  attempt!     As  well  might  it 

\  .    :    .         :  Lci,  that  as  the  whole  is  in  the  abstract  a  perfect 

list  contain  within  itself  all  the  qualities  of  the 

of  which   it   is   composed;  that  as  some   of 

K.  I        re  small    and   some    large,    some   round    and 

({uai    .       liie  black  and  some  white;  it  must  be  white 

M  k.     n  '     ^nare  and  louiid,  and  large  and  small  at  the 

n^         A  lians  inform  us,  that  every  souiiti  aitiu- 

ible  of  being  reduced  to  the  syllogistic  form,     if 

s,     I    h    .        e  glad  to  hear  from  their  own  lips  an  exempli- 

iicaiHHi  ill  the  present  case.     To  my  own  untrained  thinking, 

5i    hoiild  run  somewhat  thus:— - 

Whatever  necessarily  possesses  absolute  perfectioi        God  ; 


tht/st 

s  C  5 1  <  1  t 

SIIIVH 
lYti'W 


11 

Metaphysical  abstractions  possess  absolute  perfections  : 

Therefore,  metaphysical  abstractions  are  (      I. 
If  this  be  not  a  fair  statement  of  the  who!  ;  rit  in  the 

most  logical  form,    I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  is.      ^^limild 

it  be  any  way  wrong,  and  should  some  ardt        ;    .   i^    1  iLe 
metaphysical  school  of  theology  deign  hereafter  to  take  n 
part  in  this  discussion,  it  would  be  well  were  he  to  cc 
the  Stagyrite  and  correct  it.     In  any  event,   our  reas 
a  priori  have  either  to  acknowledge   the  absurdity  here  set 
forth  in  mood  and  figure,  or  deny  that  they  appropriate  ab- 
stract reasoning  to  questions  of  ontological  science.     If  their 
god  be  a  real  being — an  agent,  he  cannot  be  a  heap  of  ab- 
stractions:   if  made  up  of  abstractions,   he  cannot   be  an 
agent.     No  reasoning  imaginable  can  make  him  both  :  yet 
to  nothing  short  of  working  out  this  impossibility  uulz,  the 
argument  aim. 

It  must  be  granted,  indeed,  that  such  parts  of  tl        re 
as  have  a  bearing  upon  the  divine  actions,  as  well  a      i 
which  go  to  establish  the  moral  and  intellectual  ch   i         =     ; 
deity,   do  not  properly    belong   to  the  argument    a   i  n u. 
These  things  are  either  boldly  thrust  in  where  they  a 
of  all  keeping,  or  humbly  introduced  in  forma  pauper 
so  made  to  pass  off  with  the  rest.     But  after  all,  and  with 
every  advantage,  fair  and  foul,  that  can  be  claimed  for  it^  it 
is  at  best  but  a  sorry  piece  of  patch  work.     Restricted  to  its 
own  province,  it  can  prove  nothing,   demonstrate  nothini    • 
be  either  true  or  false  but  what  is  necessarily/  so,  in  the  i 
abstract  and  mathematical  sense  of  the  terms. 

Here,  indeed,  the  grand  secret  in  managing  the  argnnn  fit 
before  us  lies.  It  affixes  a  partial  and  out-of-the-way  iii  in- 
ing  to  words,  especially  those  upon  which  the  whole  qii Lo- 
tion turns,  and  so,  misconstrues  and  misapplies  genenii  iau- 
guage.  Necessity^  for  instance,  which  by  the  way  is  the  key- 
stone of  the  structure,  is  different  from  what  it  is  found  to 
be  anywhere  else,  except,  perhaps,  in  some  other  region  of 
mere  speculation.  In  the  premises,  it  is  attenuated  to  tlie 
utmost  fineness  of  its  mathematical  acceptation,  although  the 
weight  of  its  common  and  real  meaning  is  essential  to  the 

B 


12 


W'l'  1 1     ; 

"  i  I,  .; 
review 

the  ..  ' 

I    !  n  ■  t  '•  ■ 

t  IK ! ;, 


\';ii.iiiiiy  of  die  conclusion.  5e^6.v/////rr,  m  like  manner,  is  to- 
tal iy  dissimilar  to  any  thing  known  by  tlial  name.  It  seems 
an  evanescent,  or  rather  imperceptible— nothing;  yet,  lo  !  it 
is  IouihI  iii  the  end  that  something  substantial  was  after  all 
t»j  hr  lintlerstood. 

ilu   e  things,  however,  will  be  more  clearly  apprehended 
wh   !!  we  come  to  discuss  the  logic  of  this  strange  argument 
in    ill.      In  the  meantime  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  show,  that 
till    c  h  I    icter   of  irrelevancy  here   laid   at  the   door   of  the 
a  j)ri    1 1   argianciiit,    is   not   unwarranted    by  the  authority  of 
,   >  .  ?       ^^es  amonnr  the  reliorious  themselves.     Abundance  of 
might  be  adduced,    but  I  shall  content   myselt 
ict  from  the   Edinburgh   Review  for  October 
..   p.  113,)  in  an   article  upon  Dr  Morehead's 
:  on  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion."     That  the 
reasons  upon  theistical  principles  is  evident  from 
on  he  makes  to  "the  will  of  the  creator,"  to  which, 
rk  in  passing,  he  allows  the  most  Orthodox  lati- 
ic.cu.ve   to   our   argument  a  priori   he  observes:— 
he  truth  is,  it  involves   a  radical  fallacy  which  not  only 
renders   it  useless  but  dangerous  to  the  cause  it  is  intended 
to   support.     The   question    as   to    the  being  of  a  god,    is 
|Hnt  Iv  n   question  of  fact:  he   either  exists  or  he  does  not 
evi  !       It   !    there  is  an  evident  absurdity  in  pretending  to 
demonstrate  a  matter  of  fact,   or  to  prove  it  by  argument  a 
priori;  because  nothing  is  demonstrable  unless  the  contrary 
a  contradiction,    and  this   can  never  be  predicated 
negative  of  any  proposition  which  merely  afiirms  or 
asserts  a  matter  of  fact.     Whatever  we  conceive  as  existent, 
V  .      H    also  conceive  as  non-existent,  and  consequently  there 
whose  non-existence  implies  a  contradiction,  or, 
HI    r  A     lis,  whose   existence  is   a  priori  demonstrable. 

I  hi  li  list  be  evident  to  every  one  who  knows  what  demon- 
stration really  means.  It  is  a  universal  law,  that  all  heavy 
bodies  descend  to  the  earth  in  a  line  directed  towards  its 
centre.  But  the  contrary  of  this  may  easily  be  conceived, 
htt  ui^c  It  involves  no  contradiction;  for  bodies  might  have 
tV,;!.  ;    upward,  if  we  may  so  express  it,  as  well  as  downward, 


: «  !  i 


\    I   S  I     !    S   I. 


13 

had  such  been  the  will  of  the  creator.  But  we  cannot  con- 
ceive the  opposite  of  one  of  the  demonstrated  truths  of  geo- 
metry, as,  for  example,  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triarigle 
should  be  either  greater  or  less  than  two  right  angles,  be- 
cause this,  implies  a  contradiction.  The  distinction,  there- 
fore, between  necessary  or  demonstrable  truths  and  matters 
of  fact,  consists  in  this,— that  the  contrary  of  the  tormer 
involves  a  contradiction,  whereas  that  of  the  latter  does  not. 
But  there  is  no  contradiction  implied  in  conceiving  the  non- 
existence of  the  deity;  and  therefore  his  existence  is  not  a 
necessary  truth,  a  priori  demonstrable." 

To  add  any  thing  to  the  foregoing  reasoning  of  the 
reviewer  were  perhaps  superfluous.  It  is  clear  and  satisfiic- 
tory.  Yet  I  cannot  well  refrain  from  taking  notice  of  a 
sin^rle  circumstance  by  way  of  illustration.  Men  have  often 
been  made  to  suffer  severely— on  some  occasions  to  the  loss 
of  life— for  denying  the  being  of  a  god,  while  the  great  mass 
of  the  people,  so  far  from  regarding  these  occurrences  as 
either  absurd  or  unjust,  have  looked  on  them  as  well-merited 
punishments.  But  was  ever  any  one  put  to  death,  or  sent 
to  the  pillory,  for  denying  that  twice  two  make  four?  The 
idea,  indeed,  is  ridiculous  ;  but  wherefore  should  it  be  so  -^ 
Simply  because  it  is  not  possible  there  should  be  any  differ- 
ence of  opinion  about  the  matter.  If,  however,  the  dogmas 
of  theology,  or  even  say  the  primary  one,  were  capable  of 
demonstration  as  mathematical  doctrines  are,  there  could  be 
no  difference  in  the  respect  due  to  doubts  and  denials  in 
either  case  ;  or  rather,  it  would  be  impossible  to  find  doubt- 
ers and  deniers  in  the  one  more  than  in  the  other.  I  do  not 
mention  the  horrid  penalties  awarded  in  our  barbarous  laws 
to  certain  kinds  of  unbelief,  in  proof  of  the  real  importance 
of  the  articles  of  faith  they  have  been  enacted  to  maintain 
by  brute  force.  Statutes  of  this  description  are  a  proof  of 
nothing  but  legislative  ignorance  and  the  persecuting  nature 
of  the  religions  they  have  been  made  to  defend.  Their  very 
existence,'^however,  as  well  as  that  of  the  stupid  prejudices, 
alas '  but  too  prevalent,  upon  which  they  are  founded,  are 
totally  incompatible  with  the  validity  of  that  mode  of  argu- 


i 


1  f- 

incut  wluiA'i  would  demonstrate  the  being  of  a  god  upon 
ab:sir.u-(,  >;':'..^^  'les. 

HiH  U  ^  positions  and  reasonings  oi  the  different 
auih  i  .  V,  ho  have  adopted  the  mode  of  procedure  now  shown 
i^  hv  directed  so  wide  of  the  mark,  must  not  be  passed  over 
\\  '  i  special  notice.  It  is  more  easy  to  censure  an  argu- 
I  neral  terms,  than  to  meet  all  its  particular  parts 

on  i  i  r  ail  I  open  grounds.  Even  this  labour,  therefore,  I 
I  fu  .  yi.iiiy  undertake,  that  there  may  be  nothing  left  to  sup- 
pose on  the  score  of  disingenuousness  or  pretended  want  of 
inter-t  in  the  matter.  No  one  can  be  more  fully  aware  than 
I  an  >w  nearly  this  discussion  approaches  in  some  points 

ti  a  L  ,ai  dispute.  But  what  of  that?  If  the  religious 
w  •  ui  (  (loose  to  peril  their  cause  on  grounds  so  insecure,  upon 
Hi  elves  let  the  dishonour  of  perverting  things  from  their 
t  •  i!  purposes,  and  all  its  consequences,  fall.  Be  it  always 
I  I  ered,  too,  that  this  argument  of  theirs,  has  repeat- 
i  n  put  forth  as   invulnerable,   and  that  according  to 

iln  ii  uun  showing,  the  mighty  problem  of  the  being  of  a 
god  (i   fiends  upon  the  result. 


.  i  V'OC'M  I  i 


CHAP.  II. 

Fallacies  of  Dr  Clarke's  Demonstration. 

the  reasonings  of  the  theologians  who  have 
le  fundamental  articles  of  their  creed  upon  a 
iples,  the  "Demonstration  of  the  being  and  attri- 
«HHcs  i)\  (i  I"  by  Dr  Samuel  Clarke,  demands  our  first 
aiit  iiiion,  i  hi  iDiith  is  due  to  the  reverend  divine  on  ac- 
count of  his  acknowledged  talents  and  great  reputation,  as 
well  as  the  early  appearance  ol  his  work.  His  Demonstra- 
been  too  long  before  the  public,  and  ranks  too  high 
1  theological  production,  to  require  particular 
1  e.  This  celebrated  treatise  is  stated  in  twelve 
,  Mipported  severally  by  such  arguments  as  the 
i.i.a  ha\t  deemed  best  calcuhited  for  that  purpose. 


I  i  :r . 


; ;  -^     :  i 


tt  I 


'   I- 


11 V 


15 

He  introduces  his  subject^by^assigning  certain  causes  for 
the  existence  of  atheism.  These  he  specifies  to  be  excessive 
ignorance  and  stupidity ;  or  vicious  habits ;  or,  at  best,  false 
philosophy. 

It  is  perhaps  hardly  worth  while  to  contend  about  these 
matters ;  yet  it  may  be  observed,  that  if  some  savage  tribes,  as 
inferior  in  intelligence  as  they  are  represented,  have  no  no- 
tion or  belief  of  the  being  of  a  god  ;  a  greater  number,  to  the 
full  as  ignorant  and  stupid,  possess  abundance  of  credulity 
upon  the  subject ;  and  if  we  go  to  what  is  called  civilised  life, 
the  most  ignorant  and  debased  are  not  only  religious,  but 
generally  the  most  firmly  fixed  in  their  faith.  The  second 
class  of  persons  mentioned, — men  who  from  their  evil  prac- 
tices have  been  led  to  scoff  at  every  thing  religious — are  not 
atheists  at  all.  Such  characters  always  show,  in  the  hour  of 
suffering  and  in  the  prospect  of  death,  that  they  had  never 
been  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  falsehood  of  religion,  but 
only  that  it  marred  their  merriment  and  discountenanced 
their  wickedness.  The  form  and  profession  of  faith  thrown 
aside  recklessly  and  without  consideration,  the  essence  re- 
mains. It  lies  dormant  for  a  time,  till  the  storm  of  passion 
which  crushed  it  to  a  certain  extent  has  subsided,  when  it 
springs  into  activity  more  powerfully  than  ever.  Slavish- 
ness  to  the  appetites  can  never  convince  the  understanding. 
It  may  drive  men  to  disregard  religion,  as  well  as  every  thing 
else  of  a  serious  nature,  but  it  cannot  make  them  disbelievers, 
Disregarders  and  disbelievers,  however,  are  very  different 
characters. 

As  to  the  philosophy  which  leads  to  atheism  being  false, 
that  is  the  very  question  to  be  tried  in  the  sequel.  Of  those, 
however,  who  take  philosophy  as  the  basis  of  their  unbelief, 
the  Doctor  has  a  preliminary  concession  to  demand  ;  namely, 
that  the  being  of  a  god  is  very  desirable.  The  demand  is 
made  that  they  should  "  be  very  willing,  nay,  desirous  above 
all  things  to  be  convinced  that  their  present  opinion  is  an  error." 
But  what  opinion  must  be  formed  of  the  goodness  of  a  cause 
or  the  soundness  of  an  argument,  when  it  is  found  necessary 
either  to  beg  or  demand  a  predisposition  in  its  favor?     The 


16 


frame  of  mind  most  proper  and  most  adequate  to  judge  ot 
any  matter,  is  to  be  without  desire  or  predisposition  of  any 
kiiid,  whether  for  or  against  it.  Any  other,  indeed,  is  pre- 
judicial. Let  us  hear,  however,  what  his  reverence  has  to 
urge  for  the  necessity  of  this  concession. 

"  Man  of  himself,"  says  he,  ''  is  infinitely  insufficient  for 
his  own  happiness  ;  he  is  liable  to  many  evils  and  miseries, 
\v}  11  ii  he  can  neither  prevent  nor  redress  ;  he  is  full  of  wants 
wh  '  he  cannot  supply,  and  compassed  about  with  infirmi- 
tii  .  wiiich  he  cannot  remove,  and  obnoxious  to  dangers 
ul  !  he  can  never  sufficiently  provide  against,  &c.  Under 
wliit  h  evil  circumstances  it  is  evident  there  can  be  no  suffi- 
tiuiit  support  but  in  the  belief  of  a  wise  and  good  God." 

T<j  make  this  case  worth  a  rush,  it  ought  to  have  been 
shewn  that  tlie  faithful  are  exempted,  and  none  else,  from 
the  calamities  here  complained  of.  If  the  belief  of  a  god,  or 
even  the  real  existence  of  such  a  being,  is  not  to  relieve  me 
of  mv  infirmities  and  wretchedness,  why  should  either  the 
one  or  the  other  be  any  way  desirable  to  me  ?  What  earthly 
good  can  it  do  a  man  environed  with  woes  and  worn  down 
with  misery,  to  be  assured  that  a  god  exists  who  either  can- 
ned or  will  not  afford  him  relief?  Has  it  not  rather  a  strong 
trn  ""rncy  to  excite  his  chagrin?  A  god  so  poor  and  useless 
be  unable  to  affi)rd  him  relief,  could  only  be  an  object 
*  proach  and  contempt;  and  one  who  could,  but  would 
1  !  must  appear  too  odious  and  malevolent  in  character  to 
he  icgarded  with  other  feelings  than  fear — if  not  hatred  and 
aversion  The  incredulous  man  is,  on  the  contrary,  much 
more  comfortably  situated.  If  he  suffers, — he  estimates  the 
causes,  whether  moral  or  physical,  according  to  their  own 
character,  without  looking  into  the  terra  incognito  for  some 
sin  n  ed  agency  to  account  for  them.  He  is  not  like  the 
chiti  ..ho  beats  the  floor  for  hurting  him  when  befalls,  or 
ki     t?s  for  not  breaking  his  bones. 

If  ever  Dr  Clarke  studied  the  interesting  subject  of  the 
orifnn  of  evil,  or  even  thought  or  read  upon  it,  he  seems  to 
hnvc  forgotten  ail ;  for  the  above  argument  is  given  with  the 
most  admirable  simplicity,  although  it  evidently  militates  di- 


17 

rectly  against  himself.  It  is  as  much  as  to  say,  There  is  a 
dreadful  deal  of  evil  in  the  world,  and  we  cannot  get  quit  of 
it  by  any  efforts  of  our  own ;  but  these  very  circumstances 
render  it  imperative  on  the  athiest  to  wish  that  the  doctrine 
he  is  opposed  to  were  true,  since  in  that  case  he  would  have 
a  god  disinclined  to  remedy  the  evil,  or  as  incapable  of  doing 
it  as  himself.— What !  says  the  unbeliever,  convince  us  by 
our  sufferings  that  we  should  like  to  have  a  god  upon  \vhom 
to  father  them  !  This  is  certainly  a  new-fashioned  way  of 
paying  compliment  to  deity.  The  author,  to  be  sure,  after- 
wards talks  about  the  happiness  of  a  hereafter,  but  to  allude 
to  a  matter  as  admitted,  which  does  not  even  follow  as  a 
consequence  upon  what  he  has  yet  to  prove,  is  preposterous 
in  the  extreme  ;  more  especially  when,  with  regard  to  the 
primary  point,  he  is  only  pleading  for  a  favorable  reception 
of  what  he  has  to  offer  in  evidence.— But  we  must  now  recur 
to  Dr  Clarke's  propositions. 

His  first,  that  "  something  has  existed  from  eternity,''  no 
one  can  object  to.  It  carries  its  evidence  along  with  it,  and 
must  indeed  be  as  cordially  agreed  to  by  the  antitheist  as  the 
most  devout  christian.  The  second,  however,  does  not  stand 
in  the  same  jnedicament.  It  is  this,  "  There  must  have  ex- 
isted from  eternity  some  one  unchangeable   and  independent 

being'' 

I  need  say  nothing  of  the  alteration  of  the  subject  in  the 
present  proposition  from  that  of  the  preceding.  It  is  perhaps 
of  little  consequence  any  farther  than  indicating  a  certain 
leaning,  for  which  there  ought  to  have  been  shewn  some  sort 
of  warrant.  W^as  the  mere  something  in  the  one  case,  not 
sufficiently  pregnant  in  meaning  to  sustain  the  weight  of  dig- 
nity awaiting  the  being  in  the  other  ?  So  at  least  it  would 
appear.  What  I  particularly  object  to,  however,  is,  that  the 
two  terms  in  the  predicate,  "  unchangeable  and  independ- 
ent," are  linked  together  as  inseparable.  The  author  does 
not  say  one  word  in  favor  of  this  conjunction,  and  certainly 
there  is  no  necessity  for  it  in  the  nature  of  things.  In  his 
subsequent  reasoning,  he  aims  at  establishing  independence 
alone,  yet  his  conclusions  are  afterwards  and  all  along  drawn 


as  if  both  had  been  tlemonstraleil.      What  are  we  to  think  of 
-u   li  a  in  infiiiiu      i'lccibcly  this, — that  the  reverend  theorist 
iitent  upon  making  out  his  cn^c  in  some  sort,  that  an 
;  is  overleaped  with  surprising  faciUty,  and  a  hia- 


W :  l 


„>   li 


JU: 


10     ill  I.      reasoning  regarded  as  of  no  account. 

W  m  ii5pect  to  the  independence  of  the  something  which 
has  ahvay  existed,  the  author's  argument  amounts  to  this  : 
there  must  eitiier  be  one  being  only  of  independent  exist- 
ent ,  ri  11!  infinite  series  of  beings  of  dependent  existence. 
jlu!    i    I  ot  be  an  infinite  series  of  the  latter  descrip- 

11011  i  ia  icture,  there  can  only  be  one  being  of  independ- 
(lii    r  ire — In    support   of  his   minor   premiss,   as  here 

>iau  i.  !)r  Clarke  maintains  that  as  no  individual  in  the 
M  the  cause  of  itself;  every  one  must  have  a  cause, 

mid       ,  whole  must  have  a  cause  as  well  as  the  different 

|iaii  .  ^' li  we  consider,"  says  he,  "  such  an  infinite  pro- 
fit .ion  as  one  entii^e  endless  series  of  dependent  beings,  it 
is  plain  this  whole  series  of  beings  can  have  no  cause  from 
without  of  its  existence ;  because  in  it  are  supposed  to  be  in- 
cIimI.  (I  all  things  that  are  or  ever  were  in  the  universe:  and 
ti  i^  r!  iin  it  can  have  no  reason  within  itself  of  its  existence; 
!m  I  M  no  one  being  in  this  infinite  succession  is  supposed 
t  .  !>e  self-existent  or  necessary,  but  every  one  dependent  on 
Hi,  iuregoing;  and  where  no  part  is  necessary,  it  is  manifest 
the  n'hnle  cannot  be  necessary." 

The  fallacy  here  lies  in  the  use  of  terms  totally  inept,  and 
like  theentireargument,  inappropriate  to  thepurpose.  Is  it  not 
absurdtotalkofanythingbeing  without  orbeyond  infinity?  and 
iiiither,  to  make  the  whole  force  of  a  dilemma  rest  upon  such 
absurdity?  Is  it  not  equally  absurd  to  reason  as  if  an  end- 
less series  were  to  be  regarded  as  made  up  of  parts,  everyone 
of  which  may  be  taken  into  account?  Did  the  metaphysi- 
1  i  III  suppose,  that  by  the  introduction  of  liis  distributives 
am!  collectives,  he  had  grasped  the  term  of  that  whicli  is 
iniinite?  He  says  (in  rfPect),  you  have  told  me  what  the 
cause  of  the  last  individual  of  the  series  is,  and  of  the  one 
precedinir  that,  and  so  on,  but  you  have  not  told  me  what  is 
I  h    (  1  ihu  ul  the  first.      i  he  reply — it  is  almost  superfluous  to 


"     19 

say — is,  that  there  can  be  no  first,   or^any  thing  to  leave  an 
idea  of  priority  in  the  mind. 

Dr  Clarke  illustrates  his  argument  by  reference  to  an 
article  extracted  from  Wollaston's  Religion  of  Nature,  com- 
paring  an  infinite  series  to  a  chain  "  hung  down  out  of 
heaven  from  an  unknown  height."  But  the  chain  in  this  in- 
stance is  like  all  other  things  by  which  theists  would  bring 
us  to  concur  in  their  imagined  cause  of  an  infinite  series. 
The  chain  is  evidently  meant  to  be  limited  in  extent.  If  not, 
what  is  to  be  understood  by  the  allusion  made  by  the  writer 
to  "  what  it  hung  upon  ?"  The  point  of  suspension,  although 
at  an  unknown  height,  is  certainly  somewhere,  and  so, 
acts  as  a  limitation  to  our  views,  and  by  consequence  ren- 
ders the  simile  useless.  We  may  imagine  the  chain  car- 
ried further  off  than  where  it  is  supposed  to  have  hung 
from  ;  so  that  if  it  was  infinite  in  its  extent  in  the  first  case, 
it  must  be  more  than  infinite  in  the  second. 

But  what  is  the  difference,  after  all,  between  an  imagi- 
nary chain  infinitely  extended,  and  an  imaginary  rod  ex- 
tended in  the  same  manner?  If  there  be  any  difference 
relative  to  the  point  at  issue,  what  is  it?  Yet  the  learned 
doctor  would  pronounce  the  one  independent  in  its  exis- 
tence, and  the  other  necessarilv  the  reverse  ! 

The  author  states  the  same  case  in  another  form  ;  but  as  this 
repetition  of  the  argument  is  founded  upon  the  fallacy  which 
has  just  been  exploded,  of  course  it  must  share  the  fate  of 
that  which  serves  as  its  basis. 

Dr  Clarke  himself  seems  half  conscious  of  the  inadequacy 
of  his  reasoning  in  demanding  a  cause  for  the  existence  of  an 
infinite  series,  for  he  is  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  protest- 
ing, as  it  were,  against  the  process  by  which  he  is  baulked  of 
his  object.  *'It  is  only,"  he  says,  "a  driving  back  from  one 
step  to  another,  and  removing  out  of  sight,  the  question 
concerning  the  ground  or  reason  of  the  existence  of  things." 
What  he  adds  about  the  series  being  neither  self-existent  nor 
necessary,  is  an  unproved  extravagance,  the  gist  of  which 
shall  come  under  review  in  noticing  the  next  proposition. — 
But  here  we  may  ask,  if  the  same  plea  would  not  hold  equally 

C 


«0 


"I 


:) 


ni 


I  W 


inc 


;il 


Ur 


in  t  ci  >nigie  being?  it  it  iiatl  nut  existed  yester- 
Ui  not  exist  to-day.  Its  continued  existence,  then, 
pen  its  prior  existence.  If^  however,  it  were  ob- 
lat  to  carry  back  the  incjuiry  concerning  the  ground 
ii  of  its  existence  in  this  manner,  would  be  to  re- 
question  out  of  sight  altogether, — what  could  the 
lave  answered  that  would  not  have  "  removed"  his 
k  objection  ? 
ike's  third  proposition  is,  that  "  That  unchangeable 
and  iki  pa  lent  being  which  has  existed  from  eternity  without 
any  frtrDfn!  cause  of  its  existence,  must  be  self-existent,  that  is, 
w/r         ////  existing,'* 

At  first  sight  this  proposition  appears  to  differ  little  from 
lilt  leading  one.  In  glancing  along  what  follows,  however, 
ur  iieiceive  that  more — much  more,  is  meant  than  directly 
mills  ill,  eye.  Here,  indeed,  we  have  the  epitome  of  the 
whnh  ;n  -nment.  Here  the  author  makes  a  wild,  but  deter- 
mined assault  upon  the  necessary  existence  of  matter.  1 1  re 
hi  hriiMr-  out  those  subtle  and  incomprehensible  theories  re- 
iai  V  iu  the  divine  nature  of  space  and  duration,  and  the 
sine  qua  nan  of  existence,  which  are  so  deeply  interwoven 
with  the  argument,  and  at  the  same  time  involved  in  dark- 
II r  did  obscurity.  And  here  too  he  summons  up  that 
most  potent — that  eldest  of  all  existences — Necessity,  which 
he  subsequently  exalts  above  all  things;  even  "above  all 
that  I-  called  god  and  that  is  worshipped." — The  truth  is, 
that  the  stress  he  has  laid  upon  necessary  existence  is  so 
prodigious,  that  we  are  at  a  loss  to  see  what  he  would  be  at. 
Is  it  not  enough  that  the  eternal  being  should  be  proved 
V  n  V  f.  !u  ;  that  is,  uncreated?  "No,"  says  Dr  Clarke  in 
tfu  ivf  words  of  his  seventh  reply  to  Butler;)  "  necessity  is 
t!  d,   or  reason,  or  foundation   of  existence,   both  of 

tl  me  substance  and  all  the  attributes ;"  and  in  the  pa- 

U  preceding,  he  speaks  of  that  necessity  by  which  the 
use  exists  ;  and  again,  in  his  second  letter,  he  declares 
to  be  "  in  itself  original,  absolute,  and  in  the  order 
itecedent  to  all  existence," — so  that,  according  to 
i  arity,  even  the  Great  First  Cause  of  all  things, 


iii's' 

1 :  <  • ./ 
of     : 


21 

(at  least  what  the  iheist  calls  by  this  name,)  could  not  exist 

— but  for  NECESSITY. 

All  this,  of  course,  makes  us  somewhat  curious  to  know 
what  this  mighty  existence  is,  and  it  is  so  far  fortunate  that 
our  curiosity  does  not  go  ungratified.  We  are  told  that  it 
is  anything  the  contrary  of  which  it  is  a  plain  impossibilitv, 
or  implying  a  contradiction  to  suppose :  "  for  instance, 
the  relation  of  equality  between  twice  two  and  four  is  an 
absolute  necessity,  only  because  it  is  an  immediate  contra- 
diction  in  terms  to  suppose  them  unequal.  This,"  the 
author  continues  to  observe,  "  is  the  only  idea  we  can  frame 
of  absolute  necessity;  and  to  use  the  word  in  any  other 
sense,  seems  to  be  using  it  without  any  signification  at  all." 

Proceeding  upon  this  partial,  this  extravagant  view  of  the 
case,  the  reverend  doctor  sets  about  overthrowing  the  ne- 
cessary existence  of  matter,  by  attempting  to  prove  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  in  nature  as  a  vacuum.  The  attempt, 
however,  fcills  wretchedly  short  of  its  aim,  depending  as  it 
does  upon  an  lil-informed  and  very  inadequate  estimate  of 
the  properties  of  matter.  On  his  knowledge  of  material 
things  and  their  properties,  it  would  almost  be  a  want  of 
charity  to  expose  him.  He  makes  no  account  of  matter  be- 
ing of  various  descriptions,  nor  of  the  diversity  of  effects 
which  must  follow  the  operations  of  things  so  different  as  the 
different  species  of  matter.  "  All  bodies,"  he  sagely  ob- 
serves, "  being  equally  heavy,  it  follows  necessarily  that 
there  must  be  a  vacuum  !" 

The  necessity  of  the  sequence,  I  confess,  I  do  not  distinct- 
ly perceive  ;  but  suppose  a  vacuum  granted, — what  then  ? — 
that  matter  does  not  exist  necessarily  ?  Upon  a  priori  prin- 
ciples, the  theory  of  a  vacuum  was  totally  uncalled  for.  We 
can  conceive  matter  not  to  exist,  and  that  seems  quite  enough 
for  the  purpose.  The  purpose,  however,  goes  too  far  :  the 
argument,  as  already  shown,  proves  too  much.  If  matter  is 
to  be  denied  necessary  existence  because  this  supposition 
may  be  made  respecting  it,  where  is  the  single  thing  that  can 
escape  the  same  doom  ?  Gods  and  devils,  angels  and  spi- 
rits, heaven  and  hell, — supposing  them  all  to  exist — could 


lune  fio  i  I'liiii  to  necessary  tiXi^iciicc,  since  ii  implies  no  con- 
tradiction to  inia<rine  them  not  to  exist. 

The  self-existence  which  depends  upon  Dr  Clarke's  neces- 
hif\,  i  j:  thus  a  mere  mathematical  chimera,  and  no  where 
U)  in  i  .— no  where  in  the  world  of  realities — is  a  proof 
thrst  !h(  10  is  something  radically  wrong  in  the  argument.  If 
Mil  ft  :i  condition  as  necessary  or  self-existence  really  exists, 
—why  can  it  not  be  proved?  Why  can  it  not  be  made 
applicable  to  the  material  universe — to  substance,  the  pro- 
perties and  operations  of  substance,  and  all  that  results  from 
them  ^  Hecause  in  these  discussions  a  proper  view  of  neces- 
sity never  seems  to  have  been  taken.  This  is  the  reason,  too, 
why  Hume  in  his  essay  <'Of  the  Idea  of  a  Necessary  Con- 
nexion,'' nnd  after  him,  Dr  Brown,  in  his  "  Observations" 
iH  I     I  fume's  doctrine  concerning  the  relation  of  cause 

iu    I  .  have   fallen  into  such  strange  heresies  in  philoso- 

;  relation  to   physical  subjects,    they  looked  for  ma- 

thematical necessity,  and  if  they  looked  in  vain,  it  is  because 
their  expectations  were  not  founded  in  reason  or  the  nature 
of  things.  This  statement  I  shall  now  make  good,  and  at  the 
same  time  prove,  which  is  more  to  the  point,  that  matter  is 
possessed  of  necessary  existence. 

Th  It  which  is  necessary,  then,  I  would  say,  is  obviously 
nnii  Min[)ly,  that  which  must  be;  that  which  is  inevitable; 
that  which  is  impossible  not  to  be.  It  is  useless  to  talk  of 
that  which  is  the  contrary  of  an  express  contradiction.  It  is 
surely  enough  that  upon  every  thing  else  than  what  is  neces- 
sarv,  the  stamp  of  impossibility  is  allowed  to  be  set.  Con- 
!  iie^  and  contradictions  only  belong  to  metaphysics  and 
-t  tuetry.  Mankind,  however,  were  conversant  with  mat- 
in i^X  common  occurrence  long  before  they  became  mathe- 
II!  ms  or  thought  of  soaring  beyond  physical  things;  and 
even  .el,  how  few  comparatively  know  any  thing  of  abstract 
speculation  or  the  use  of  its  language.  The  usual  accepta- 
uou  of  the  word  necessity,  therefore,  must  be  held  the  pri- 
m  iiv  and  essential  acce})tation  ;  and  that  which  would  cut  it 
duwii  io  the  contrary  of  a  contradiction,  secondary  and  par- 
ti u  1  iilv.     There   is   as  absolute  a  necessity  that  a  piece  of 


23 

wood  should  burn  on  being  exposed  to  the  action  of  fire,  as 
there  is  for  the  equality  between  twice  two  and  four.  I  shall 
be  told  that  our  ascertainment  of  the  facts  in  these  cases  is 
derived  from  entirely  different  sources:  that  although  expe- 
rience be  requisite  in  the  one  case,  it  is  not  so  in  the  other ; 
that  besides,  experience  can  never  prove  a  thing  necessary, — 
because  while  it  is  granted  that  each  successive  experiment 
increases  the  probabilities  of  a  result  similar  to  that  which 
preceded,  no  number  of  probabilities  can  ever  amount  to  a 
certainty. 

To  this  I  would  reply,  that  the  doctrine  here  laid  down 
holds  true  in  matters  of  chance,  (for  instance,  the  throwing 
of  dice  or  the  cutting  of  cards,)  because  the  tendency  and 
precision  of  the  agency  employed  can  never  be  perfectly  is- 
certained,  and  therefore  is  to  be  left  to  the  calculation  ui 
the  diflPerent  probabilities.  It  is  quite  otherwise,  however, 
in  the  operations  of  nature.  There,  all  is  fixed  and  immu- 
table as  the  truths  of  geometry  themselves.  An  experiment 
once  fairly  and  fully  verified,  nothing  remains  but  to  adopt 
the  result  as  a  determinate  principle,  from  which  there  can- 
not possibly  be  the  slightest  deviation.  Suppose  a  person  to 
have  been  once  or  twice  injured  by  burning,  what  should 
even  the  stickler  for  mathematical  necessity  think  of  this 
person,  were  he,  nevertheless,  to  proceed  upon  the  ground 
of  there  being  no  certainty, — but  only  a  small  chance,  pro- 
portioned to  the  number  of  times  he  had  suffered  previously, 
— at  any  rate,  no  necessity  of  his  again  experiencing  pain 
from  the  application  of  fire  to  his  flesh  ?  Both  in  the  animal 
economy  and  in  chemistry; — and  indeed  in  every  department 
of  physical  science, — in  hydraulics,  in  electricity,  in  mecha- 
nics,— the  nature  and  operation  of  a  thing  once  being  deter- 
mined by  adequate  experience,  uniform  results  are  always  ac- 
counted necessary.  Sometimes,  it  is  readily  granted,  our  aii- 
ticipations  in  these  matters  are  not  realized  ;  that  is,  an  experi- 
ment fails,  but  what  of  that?  Would  Dr  Clarke  himself 
have  imputed  the  failure  of  an  experiment  to  a  want  of 
stability  in  the  laws  of  nature?  No;  but  to  the  mismanage- 
ment of  the  operator,  or  else,  to  a  difference  in  the  causes 


24 


III  It  |iii  jt  '  I  (iilierence  in  the  effect.  This  uniform  rela- 
tion between  cause  and  effect  is  what  may  fairly  and  pro- 
perly be  called  physical  necessity ;  and  unless  the  laws  of 
nature  be  variable  and  uncertain,  that  necessity  is  as  abso- 
liife  n<  it  is  that  two  and  two  should  be  four. 

\\  h  It  now  becomes  of  Dr  Clarke's  absolute  necessity, 
whit  li  includes  nothing  but  the  reverse  of  what  cannot  be 
conceived  ? — which  rejects  as  destitute  of  all  meaning,  what- 
i\  I  js  iiot  the  opposite  of  a  mathematical  contradiction? 
Wt  can  conceive  of  a  man  (or  three  men  as  the  scripture 
hatli  it)  walking  unharmed  in  the  midst  of  a  burning,  fiery 
furnace.  We  can  conceive  of  a  man  walking  upon  the  fluc- 
tuating surface  of  the  ocean,  or  mounting  into  the  air — even 
takinir  a  voyage  to  the  moon  and  dog-star.  We  can  easily 
conceive  of  hundreds  of  events  running  counter  to  the  laws 
of  nature;  but  do  these  whimsical  and  absurd  conceptions 
brincr  the  things  conceived  within  the  range  of  possibility? 
N  1  .ure  than  the  equally  whimsical  and  absurd  conception 
c  t  u  e  non-existence  of  matter  would  bring  that  conception 
\    M       the  same  range. 

'I  ii<  necessary  existence  of  matter,  then — for  all  that  the 
doctor  has  done  to  it — rests  precisely  where  it  was.  It  had 
lonji  aero  been  received  as  an  indisputable  doctrine,  if  not  an 
axiom  in  philosophy,  that  out  of  nothing,  no  thing  can  come; 
and  it  has  never  yet  been  shown  to  be  essentially  incorrect. 
If,  therefore,  theologians  do  not  relish  this  doctrine, — if,  in 
ihin     ves,  it  looks  horrible  and  grim, — they  might  surely  be 

i! IV  trouble  of  showing  that  somethin^j  can  be  made  from 

;ii  11  1,  and  nothing  from  something,  instead  of  resorting 
!(i  I  V  method  of  getting  rid  of  it  by  a  side-wind.  We 
i !!  i  t  agree  with  Clarke,  that  something  must  have  existed 
tit  in  eternity;  but  the  question  is,  what  is  this  something? 
Whir  is  it  matter  of  whose  existence  everything  testifies 
in  ift!  strongest,  the  most  irresistible  manner;  or  is  it  an 
iH^j;  i)t  imaginary  perfections,  physical  as  well  as  moral, 

w  11  IK  Lit  a  body  for  their  habitation  or  a  medium  for  their 
txi  tire?  Whether  is  it  somethinn:  whose  existence  is  a 
f  knowledge,  a  matter  of  absolute  certainty,  or  some- 


.t 


I  it 


!)] 


25 


thing  of  whose  existence  we  know  nothing  whatever,  but  is, 
on  the  contrary,  the  very  thing  in  question? 

The  necessary  existence  of  anything, — any  being,  I  mean, 
such  as  matter  is,  and  God  is  said  to  be, — is  its  self- 
existence  ;  and  to  prove  it  to  be  self-existent,  it  is  only  in- 
cumbent to  shew  cause  why  it  should  be  uncreated  and 
eternal.  Now  this  has  already  been  done  as  far  as  a  nega- 
tive view  of  the  question  regarding  matter  makes  admissible. 
Another  view  of  it  is,  that  matter  is  the  thing  above  all 
others  absolutely  necessary  to  figure,  motion,  agency,  colour, 
and  what  not ;  that  it  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  our  own  exist- 
ence and  that  of  all  things  else,  even  the  stupendous  tab 
of  the  nniverse  itself.  Take  away  matter,  and  you  effect  the 
taking  off  of  every  thing  of  which  we  can  form  the  slightest 
idea.  All  is  annihilated  except  space  and  duration.  Our 
observations  on  these,  however,  we  must  reserve  till  we  come 
to  notice  the  more  direct  treatment  of  them  in  Mr  Gillespie's 
argument. 

To  close  this  rather  tedious  part  of  the  discussion,  the 
question  of  the  self-existence  of  matter  may  be  put  in  this 
form. — Either  it  is  eternal,  or  it  is  not. —  If  eternal,  it  is  by 
consequence  self-existent.  If  not  eternal,  it  must  owe  its  ex- 
istence to  some  cause.  But  to  fall  upon  the  latter  alterna- 
tive is  clearly  to  beg  the  question.  It  is,  as  is  done  in  the  ar- 
gument from  final  causes,  to  take  for  granted  the  prior  - 
ence  of  an  agent  capable  of  producing  the  effect.  Tl 
istence  of  such  an  agent,  therefore,  ought  to  be  fully  dem<  n 
strated  before  the  self-existence  of  matter  can  legitimau  )  be 
questioned  at  all. 


26 


CHAP.  III. 

Fallacies  of  Dr  Clarke — continued. 

Dr  Clarke's  fourth  proposition  is,  "  What  the  substance  or 
A  <jf  that  being  which  is  self-existent  or  necessai'ily  exist- 

iiuj  is,  ff'e  have  no  idea  ;  neither  is  it  at  all  possible  for  us  to 
comprehend  it^^ 

That  we  can  have  no  knowledge   whatever  of  the  deified 

something  which  Dr  Clarke  had  here  in  his  eye, — either  as  to 

1    -  •    e,  substance,  or  anything  else,  I  most  readily  and  most 

|)(!      ^^  believe.     That  this  should  be  acknowledged  by  a 

r  st,  is  nothing  strange.     But  strange  it  certainly  is — 

passing  strange;  it  surely  is  ridiculous  that  the  people 

^ !    ^  so  stoutly  assert  the  being  of  a  god,   and  would  thrust 

in vstical  dogmas  down  our  throat — it  is  surely  absurd 

liese  very  people,  for  all  tlieir  clamour  of  demonstra- 

— should   be   reduced  to   the   miserable  necessity  of  ac- 

dging  that  they  don't  know  what  it  is  that  they  talk 

V  at  would  Dr  Clarke  liimself  have  said  of  a  person  who 
|rr  f  nded  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  something,  till  then 
iiiii  n  wn  in  nature,  but  who  could  tell  nothing  about  its 
.  .s,  1 1,  e, — who  could  not  tell  whether  it  was  an  animal,  a 
iiiiip  r  iL  a  vegetable; — whether  it  was  a  solid  substance,  a 
ii(|iii(l,  a  gas,  or  whether  it  possessed  gravity  and  extension  ; 
— and  yet  gravely  declared,  that  it  was  impossible  ever  to  find 
Uiii  anything  of  this  kind  about  it?  This,  it  is  true,  is  to 
take  a  practical  view  of  the  case, — and  although  the  latter  is 
certninly  the  most  eligible  way  of  judging  of  all  such  matters, 
.  4  can  afford  to  give  the  theologian  the  advantage  of  any 
sort  ot  argument  he  may  choose  to  adopt,  however  inappli- 
cable to  the  })urpose.  What,  then,  does  this  concession 
make  for  the  theologian  in  the  present  instance  ?  Absolutely 
notliin;  .      If  tlie  theological  demonstration  were  thoroughh' 


f^-- 


correct,  it  ought  not  only  to  affect  the  existence,  but  every 
part  of  the  character  of  deity ; — his  essence,  his  nature,  and 
all  his  modes  of  being.  Nay,  this  very  knowledge  of  his 
nature  ought  to  enable  us — by  means  of  certain  definitions, 
axioms,  and  canons — to  predict,   with  the  ir  \     titude, 

every  event  in  futurity.     By  the  use  of  poi  did 

curve  lines,  &c.,   we  describe   (let  us  say)   an  eq;  r 

angle  :  but  when  the  description  is  finished,  we  percei\u  pro- 
perties in  the  figure  which  enable  us  to  demonstrate  its  rela- 
tions to   other  species  of  the  triangle,   the  quadrangle,   the 
circle,  sexagon,  sphere,  cone,  and  I  know  not  what  all  else. 
Now,  if  a  priori  reasoning  were  as   available  for  theological 
as  mathematical  purposes,  the  character  and 
thing  demonstrated  ought  to  be  equally  c^   . 
all  who  understand  the  terms  in  which  the  dem 
made,  and  in  any  way  capable  of  appreciating  t 
But,  alas  !   the  essence,  the  nature,  and  mode  of 
god  of  our  theologues  are  as  yet  an  enigma,   anc    s  i 

for  ever  remain  so,  notwithstanding  all  their  de?  ; 

respecting  him. 

Dr  Clarke   tries  to  get  out  of  the  difficulty  in  which  he 
here  finds  himself,   by  comparing  the  conduct  of  the  unbe- 
liever in  denying  the  existence  of  a  god,  to  that  of  a  blind  or 
deaf  man  in  denying  the  existence  of  colours  or  sounds,     in 
this  comparison  he  commends   the  latter  as   infinit     ' 
reasonable  than  the  former;  for  the   blind  or  deal 
says,  can  have  nothing  but  testimony  for  his  belief 
ing  sounds  or  colours,  whereas  the  atheist,  with  th*  -<! 

of  his  reason,  may  have   "undeniable  demonstration  ^ 

there  ever  any  other  sort?)  for  the  existence  of  a  - 
being.  Although,  however,  it  were  admitted  that  | 
ficient  of  any  of  the  external  senses,  had  no  other  e\  i  j  1 1 
than  testimony  for  the  existence  of  the  objects  perceived  In 
others  through  the  medium  of  those  senses,  the  comparison 
would  be  altogether  invalid.  Upon  what  authority  do  we 
inform  a  blind  man  of  the  existence  of  colours  ?  Is  it  not 
upon  the  authority  of  evidence  which  it  is  not  possible  he 
can  either  perceive  or  underst aiu         r     ?   *be  thei^t      ' 

D 


as 


possess 
with,  til 
can   p^'- 

irrt:!:n'. 

ClSt'cl  f 
still  li 


a   1 


yet  It 
of  I  ^ . 


]ir()Vv'  5 

tlllll,'!!} 

b  <  'i  ^'^    ■  ^ 


^cres  over  the  athiest  ?     Is  he  favored 
"sixth  or  a  seventh  sense,  whereby  he 

r    :.:.aurii\  things,— a  race  of  iu;u-  >   .^'-nces, 
ations, — while  we  remain  neces^ui.j  and 
led  from  so  noble  an  1     nviable  a  kind  of 
If  so,  what  is  that  sense,  w  is  it  exer- 

•vrhwe  maybe  unable  completely  to  under- 
piion  of  it,  or  tuiiy  to  appreciate  its  benefits, 
ly  be  but  an  act  of  charity  to  make  us  aware 
.>ss  of  our  condition.  If  not,  why  throw  a 
.Inr  upon  unbelief  as  though  it  were  as  palpable  a  perversity 
as  a  I.  aid  to  be  for  a  blind  man  to  deny  the  existence  of 
colours  or  a  deaf  one  of  sounds?  Our  possession  of  those 
.  of  which  such  unfortunates  are  destitute,  we  can  easily 

em  by  a  much  stronger  sort  of  evidence  than  tes- 
!,et  the  religious  do  the  same  with  us,  and  ^v      h  ui 
r  aiithnritv.-^The  fkct  of  the  case  is,   thai   li 

teach,  are  at  least  equally  blind  with  those 
,h  struct;  equally  ignorant  with  those  over  whom 

HUM    I  assume  such  a  wonderful  superiority. 
U  .  sort  of  salvo  for  the  awkwardness  of  maintaining  the 
existence  of  a  thing,  of  the  modes  of  which  he  knows  nothing, 
the  author  makes  a  false  statement   respecting  our  ignorance 
of  all  other  things.     "  There  is  not,"  he  says,  "  so  mean  an^ 
.ont.inptibleaplant   or  animal,   that  does  not  confound  the 
nH>.i  .nlorged  understanding  upon  earth  ;  nay,  even  the  sim- 
l  plainest  of  all  inanimate  beings  have  their  essence 
ce  hidden  from  us  in  the  deepest  and  most  impe- 
-urity."     Now,  what  does  he  mean  by  a  plant  or 
iiding  the  most   enlarged    understanding  on 
hp  refer  to  their  essence  or  substance  ?  In  that 
iy,  that  none  but  the  worst  informed  are  ig- 
ituent  principles  entering  into  combina- 
the  substance  of  all  animal  as  well   as  of  vegetable 
If  it  be  asked  what  the  essence  of  these  prmciples 
rl.on  f>>r  instance,   or  any  of  the  fifty  or  sixty  sub- 
bunted  simple  in  tin    present  state  of  chemical 
i        uld  reply,  that  the  question  is  impertinent.    If 


1 
t 

In 
SC 


i  t  ■  i  t  c. 


» 


the  term  essenct^  or  substance,  bears  reference  to  anytbiiig 


;onot 

de- 

luore 

1   to 


beyond  the  simple  elements  of  matter,  I  coi 

understand  its  signification,  and  would  be 

fined.     Were  water  to  be   resolved  into  coi. 

simple  than  oxygen  and  hydrogen,  and  names  i 

such,  it  would,  I  dare  say,  be  still  inquired,  wl. 

sence  of  these?     But  let   those  who   carp   and   cavil  about 

essence  in  this  manner   (having  a  more  occult  reference  in 

their  eye  than  to   the   ultimate  principles   of  things)    tell   us 

their  meaning,   and  we  shall  endeavour  to  meet  their  most 

searching  inquiries  upon  the  subject. 

Taking  matter  to  be  the  self-existent  being,  the  converse 
of  Dr  Clarke's  fourth  proposition  is  thus  fairly  made  out  .--^-^ 
namely,  that  of  its  essential  principles  we  certainly  have 
some  idea.  But,  at  all  events,  give  us  something  half  so  sa- 
tisfactory respecting  the  essence,  or  substance,  or  mode  of 
the  existence  of  a  god,  and  we  shall  be  pertbctly  coi  luu. 
The  very  fact  of  speaking  of  plants  and  animnK.  jiooi 

that  we  know  something  of  the  modifications  ot  matter;— can 
we  say  as  much  for  those  of  deity?  The  very  proposition 
under  notice  settles  this  question. 

The  fifth  proposition  is,  that  "  The  self-existent  being  must 
he  eternal,''— that  is,  (not  that  it  has  existed  from  eternity, 
for  that  has  already  been  proved,  but)  that  it  must  continue 
for  ever  in  existence.  This  proposition  is  but  very  lamely 
supported.  As  there  is  no  occasion,  however,  to  deny  that 
the  self^existent  being— whatever  it  may  be— is  eti  i  nai.  ^\e 
need  not  be  at  the  trouble  of  shewing  the  misapplies  ! 

the  author's  reasoning. 

Dr  Clarke's  sixth  proposition,  viz.  "  That  the  self-existent 
being  must  be  infinite  and  omnipotent,''  rests  entirely,  as  his 
third  does,  upon  a  view  of  Necessity,  which  has  already  biiii 
shewn  to  be  both  partial  and  unphilosophical.  It  is  only 
requisite  to  observe  here,  that  the  argument  brought  in  prv  ^  r 
of  the  proposition  is  exceedingly  defective.     It  is  shortly 

this; "  because  something  must  of  necessity  be  5^11  cxibicnr, 

therefore  it  is  necessary  that  it  must  likewise  be  infinite. ' 
Vow,   although  it  be  indisputable  that  something  must  be 


*'   — *  _  ■  * 


so 


eterml,  as  it  also  is,  that  something  mn^t  be  infinite  :  the 

soiiiethiisg  Hi  tliij  one  case  is  noi  \)rrixv{i  \u  be  identical  with 
the  soirietlung  iii  the  othf''  .:-',?s  not  at  all  toiiow, 

isequence,  the  argument  amounts  to  nothing.  To  re- 
inatter  may  be  regarded  as  eternal  and  space  in- 
iiiust,  it  is  true,  award  both  attributes  to  the 
I  III t!  ;  iHit,  at  same  time,  we  cannot  deny  to  the  former  that 
Mil  *  II  IS  ascribed  to  it.  Matter,  indeed,  may  be  infinite  as 
w  til  as  self-existent;  but  if  so,  it  is  not  because  there  exists 
betw  iii  ihese  qualities  anything  like  an  indissoluble  rela- 
tion. 

Having,  in  his  own  estimation,  proved  the  omnipresence 
of  the  something  which  has  existed  from  eternity,  the  author 
hence  infers  that  it  "must  be  a  most  simple,  unchangeable, 
uncorruptible  being;  without  parts,  figure^  motion^  divisibility^ 
'  '  i  i .  other  such  properties  as  we  find  in  matter."  And 
wli  rf.  ;  ?  Because  "  all  these  things  do  plainly  and  ne- 
ily  finiteness  in  their  very  notion,  and  are  utterly 
th  complete  infinity."  This  doctrine  may  be 
1  v^  a  being  made  up  of  a  heap  of  abstractions,  but 
y  sounds  very  strangely  when  applied  to  a  being  such 
{]  is  represented.  Even  Dr  Clarke  himself  speaks 
a  male  person,  possessed  of  certain  powers  and 
iites.  If  therefore  his  own  language  does  not 
i  cannot  conceive  wiiat  does.  Does  not  per- 
f  itenoss?  does  not  agency  imply  the  same 
!  IS   endless   to   follow  out   this   contemptible 

It  is  inconsistent  and  contradictory,  as  well  as 


t:  *^ ■  ir. 


4    t'l 


t  '  !  J  t 


till'!-* 


ii 


If      Ith  proposition  is,  '* 


/  iiuf  / 


■•"; 


'le. 


a 


t  1 1 


^hr  self-existent  being  can  be 
)se  two  or  more  distinct  beings  (it  is 
iselves   necessarily  and  independent 
plain  contradiction;  that  each  of 

tilt!  I  bi  !ur  .c|,ciiULiii  ui  liie  other,  they  may,  either  of 
ilti  nn  bi  ipposed  to  exist  alone,  so  that  it  will  be  no  con- 
is  dib  imagine  the  other  not  to  exist,  and  consequently 
IK  -  '  111  will  be  necessarily  existing."     Here  again, 

as  iii  iiib  rra-.t  luiig  upon   the  third  proposition,  the  reverend 


31 


author  places  his  whole  dependence  on  mathematical  Neces- 
sity, But  bearing  in  mind  the  evident  worthlessness  of  such 
dependence,  T  would  only  observe,  that  it  is  with  the  real 
state  of  things  we  have  to  do,  and  not  with  mathematical 
contradictions  at  all.  If  matter,  for  instance,  as  a  whole,  be 
not  allowed  to  be  unique,  it  follows,  from  our  previous  evi- 
dence of  its  eternity,  that  there  must  be  at  least  a  plurality  of 
self-existent  beings.  Even  although  the  unity  of  matter 
were  granted,  if  we  are  to  call  space  a  being,  the  same  con- 
clusion appears  to  be  unavoidable.  Unless,  indeed,  space 
and  duration,  and  the  diversity  of  matter,  are  to  be  excluded 
from  view  (which  would  be  incompatible  with  a  priori  prin- 
ciples), this  seventh  proposition  must  for  ever  remain  unte- 
nable upon  any  reasonable  grounds. 

Dr  Clarke's  argument  a  priori  stops  here.  In  his  eighth 
proposition,  and  those  following,  he  had  to  prove  that  the 
self-existent  being  must  be  intelligent,  and  all-powerful,  and 
a  free-agent,  and  wise,  and  good,  and  just,  and  so  forth. 
But  this  the  author  clearly  perceived  could  not  be  made  out 
a  priori.  What,  therefore,  was  to  be  done  ?  He  had  set  out 
with  undertaking  to  demonstrate  the  being  and  attributes  of 
god,  and  the  task  could  not,  of  course,  be  performed  with- 
out intelligence  and  all  the  rest  of  it  sharing  in  the  demon- 
stration ; — how,  then,  was  he  to  proceed  ? — Even  by  being 
contented  with  following  the  humble  course  of  reasoninir 
consequentially  instead  of  necessarily.  He  begins  by  carry- 
ing matters  with  a  high  hand  ;  by  attempting  to  make  out 
every  thing  a  flat  mathematical  contradiction  that  does  not 
quadrate  with  his  preconceived  theory  :  he  ends  by  recur- 
ring to  the  apologetic  mode  of  argument  adopted  by  others 
many  hundred  years  before  !  And  what  does  the  doctor 
make  of  all  his  shifts, — of  all  his  turns  to  catch  the  cur- 
rent as  it  serves,  whatever  point  the  wind  may  be  bl* 
from?  Nothing  at  all  to  boast  of:  nothing  even  capab 
servino"  as  a  consolation  for  having  been  forced  to  so  hum- 
bling  a  step,  for  having  employed  so  crooked  and  inconsis- 
tent a  policy.  * 

The  two  arguments  of  our   author,    in  fact,  counteract 


9St 


C 


each  other.     If  the  first  be  well-founded,  the  eecond  cannot; 

and  if  the  second  be  well-founded,  the  first  cannot.  Sup- 
pose ih  iiad  established  the  whole  of  the  propositions  up  to 
the  seventh  inclusive,  we  have  only  a  something  eternal,  in- 
dependent, unchangeable,  unique,  incomprehensible,  and 
everywhere  present;  whose  nonexistence,  whose  tempo- 
I  !  .  u!  ose  dependency,  and  so  forth,  cannot  be  conceived  : 
I  in  short,  that  answers  to  our  notions  of  space; 

tablish  the  existence  of  a  deity?  Are  we  to 
ice  not  merely  a  being  but  a  god  ?  To  settle  this  ques- 
we  may  ask,  what  are  tlie  divine  attributes?  Are  they 
aot,  according  to  the  author^,  own  description,  an  assem- 
Ub  ^  ^'  possible  perfections,  and  that,  too,  if  the  ex- 
pression be  allowable,  in  an  infinite  degree?  Can  we,  then, 
ascr  infinite  intelligence,  or  any  intelligence,  to  such  a 
,  ,  ...^  Caii  we  ascribe  to  it  infinite  power,  or  any 
I  .  r  nlill?  Can  we  ascribe  agency,  whether  free  or  not 
't  which  is  immoveable— to  that  which  even  ex- 
le  consideration  of  it  the  conception  of  motion 
her?  Dr  Clarke  himself  has  declared  this  to  be  im- 
l>u^.u.ic.  What,  then,  does  the  demonstration  amount  to  ? 
The  existence  of  a  mere  nonentity. 

On  the  other  hand,  taking  the  author's  own  absolute  ne- 
cessity as  the  basis  of  all  sound  demonstration,  and  the 
criterion  by  which  we  are  to  try  all  that  assumes  this  charac- 
1,1,  what  does  he  make  of  the  intelligence,  and  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  and  power  of  God?  He  does  not  so  much 
as  pretend  that  these  are  necessary  to  the  Something  whose 
existence  he  has  demonstrated.— The  conclusion,  therefore, 
to  which  we  are  necessarily  driven,  is,— either  that  his  ne- 
cessity is  good  for  nothing  in  the  argument— in  which  case 
his  whole  demonstration  falls  to  the  ground— or  that  it  leaves 
the  god  of  that  demonstration  without  power,  without  intel- 
ligence, justice,  goodness, -truth  ! ! ! 


in 


chui 


ss 


CHAP.  IV. 
Fallacies  of  Mr  Richard  Jack, 

It  would  be  a  fearful  task  to  toil  through  the  dreary  wander- 
ings of  this  ungainly  author.  In  perusing  his  work,  one 
would  imagine  he  had  been  born  with  theorems  in  his  head, 
and  a  rule  and  compasses  in  his  hands ; — and  were  it  not  that 
he  himself  tells  us  of  certain  misfortunes  which  befel  him  on 
his  flight  from  the  Scottish  capital,  and  its  rebel  occupi  -. 
in  the  memorable  year  forty-five,  we  should  scarcely  1 
thought  him  susceptible  of  human  passions,  or  capabl 
taking  a  share  in  the  concerns  of  those  stirring  times,  li  - 
performance  is  entitled,  "  Mathematical  Principles  of  Th^o-^ 
logy;  or,  the  Existence  of  God  geometrically  demons? 
in  three  books."  {London,  1747.  Svo.  pp.  S28,)— Per  i  ^ 
ouffht  not  to  notice  the  work  at  all:  it  is  of  a  character  so 
prosing,  formal,  and  roundabout.  The  tactician  draws  his 
lines  of  circumvallation  at  so  great  a  distance  from  the  for- 
tress he  purposes  to  reduce  ;  his  approaches  are  made  so 
tardily,  and  with  so  little  energy,  that  we  are  apt  to  lose 
patience  at  his  over-precaution,  and  waste  of  pains  as  well  as 
time.  If  all  this  were  a  sure  precursor  of  success,  we  should 
have  nothing  to  complain  of;  but  even  his  closing  positions 
are  so  ill  chosen,  as  either  to  be  perfectly  harmless,  or  to  lie 
entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  The  book  is,  neveriJ 
less,  a  great  curiosity.  It  fiirnishes  the  finest  speciniun- 
anywhere  to  be  found,  of  strict  mathematical  reasoning  as 
applied  to  theology.  It  may  therefore  be  amusing,  if  not 
instructive,  to  touch  upon  a  few  of  the  author's  happiest 
efforts  (and  those  upon  the  most  important  points  of  the 
discussion,)  were  it  only  to  show  the  effect  even  of  the 
purest  logic,  when  pressed  into  the  service  of  the  argument 
a  priori  for  the  being  and  attributes  of  a  god. 

The  first  book,   consisting  of  forty-five  propositions  and 


on 


i)i 


34 

theorems,  is  taken  up  in  proving  the  self-existence  of  an 
independent  being.  In  the  second,  an  attenrpt  is  made  to 
demonstrate  that  that  being  cannot  be  matter  ;  for  all  vision- 
antb  must  have  a  fling  at  this  untractable  impediment  to 
their  motions — this  desperate  eye-sore  to  all  their  specula- 
tions. Mr  Jack  says,  (prop,  41,  theor.  40,) — "Matter  is  a 
dependent  being,  because  that  being  which  can  have  any 
chanore  or  mutation  made  on  any  of  the  powers  or  properties 
11  I  ubsesses,  is  a  dependent  being;  but  a  change  or  mutation 
can  be  made  on  some  of  the  powers  or  qualities  that  matter 
or  any  material  being  possesses ;  therefore  matter  is  a  de- 
pendent being,  which  was  to  be  demonstrated." — It  is  to  be 
veivi  1,  that  a  dependent  being  had  been  previousiy  de- 
i    '  'whose   existence  is   the  eflect  of  some  other 

Hior;  so  that  this  syllogism  purports  to  be  a  demonstration 
t  matter  having  been  created  out  of  nothing!  How  is 
l)V  what  magic  is  so  rare  a  case  made  out?  I  say  at 
,  by  the  shallow,  paltry  trick  of  equivocation.  The 
t  of  the  major  premiss,  which  ought  to  have  been 
;il  with  the  predicate  of  the  definition  of  a  dependent 
iviously  given,  is  totally  different  from  it.  The  de- 
finitiuii,  it  is  true,  as  applied  to  matter,  involves  an  impossi- 
bility. Besides  taking  for  granted  the  existence  of  some 
agent,  unknown  and  undescribed,  its  power  of  bringing 
all  material  things  into  existence  isasumed.  But  if  the  defi- 
1  if!  n  in  question  falls,  the  conclusion  that  matter  is  a  de- 
pendent being,  reaches  to  its  forms  only,  leaving  its  inde- 
pendence as  to  existence  untouched. 

this  is  theological  demonstration.    Demonstra- 
aiii.},  much  more  easy,    and  infinitely  better  adapt- 
subject  in  hand,   than  the  vexatious  and  trouble- 
cess  of  induction  ;  by  which   we  are  bound  to  pro- 
acrent,  and  prove  the  extent  of  its  powers  and  mode 
11 — and  that  too  by  experience — before  we  can  le- 
y  ascribe  to  it  any  effect  whatever.     Here,  nothing 
further   is   necessary   than  to   frame  a   hypothesis — nothing 

more  than  to 

"  Call  some  spirit  from  the  vasty  deep ;" 


Us^ 


t  ■  u  T ; ,    I 
r !  1    \  u 
si  Mil  k: 


il'tX 


i) 


g 


111 


35 

invest  it  with  the  attributes  in  which  popular  prejudice  has 
arrayed  the  object  of  its  adoration,  and  by  t!ie  flourish  of  a 
conjuring  wand,  bid  matter  begone  into  its  assumed  original 
nothingness.  Mighty  magicians  !  If  our  reasoners  a  priori 
could  but  tell  us  where  they  get  the  creative  power  of  which 
they  speak  so  much,  independent  of  the  thing  they  go  about 
to  destroy,  they  would  render  their  argument  somewhat 
more  tangible.  If  they  could  even  tell  us  of  a  single  change 
effected  in  matter  by  means  of  their  pretended  agei  \.  k 
information  would  both  be  new  and  directly  to  the  pc 
But,  alas  for  them  !  how  should  they  know  anything  oi  a 
being  necessarily  prior  to  the  existence  of  the  material 
world, — or  (supposing  such  a  being)  its  essence  or  inodus 
operandi?  In  any  of  the  numberless  changes  effected  upon 
material  bodies,  do  we  see  any  thing  operating  except  other 
bodies  of  the  same  kind  ?  Can  we  even  conceive  of  any  other 
than  material  agency  ?  If  aught  else  than  substance  operates 
in  the  mutations  observed  in  physical  phenomena,  Nature, 
by  denying  the  fact,  betrays  and  belies  its  god,  and  science 
and  philosophy  are  left  with  a  heavy  account  of  heresy  to 
answer  for. 

After  having  demolished  the  self-existence  of  matter,  .Mr 
Jack  proceeds  to  prove  that  it  owes  its  existence  to  his  own 
"  independent  being."  As  the  argument  he  employs  on  this 
occasion  affects  to  demonstrate  the  intelligence  of  the  thing 
referred  to  in  the  first  book,  and  is  the  only  one  which 
touches  upon  this  highly  momentous  point,  it  is  the  more 
worthy  of  attention.     It  is  as  follows  :  — 

"  The  self-existent  and  independent  being  does  possess  a 
self-determining  power,  or  volition,  and  that  self-determin- 
ing power  or  volition  is  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  the 
first  temporary  being."  (Book  II.  prop.  32,  theor.  31.) 

"  Let  A  represent  the  self-existent  and  independent  being, 
B  the  first  temporary  being :  I  say,  the  self-existing  and  in- 
dependent being  A  is  possessed  of  a  self-determining  power, 
or  volition,  and  that  self-determining  power  or  volition,  is 
the  cause  of  the  existence  of  the  first  temporary  being  B. 
For  because  the  existence  of  the  first  temporary  being  B,  is 

E 


36 


the  effect  that  arises  from  the  exertion  of  some  of  the  powers 

III  (jualities  of  the  seir-exisliii«4  and  independent  being  A, 
lunl  ill  cause  of  the  exertion  of  any  power  or  quahty  of  the 
siliM  \i.tnig  and  independent  being,  is  a  self-determining 
jH>uti.  liiii  the  self-existing  and  independent  being  does 
l)s)v.  -  :  therefore  the  cause  of  the  exertion  of  that  power  or 
qii alnv  nl  uie  self-existing  and  independent  being  A,  which 
cin  .  pr  >  hi  le  the  existence  of  B,  is  a  self-determining  power 
(.r  V  a  that  it  does  possess,   and  will  be  the  cause  of  B's 

tx  !  -nee;  consequently  the  self-existing  and  independent 
iu  isjir  A.  ii^es  possess  a  self-determining  power  or  volition, 
whit  !i  .  it-uetermining  power  or  vuiition  is  the  cause  ui  Uie 
.  X  viriH  r  uftlie  first  temporary  being  B's  existence.  There- 
11  f  self-existiny  and  independent  being  does  possess  a  self- 
rf.  /  ///./y  power,  which  self-determining  power  is  the  cause  of 
1 1),  ,  ifpvce  of  the  first  temporary  being,  which  was  to  be  de- 
monstrated.' 

Who  can  doubt,   after  so  luminous  and  strictly  geometH- 


ca 


al 


t  IXi 


demonstration,  that  the  creation  of  a  mathematician's 
possesses  intelligence;  that  by  the  simple  act  of  its 
,n  it  lins  called  all  things  into  existence?  What  signi- 
I,  alliiou'di  the  latter  be  assumed  as  the  effect  of  the 
I?  What,  at  least,  does  it  signify,  that  the  introduc- 
t)f  one  of  the  factors  into  the  theorem  is  gratuitous? 
\x  no  one  can  expect  that  so  trivial  an  affair  as  the 
■1  of  a  temporary  being  by  a  self-existent  one  should 
i  ove(h  Do  we  not  see  that  that  flict  is  brought  in  as  a 
\  of  the  self-determining  power  of  A,  and  that  this 
next  made  out,  in  the  clearest  manner,  to  be  the 
ij\  the  c.^i^^tence  of  B?  What  more  than  this  beautiful 
i)!  reasoning  does  the  captious  infidel  want?  Descartes 
bo.i.tl'uily  exclaimed,  in  the  style  of  Archimedes,—"  Give 
nil  mutter  an<!  motion,  and  1  will  make  you  a  universe;" 
h)U!x  with  much  scantier  materials,  our  new-fangled  theorists 
nrrhiiu  I  <^reat  deal  more, — only  give  them  A  and  B,  and 
{\w\  uroduce  you  both  the  universe  and  its  creator! 

Tiie  <n-eatest  i)aii  of  Mr.  Jack's  theorems,   problems,  &c. 
^vc.  consisting   of    upwards   of  an    hundred    in    number,    is 


ixin- 


37 

taken  up  in  proving  what  stands  in  no  need  of  proof, — some- 
times even  of  self-evident  propositions — (such  as  that  "  a 
being  cannot  act  before  it  exists;  the  existence  of  the  cause 
of  any  effect  is  antecedent  to  the  existence  of  that  effect :  a 
being  cannot  be  instrumental  in  its  own  existence;  a  being 
cannot  act  after  its  existence  is  terminated,"  and  so  forth  ;)  — 
while  the  most  arbitrary  and  fanciful  notions  are  made  the 
bases  of  doctrines  the  most  important  in  the  whole  argu- 
ment. This,  verily,  is  straining  at  a  gnat  and  swallowing  a 
camel.  But  we  have  done  with  him.  If  the  "  Mathemati- 
cal Principles  of  Theology"  be  destined  to  escape  oblivion, 
they  may  afford  grounds  for  curious  speculation  respecting 
that  bias  toward  absurdity  which  is  too  frequently  found  to 
beset  the  human  mind.  One  of  our  finest  critics  has  de- 
scribed it  to  be  natural :  but  if  so,  it  has,  in  the  present 
instance,  received  no  inconsiderable  addition  from  the  hand 

of  education. 

On  this  particular,  a  word  here  may  not  be  out  of  season. 
We  have  often  heard  it,  as  it  were,  oracularly  declared,  that 
a  mathematical  education  is  of  great  value,  were  it  for  no- 
thing more  than  this, — that  it  habituates  the  mind  to  the 
closest  investigation,  and  the  most  unyielding  rules  of  de- 
duction. If,  however,  we  are  to  judge  from  the  examples 
before  us,  we  must  adopt  an  opinion  vastly  different.  The 
trentlemen  who  have  availed  themselves  of  their  mathemati- 
cal acquirements  in  establishing  the  first  principles  of  their 
faith,  have  doubtless  been  deeply  learned  in  the  science, — and 
yet,  what  have  they  effected  ?  Nothing  to  the  purpose;— no- 
thin^  but  a  perversion  of  the  truly  estimable  wisdom  of  the 
schools  from  its  proper  end  and  use,  to  the  furtherance  of 
that  which  begins  in  weakness  and  ignorance,  and  terminates 
in  folly.  The  unskilful  may  frequently  be  diffuse  and  indi- 
rect in  the  conducting  of  an  argument,  and  often  at  a  loss 
to  find  the  nearest  and  most  efficient  way  of  bringing  it  to  a 
close;  but  the  learned — who  seem  to  have  cared  but  loo 
litde  for  the  respect  due  to  their  classical  distinctions, — for 
them  it  was  reserved  to  confound  the  objects  of  totally  dif- 
ferent branches  of  study.     Their  error  appears  to  be  of  the 


88 


suint  1  tM->  Willi  liuit  of  Liic  Abyssinian  doctor,  celebrated 
fur  !;is  ireatnient  of  elephantiasis,  who  grew  so  full  of  his 
piou  ;  ,  that  he  judged  of  everything  by  its  rules — esti- 
ijia  rits  and  moral  character,  as  well  as  the  dis- 

ea>  i  ii  u  by  the  thickness  of  their  legs.  But  matters 
ul   in  ne  iniiriediate   concern  remain  to  be  settled  with  Mr 


CHAP.  V. 

Fallaciousness  of  Air  Gillespie's  "  Argu7nent" —  The 

Introduction, 


The  argument  above  referred  to,  is  by  no  means  the  least 
important  of  those  now  brought  under  notice.  It  does  not 
indeed  possess  the  originality  of  Clarke's  "  Demonstration," 
no  I  VI  n  the  half-constrained  and  half-popular  style  of  that 
work  ;  but  the  latter  quality  is  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  precision  of  purpose  and  exactness  of  arrangement.  Mr 
Gillespie^s  argument,  in  short,  is  little  else  than  the  quintes- 
sence of  that  of  his  predecessor,  more  directly  applied  and 
more  logically  stated.  It  is  perhaps  as  well  as  can  be  ex- 
pected of  a  work  of  the  sort,  and  may  probably  supersede  every 
thing  of  the  kind  that  has  gone  before  it. 

The  author,  in  his  introduction,  makes  some  very  shrewd 
observations  relative  to  the  character  and  efficiency  of  the 
evidence  commonly  offered  in  support  of  the  existence  of  a 
god.  These  are  classed  in  three  divisions.  The  first  pur- 
ports to  be  ''  An  inquiry  into  the  defects  of  mere  a  posteriori 

;.  ior  the  being  ot   a  deity;"  the  second  to  be  "  A 

"*    *^  miuel    Clarke's   demonstration   of  the  being 

of  God,"  and  the  third,  a  proof  that   "  neces- 

sar\  i\  nplies  infinite  extension." 

I  ih    I'  s  iitained  in  the  first  division  are,  generally, 

I'xcriliiii  .-^ikI  He)  V  much  to  the  poiut  :   but  with  a  posteriori 


39 


reasoning  we  have  here  nothing  to  do.  Tho-r  wliirh  imme- 
diately follow,  form  a  sort  of  apology  for  the  ii  an- 
ment  adopted  by  the  author,  and  are  intended  to  i 
species  of  argument  in  the  most  advantageous  light.  "  No- 
thing," he  says,  "appears  to  be  more  unreasonable,  iui 
that,  if  there  be  a  necessarily  existing  being,  there  can  be  no 
way  of  proving  it.  To  say  so,  seems  absurd.  And  if  there 
be  any  way  of  proving  there  is  a' necessarily  existing  being, 
that  must,  of  course,  be  by  arguments  drawn  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  thing.  Reasoning  from  experience  can  show 
what  may  be,  or  is  :  they  cannot  show  what  must  be.  To  say 
therefore  that  a  priori  reasoning  in  the  matter  can  never 
turn  to  any  account,  is  to  say  that  we  can  never  prove  a  ne- 
cessarily existing  being." 

"When  we  say  that  a  priori  reasoning  can  never  be  turned 
to  any  account,  we  mean,  to  any  account  in  demonstrating 
the  existence  of  a  god, — such  as   any  of  those  generally  be- 
lieved to  exist ;  that  is,  a  supernatural  being,  a  being  distinct 
from  nature,  and    either  partially  or  wholly,  overruling  the 
affairs  of  the  world,  physical  as  well  as  moral.     But  our  me- 
taphysical opponents  are   always  for  stealing  a  march  upon 
us.     They  never  speak  out  at  once ;   they   never — neither 
first  nor  last — say  distinctly  what  god  is.    Humble  terms  are 
employed  in  the  outset ;  such  as,  something^  being^  or  exist- 
ence.    By  and   by,  however,   through   the  accession  of  new 
qualities,  it  gradually  grows,    under  their  management,  into 
a  something  of  vast  and   indescribable  importance.     If  Mr 
Gillespie  had  even  told  us  what  he  meant  by  the  word  /        . 
which  he  so  frequently  makes  use  of,  we  should  have 
able  to   say  whether  it  could  be  proved  necessarily  to  exist 
or  not.     If  a  mere  abstraction   is  represented  by  it,  wt   cau 
have  no  quarrel  with  any  kind  of  demonstration  about    t  he 
pleases :  but  in  that  case  his  argument  does  nothing  to  the 
question  proposed.     Should  it,  on  the  contrary,  refer  to  an 
agent  of  any  kind — something  possessing  power — something 
that  acts — a  thing,  in  short,   having  a  real  existence,  in  the 
same  sense  as  that  in  which  we  apply  reality  of  existence  to 
common  objects,  there  can  be  no  objection  to  liis  free  use  of 


10 

file  term.  11  "  author*s  subsequent  reasoning  involves  the 
latter  construction  (which  construction,  1  may  mention  once 
form.  I  .iiall  uniformly  ado})t,)  for  he  makes  intelligence, 
•ifu!  }  ower,  and  freedom  of  agency,  part  of  his  argument. 
1,1  iJm  f.  liability  of  his  position,  however,  respecting  the 
fit  tessary  existence  of  such  a  being,  according  to  his  own 
*)f  necessity,  I  would  refer  him  to  what  has  been  stated 
III  iju    lirst  chapter  of  this  Refutation. 

ihe  reason  why  he  thinks  the  thing  may  be  proved,  and 
not  only  so,  but  easily  proved,  is,  that  necessity  of  existence 
itiiplies  that  what  exists  necessarily  must  be  the  sine  qua  nou 
of  every  thing  else.  But  there  is  no  being  to  which  this  con- 
dition can  be  applied,  except  matter,  and  matter  does  not 
exist  by  that  necessity  which  alone  is  admitted  in  the  argu- 
iiH  nt  apriori;  although  it  certainly  exists  by  another  neces- 
hiiy,  and  that,  too,  of  a  much  more  rational  description,  be- 
t    n-(   riore  suitable  to  the  subject. 

If!  the  third  division  of  his  introduction,  Mr  Gillespie 
launches  out  upon  the  proof  of  a  point  which  it  would  be 
premature  to  discuss  here.  Indeed,  it  seems  altogether  su- 
perfluous. "  Supposing,"  says  he,  "  that  there  is  a  neces- 
sarily existing  substance,  the  intelligent  cause  of  all  things,  it 
may  be  easily  shewn  that  that  substance  is  infinitely  extend- 
til."  Little  need  be  said  what  conclusion  may  be  thought 
necessary  to  follow  such  a  supposition,  whether  infinite  ex- 
it iiMon,  infinite  duration,  or  any  other  kind  of  infinity.  It 
is  the  supposition  itself  that  we  have  to  look  to.  If  that  be 
I  ilk  good,  he  may  make  anything  further  he  thinks  proper 
if  not,  he  will  have  nothing  of  a  substantial  character 
to  ucar  the  attribute,  of  which  he  seems  so  forward  to  dis- 
pose. 

A       mber  of  other  matters  are  introduced  to  our  notice 

n  Illy  stage  of  the  discussion,  but  in  general  they  are 

nf  i  uhordinate  description,  and  had  better  be  left  to  stand 
ui  i  ii:  Willi  ihe  main  argument.  There  is,  however,  one  ex- 
^.,  ptn.n  —  one  statement  which  calls  for  some  preliminary  re- 
;  nl>.  Ai  the  conclusion  of  the  thirteenth  section,  it  is 
a\  Li  ltd  that,   «' to   maintain  there   is   no  infinitely  extended 


41 

substance,  is  to  maintain  there  is  no  eternal  substance." — 
Now,  with  reference  to  matter,  this  doctrine  appears  to  be 
at  variance  with  fact.  No  one,  it  is  true,  can  logically  main- 
tain that  matter  is  not  infinitely  extended  ;  because  that  pro- 
cedure would  be  to  engage  in  the  proof  of  an  absolutely 
negative  position,  which  it  is  impossible  to  establish.  At  the 
same  time  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  it  would  be  a  very  hard 
task  to  bring  sufficient  evidence  in  support  of  a  contrary 
affirmation:  we  cannot  prove  that  it  is  infinitely  extended. 
The  fact  is,  we  cannot  say  whether  matter  be  infinitely  ex- 
tended or  not.  In  so  far  as  our  experience  goes,  and  our 
observation  can  carry  us,  we  find  substance  completely  oc- 
cupying every  part  of  space.  This  shall  be  shown  when  we 
come  to  review  Mr  Gillespie's  notions  relative  to  the  divisi- 
bility of  matter.  We  see  worlds  on  worlds  and  systems 
upon  systems,  floating  around  us  in  all  directions,  accompa- 
nied by  such  circumstances  as  to  prove  the  presence  of  mat- 
ter to  the  utmost  distance  which  the  best  telescopes  can 
reach.  But  what,  after  all,  is  the  greatest  latitude  we  can 
allow  to  such  distance  compared  with  immensity  ?  Judging 
from  analogy,  indeed,  we  might  be  ready  to  conclude  even 
the  infinity  of  space  to  be  filled  with  some  substance  or 
other.  Analogical  reasoning,  however,  is  necessarily  false, 
consisting,  as  it  does,  of  applying  to  one  thing  the  deductions 
of  our  experience  respecting  another.  It  is  grossly  unphi- 
losophical,  therefore,  to  build  any  theory  or  any  argument 
upon  it. 

Although  it  be  frankly  admitted,  then,  that  we  neither 
have,  nor  can  have,  any  knowledge  of  the  infinity  of  material 
extension,  more  than  we  can  have  of  its  limits ;  that  does 
not  at  all  involve  a  denial  of  the  eternity  of  matter.  1^^> 
perceive  a  vast  universe  in  existence,  but  were  it  only  a  sin- 
gle atom  of  matter,  no  power  of  man  could  reduce  it  to  anni- 
hilation, or  even  conceive  of  a  power  capable  of  producino- 
this  effect.  To  suppose,  therefore,  that  matter  ever  began 
to  exist,  or  to  suppose  its  existence  capable  of  termmation, 
is  to  admit  the  occurrence  of  these  stupendous  effects  without 
a  cause.     This  absurdity  can   only  be  avoided   by  assuming 


42 


i  'I  '  s 


the  existence  of  some  immaterial  being  actim  -  ni  agent  in 
the  case, — which  assumption  is  a  double,  if  not  a  threefold 
ahsiirdit).  1  or,  lirst,  we  have  to  take  for  granted  the  ex- 
e  of  what  is  inconceivable,  namely,  an  immaterial  be- 
:  or  else  that  of  some  substance  exempted,  and  without 
on,  from  the  essential  laws  of  its  nature.  Next  have 
le  tlie  supposed  being  with  j)ower  sufficient  to  ac- 
(  nu  !  h  (:ind  mark  what  it  is  that  is  to  be  accomplished) 
ij  or  annihilation  of  matter, — either  of  which   is 

an  )ssibility. 


\%'  t 


CHAP.  VI. 


» 


Fallacies  of  Mr  Gillespie — The  "  Argument. 


This  grand  argument  is  laid  out  in  two  books.  In  the  first, 
the  metaphysico-theologian  endeavours  to  prove  that  some 
being  exists  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  every  other  thing  in 
existence.  It  consists  of  three  parts,  or  series  of  proposi- 
n  iiaintaining,  first,  that  Space   is  this   being;  second, 

h  }  i] ration  is  also  a  being  of  the  same  kind  ;  and,  third, 
fh  II  these  are  not  different,  but  identical.  The  second  book 
a5eMl.c^  to  the  subject  of  the  forementioned  proofs,  the  di- 
vine attributes  of  omnipresence,  unlimited  power,  and  free- 
dom of  agency. 

We  cannot  afford  time — much  less  can  it  be  expected 
ill, It  others  should  afford  patience — both  to  make  a  general 
anuvsis  of  this  argument,  and  examine  the  reasonings 
brought  up  in  support  of  the  different  parts  of  it.  As, 
therefore,  authors  are  peculiarly  jealous  of  their  privileges, 
and  tetchy  and  froward  with  regard  to  any  freedom  used  in 
tin  ireatment  of  their  expressions,  we  shall  take  the  most 
laborious,  nnd  at  the  same  time,  least  advantageous  way  of 
CO  '  iting  Mr  Gillespie's  principles, — book  by  book,  and 
I  1  p  tioi!  by  proposition.  This  course  is  the  more  neces- 
but  \j    as  the   argument  a  priori,   unlike  that  derived   from 


43 

experience,  depends  upon  a  chain  of  reasoning,— not  upon 
the  pointed  putting  of  a  single  case,  or  the  tautological  re- 
petition of  a  thousand. 

The  first  proposition,— "//i/«iVy  of  extension  is  necessarily 
existing,'' — it  would  be  absurd  \n  the  extreme  to  deny.  No 
more  can  we  imagine  any  limit  prescribable  to  extensiow, 
than  we  can  imagine  the  outside  of  a  house  to  be  in  the  in- 
side of  it.  The  same  unqualified  assent,  however,  cannot  be 
accorded  to  proposiuou  the  second;  namely,  that  ''Infinity 
of  extension  is  necessarily  indivisible" 

Here,  the  author  has  given  up  his  abstract  necessi:  v,  .. 
looks  for  something  like  experiment  as  alone  capable  oi  sa- 
tisfying him :  for,  notwithstanding  some  unmeaning  talk, 
intended  to  explain  away  this  desertion  of  his  own  prin- 
ciples, he  evidently  insists  upon  a  real  division— an  actual 
separation  of  parts,  with  some  distance,  however  little  be- 
tween them,  as  that  which  he  means  by  divisibility.  U  Mr 
Gillespie  pleads  not  guilty  to  this  charge,  I  would  ask  him 
how  mathematicians  have  always  regarded  the  smallest  par- 
ticle of  matter  divisible  to  infinity  ?  Do  they  ever  contem- 
plate actual  separation  of  parts  in  such  cases?  No;  but 
parts— as  Mr.  Gillespie  himself  has  it— in  the  sense  of  par- 
tial  consideration  only.  When  they  speak  of  the  hemis- 
pheres of  the  earth,  divided  either  by  the  plane  of  the  equa- 
tor,  or  that  passing  from  the  meridian  of  Greenwich  to  the 
180tii  degree  of  longitude,— are  they  necessarily  guiltv  of 
speaking  unintelligibly  ?  If  not,  how  is  it  that  extension  is 
necessarily  indivisible  ? 

It  may  be  said,  perhaps,  that  although  matter  is,  menfaHv, 
easy  enough   to   divide,  it   is  impossible  to  apply  the  same 
process  to  extension.     But  is  not  the  space  occupied  bv  the 
earth,— or  say,  its  useful  little  representation,  a  twelve  n    i 
twenty-inch  globe,— as  easily  conceived   to  be  divisible  i  v 
mathematical  plane,   as  the  globe  itself  which   is  not  rea  h. 
but  only  mentally  divided  ?    A  mathematical   point  has  a, 
dimensions,  because  whatever  possesses  dimensions  iiiu^i  |ios» 
sess  figure,  and  that  which  has  figure  cannot  be  a  point.      J 
like  manner,   a  plane  cannot  have  thickness,  since  what 

F 


44. 


4^ 


;,  I  -.   o 


«;  ■  1 ' 


in!  ti 


n  f  f 


i.  of  the  smallest  thickness  is  not  a  plane  but  a  solid.  In 
dividing  space  by  abstraction,  therefore,  there  is  no  necessity. 
ir  author  would  have  us  believe,  of  falling  into  the  ab- 
n-v  of  space  divided  by  actual  separation  of  the  parts, 
no  space  between  them. 

1  be  of  no  great  consequence  although  the  second 
I  were  as  irrefragable  as  the  first ;  for  it  bears  upon 
iit  all  applicable  to  any  being,  whether  real  or  ima- 
oi„ar.  But  we  need  not  always  allow  even  gratuitous 
fallacies  to  escape.  The  exposure,  at  least,  shows  the  bad- 
ness of  the  cause  that  renders  the  adoption  of  them  neces- 
sary. If  Mr  Gillespie's  indivisibility  be  understood  in  an 
abslract  sense,  his  proposition  is  not  true;  if,  in  reference 
to  actual  experiment,  he  may  be  applauded  for  having  re- 
course to  inductive  instead  of  a  priori  reasoning,  he  need 
not  so  soon  have  neglected  the  principles  upon  which  he 
started,   without  intimating  some  ground  for  the  change. 

A  corollary  is  here  introduced,  asserting  the  immoveabi- 
lity  of  extension.  It  is  true,  that  either  finity  or  infinity  of 
extension  can  never  be  supposed  capable  of  motion.  Space 
(  iMot  be  carried  out  of  itself,  nor  can  those  parts  of  it  oc- 
cupied  by  Mont  Blanc,  for  example,  and  the  Peak  of  Tene- 
rifFe  ever  be  imagined  to  change  places.  To  the  truth  of 
what  is  here  maintained,  therefore,  we  must  give  unreserved 
assent,  independent  of  its  nominal  connection  with  the  false 
(hu  trine  immediately  going  before. 

;;      ^•  -  now  come  to  a  proposition  which  may  be  said  to 

.ith   it  all  the  strength,  if  it  has  any,  as  well  as  the 

ss,  of  Mr  Gillespie's  "  Argument."     It  is  the  third 

er,    and    announces   that    "  There   is  necessarily   a 

Bfing  uJ  uijinity  of  extension^ 

\{  we  had  not  already  seen  that  the  author's  reasoning 
leads  us  to  conclude  that  his  Being  is  to  be  regarded  as 
something  substantial,  we  should  have  been  at  a  loss  what 
to  make  of  the  subject  of  the  above  predicate.  As  a  logi- 
cian would  say,  it  is  not  distributed.  But  if  we  refer  lu 
tin  n  ird  division  of  his  introduction,  we  find  him  contend- 
I  a  the  necessary  being   must  be  of  the   character  now 


ascribed  to  that  subject.  At  the  twenty-third  section  he 
avows  that  "  It  may  be  laid  down  as  one  of  those  truths 
which  admit  of  no  contradiction,  that  with  regard  to  the 
uncreated  substance,  at  least,  virtue  (meaning  power,  I  pre- 
sume,) cannot  be  without  substance.  Speaking  of  this  sub- 
stance," the  author  goes  on  to  say,  "  Sir  Isaac  Newton  hath 
these  words," — which  may  be  rendered — "Omnipresence  is 
not  by  power  alone,  but  also  by  substance ;  for  without  sub- 
stance, power  cannot  possibly  subsist." 

Not  only,  however,  is  the  necessary  being  of  Mr  Gillespie 
said  to  be  a  substance,  and  therefore  by  his  own  and  Sir 
Isaac  Newton's  showing,  possessed  of  virtue  or  power,  but  it 
has  already  been  designated,  "  the  intelligent  cause  of  all 
things."  I  am  quite  aware,  that  neither  intelligence  nor 
power  can  be  demonstrated  of  any  thing  a  priori,  which  we 
shall  see  when  this  author's  reasoning  upon  those  attributes 
fail  in  our  way.  We  may,  nevertheless,  in  endeavouring 
to  bear  in  mind  the  description  of  Being,  of  whom  so 
great  things  are  predicated,  avail  ourselves  of  any  expres- 
sion of  opinion  respecting  it,  that  may  be  scattered  through- 
out the  work.  It  is  only  on  this  account  that  I  have  at  pre- 
sent alluded  to  these  after-considerations  at  all. 

Relative  to  a  Being  of  this  sort,  then, — at  all  events,  relative 
to  a  substantial  being,  the  truth  of  the  predicate  is  what  we 
have  now  to  try.  The  evidence  in  support  of  the  third  pro- 
position is  stated  in  the  form  of  a  dilemma.  "  Either  infinity 
of  extension  subsists,  or,  (which  is  the  same  thing,)  we  con- 
ceive it  to  subsist,  without  a  support  or  substratum  ;  or,  it 
subsists  not,  or  we  conceive  it  not  to  subsist,  without  a  sup- 
port or  substratum.  First,  If  infinity  of  extension  subsist 
without  a  substratum,  then  it  is  a  substance. — Secondly,  If 
infinity  of  extension  subsist  not  without  a  substratum,  then, 
it  being  a  contradiction  to  deny  there  is  infinity  of  exten- 
sion, it  is  a  contradiction  to  deny  there  is  a  substratum 
to  it." 

The  conclusion  deduced  from  the  latter  alternative,  be- 
sides appearing  lame  and  impotent,  is  somewhat  laughable. 
But  allowing  its  logic  to  pass,  it  may  be  worth  while,  if  only 


$  ■■ 


Ulj 


S.    I 


!   Hi 

i  4  ) 


■10 

lU  to  Liv  ihu  lurcc  of  this,  the  negative  horn   of 
.     ,   by  ascertaining  what  it   is  made  of. — Tb*^  nri- 
•on  of  the  word  substratum  is,   a  thing  lymg 
else.     ^Supposing,   for  instance,  a   bed  of 
der  the  soil,  gravel  is  the  substratum  of  that 
!  ;;  trc  be  sandstone  below  that,   the  sandstone  is  the 
lib  !r:i!ii!!i  of  the  gravel ;  if  coal  be  found  beneath  the  rock, 
the  substratum  of  it,  and  so  on  as  far  as  we  can  pe- 
netrate.    To  say,  therefore,   that  space  must  have  a  substra- 
iniiiing  less  than  saying  that  it  must  have  something 
upon ;  something   to   bold    it   up.     That  is, — Space 
!iMi  1  have  limits;  and  there  must  be  something  in  existence 
It  \  its  limits  to   keep  it   from  falling — out   of  itself!      If 

till  i     L  the  acme  of  absurdity,  a  ship  falling  overboard, 

:i-  r  !  sailors' jest  goes,  is  no  longer  a  joke;  and  the  clown 
M  lio  boasted  that  he  could  swallow  himself,  boasted  of  no- 
thing that  he  might  not  be  reasonably  be  expected  to  per- 
form. 

Should  it  be  contended  that  the  term  ought  to  be  under- 
suM  u  n  its  secondary  acceptation,  and  that  the  substratum 
c >f  !n«3  infinity  ot  extension  subsists  within  itself,  as  any  ma- 
terial body  is  said  to  be  the  substratum  of  its  own  extension: 
—  I  would  remark,  that  we  know  of  nothing  possessing  ex- 
ti  I!  H  n  except  matter, —  nothing  else  that  can  stand  as  an 
object  to  which  extension  may  be  ascribed  as  a  property  ; 
nuit  iliat  matter,  not  existing  by  mathematical,  but  only  by 
I  Ir.  •]  necessity,  cannot  be  the  substratum  referred  to. 
] :  it  is  evident  that,  in  material  bodies,  comprising  all  that 

V  now,   or  ca7i  know  of  Being,  it  is  impossible  to  find 

I  that  will  serve  Mr  Gillespie's  purpose.     Even  this 

lity  overlooked,  however,  what  is  it  that  next  meets 
<  .  f — One  substance  occupying  infinite  extension,  and 

pjioilur  occur}  iiig  part  of  this  extension,  if  not  also  the  whole 
of  it  ;  \i\  olhtr  words,  two  things  at  the  same  time  occupying 
the  same  space.  Theology  always  entangles  its  advocates  in 
inextricable  absurdities. 

A  religious  friend  who   has   corresponded  with  me  upon 
il  i>  I  rill,  nllenfes  that  the  substance  of  the  substraium  of  in- 


47 


111* 


ahhl 


e; 


used 


Ui     ..." 

*^        It.  ■      i- 


finite  extension  is  not  material  ;  but   ihii>   i 

something  he  has  been  taught  to  repeat,—  I      h 

his  sounder  judgment.     Substance  and  i 

The  words  are  synonymous  and   convertible.      \\  Ja  ii 

otherwise  they  become  unintelligible;  inasmuch  as  wi   nauht 

then   talk   of    an    unsubstantial    substance    and   imniaLei    u 

matter.  - 

But,  to  refer  to  the  first  proposition, — has  it  not  been  de- 
monstrated that  infinity  of  extension  exists  necessarilv  ? — 
that  it  exists,  per  se,  by  the  most  abstract  and  m(^!a|  i  \  ! 
necessity?  In  what  sort  of  predicament,  then,  must  liiat 
reasoning  appear,  which  gives  up  a  leading  and  univei  v 
admitted  truth  by  placing  it  in  a  questionable  position  ?  Mr 
Gillespie's  dilemma  recognises,  at  least,  the  possibility 
finite  extension  requiring  a  substratum  to  support  it- 
nite  extension,  which  is  itself  necessary  !  How  is  this  ? 
it  found  that  although  space  possessed  a  few  of  the  divine 
attributes,  it  did  not  possess  all,  nor  anything  like  all  that 
were  deemed  needful  to  constitute  a  respectable  deity  ?  Aui- 
wMth standing  appearances,  I  should  hope  not.  But,  at  any 
rate,  we  are  again  landed  in  a  quagmire  of  absurdity — the 
absurdity  of  supposing  a  thing  to  be  dependent  and  inde- 
pendent at  the  same  time.  If  space  must  be  conceived 
a  priori  necessary,  to  talk  of  a  substratum  being  necessary  in 
the  same  sense  of  the  word  is  nonsense :  on  the  other 
hand,  if  it  stands  in  need  of  a  substratum,  the  foundation 
stone  of  this  great  argument  must  crumble  into  dust,  and  be 
unfit  to  serve  as  a  substratum  to  anything. 

But  if  we  are  dissatisfied  with  the  author's  substratum,  we 
are  not  much  better  situated  with  the  alternative  left  us:  a  r 
according  to  the  dilemma  he  has  imposed  upon  us,  i 
obliged  to  conclude  that  infinity  of  existence  is  itseli 
stance.  I  had  thought  infinity  a  mere  nominal  adjuiu 
lowed  to  space,  from  the  circumstance  ci  oor  being  ui 
to  conceive  limits  to  its  extent;  but  iIr  thuibi  :t  m 
thinks  otherwise.  Infinity,  with  him,  i 
On  the  same  ground,  we  might  conteiKi  lliai  J  >  a 

stance  too.     Supposing,   however,   that  space   ini'nuivh 


&1  i 


ai- 


X- 


\ 


48 

I.  h!  i!  is  \v!]:ii  i>  means,  all  tiial  we  can  say  is,  that  if  it  be 
a  substance  it  is  no  longer  space,  or  extension,  or  any  thing 
t  I  fhan,-^ust  a  substance; — unless  it  may  be  both  exten- 
SHjii  and  substance  at  the  same  moment.  But  these  are  pro- 
fane tiioughts.  Perhaps  according  to  the  new  school  of 
theolocTv.  not  on1v  may  a  book  be  a  substance,  but  its  exten- 
vi,  !  ly  also  be  a  substance,  its  weight  another,  its  colour 
a  '  ,  and  so  forth.  Let  us  hear,  however,  how  the  divine 
Liiuui  V  of  infinity  of  extension  being  a  substance  is  to  be  sus- 
tained.—Mark  with  what  boldness  of  reasoning  it  is  brought 
out.  The  infidel  must  look  well  to  his  footing  and  points 
of  defence,   lest  he   be   laid  prostrate  by  its  overwhelming 

force. 

*•  1 1  any  one  should  deny  that  it  is  a  substance,  it  so  sub- 
sisting;" (that  is,  without  a  support  or  substratum,)  "to 
I  e  beyond  contradiction  the  utter  absurdity  of  such  de- 
i  we  have  but  to  defy  him  to  show  why  infinity  of  exten- 
di,.n  not  a  substance,  so  far  forth  as  it  can  subsist  by  itself 
or  wiiiiout  a  substratum." 

A  new  era  has  thus  dawned  upon  logic.  A  grand  dis- 
covery is  on  the  eve  of  rendering  her  power  irresistible,  and 
her  reign  everlasting  and  glorious.  It  is  to  be  henceforth  no 
longer  necessary  for  us  to  prove  an  affirmative :  assert  what 
wr  n  nv,  no  one  dare  deny  our  assertions.  For  to  prove  be- 
;  contradiction  the  utter  absurdity  of  such  denial,  we 
nly  to  put  a  brave  face  on  it,  and  throw  a  defiance  in 
u.  th  of  our  opponent  to  prove  the  negative. 

lUii  waiving,  in  the  meantime,  our  plea  of  want  of  evi- 
dence for  the  affirmative,  a  simple  man  would  say  in  relation 
u.  tlie  case  before  us,  that  substance  possesses  attraction, 
which  extension  does  not ;  that  it  is  observed  under  a  thou- 
sand varieties  of  figure,  density,  colour,  motion,  taste, 
<  i:r,  iuiiibustion,  crystalization,  &c.  which  neither  exten- 
or  infinity  ever  is,  or  can  in  its  nature  be.  He  might, 
ilcplorable  ignorance,  ask  if  ever  infinity  was  weighed, 
•  sion  analyzed  and  its  elements  reduced  to  gas? 
uouitl,  1  ^iare  say,  only  evince  in  the  eyes  of  the  theo- 
.  that  such  a  person  had  no  idea  of  the  very  conveni- 


ng 


or 


49 

ent  art  of  applying  metapiiysical  language  to  things  phy- 
sical; whereby  a  mere  abstraction,  or  at  most  a  property  of 
something  else,  can  so  easily  be  charmed  into  a  reality.  I  Is 
showing  why  infinity  of  extension  is  not  a  substance,  there- 
fore, would  be  set  down  as  grovelling  and  common-place, 
and,  by  consequence,  useless. 

After  all,  however,  how  does  the  notable  proposition 
stand,  that  there  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  infinity  of  exten- 
sion ?  The  principle  of  the  argument  brought  up  in  support 
of  it — the  dilemma,  in  short — gives  way  on  every  side.  It 
stands  without  a  vestige  of  backing,  except  from  the  vain 
and  swelling  words  of  a  blustering  defiance,  the  value  of 
which  no  one  but  a  fool  could  be  at  a  loss  to  estimate. 

The  author  himself,  indeed,  seems  not  half  sure  of  having 
made  good  the  doctrine  he  has  announced:  for  after  having 
done  all  he  could  do,  by  the  foisting  in  of  a  substratum 
upon  extension  to  the  destruction  of  its  necessary  existence, 
— he  comforts  himself  with  the  reflection,  that  it  is  of  very 
little  consequence  whether  men  will  or  will  not  consent  to 
call  this  substratum  by  the  name  of  being  or  substance,  be- 
cause "'tis  certain  that  the  word  substance  or  being,  has  never 
been  employed,  can  never  be  employed,  to  stand  for  any- 
thing more,  at  least,  than  the  substratum  of  infinity  of  exten- 
sion." It  is,  of  course,  of  no  manner  of  importance  whether 
men  consent  to  do  what  they  always  have  done  and  must 
continue  to  do,  or  whether  they  will  not.  But  how  far  is  the 
because  and  its  certainty  consistent  with  the  lurking  suspi- 
cion of  the  honoured  name  of  Being  or  substance  being 
refused  to  his  unsupported  substratum  ?  Yet,  on  the  very 
heels  of  this  misgiving,  he  concludes, — "There  is,  then^  ne- 
cessarily, a  Being  of  infinity  of  extension."  The  worthy 
old  father  of  the  church,  who  declared  his  belief  of  a  chris- 
tian dogma  because  it  was  impossible,  is  not  far  from  having 
a  logician  of  the  mathematical  school  to  keep  him  in  coun- 
tenance. Mr  Gillespie  frames  a  most  absolute  conclusion 
with  his  premises  dubiously  faltering  on  his  lips. 


50 


CHAP.  VII. 

Fallacies  of  Mr  Gillespie — The  "  Argument  continued. 

1  Hie  fourth  proposition  of  this  argument — that  "  the  being 
1)1  iiiiiuitj  of  extension  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity" 
-  '^  '  .1  upon  the  baseless  fabric  of  extension  being 
i  of  its  being  in  itself  a  substance,  or  requiring  a 

support  it.  There  is  a  scholium  attached  to 
it,  11,  which  we  must  not  entirely  lose  sight  ofl  It  is 
1  I  n  1  ;igainst  the  unity  and  simplicity,  and  by  consequence 
(  t  !  r  !  or  thinks)  the  infinity  of  the  material  universe. 
Ji  st  I  conceive  the  conclusion  of  this  schoHum  es- 

c u  a  right  view  of  the  eternity  of  matter,  or  even  the 

question  of  the  existence  of  a  god,  far  less  that  the  pre- 
mises are  so,  that  I  make  any  observations  upon  either. 
The  self-existence  of  matter  stands  high  above  the  reach  of 
the  ariruinent  a  priori;  but  it   is  surely  more  direct  and  pro- 


lit'!'      !.  i  >      1 

to  ret  1 1 
docs   \\{ 

othi"'-, 
titlifr--;i 


iH)se  the  weakness  of  that  argument,   than  allow  it 
!  reputation  for  close  and  rigid  reasoning  which  it 
at  all  merit.     In   the  present   instance,  as  in  all 
lere  is  not  a  single  position  taken  in  hostility  to  an- 
il  principles,  that   will  not  also   be  found   hostile, 
1  it=    1  to  physical  science  or  sound  philosophy. 

r     •      the  substratum  c  f  the  infinity  of  extension,   is  held 
i  sensible   in  the  self-existent   substance.     This  is 

tiH   pni  here  adopted:  but  in  reply  to  a  similar  theory 

in  I  >!' 1  ^^:  k,/ ^  "  Demons! ration,"  ii  has  been  shown  to  be con- 
I  o  o  reason  and  the  nature  ui  things.  Upon  that  point, 
th  \      a!  i  not  now  going  to   contend.     It  is  upon  the 

ii,      rin«   <  r  being  finite  in  extension. 

!  >  the  proof,"  says   Mr  Gillespie,  "  whether  or 
niiver^e  tan   be  such   substratiinj,   we  have 


c , 


>U 


not  Uk;  iiKiU'fia!   I 


h\}\  to  a>k,    are  tiie  parts   of  the  material  universe  divisible 


51 

from  each  other?  and  are  they  moveable  among  them* 
selves  ? — for  if  they  be  so  divisible,  if  so  moveable,  then 
the  material  universe  cannot  be  the  substratum  of  infinity  of 
extension." 

That  matter  is   divisible,   (on   a   certain  and  special  con- 
struction of  terms,)  no  one  will   deny;  but  that  it   is  abso- 
lutely so,  is  not  true.     We  can  divide  substance  by  abstrac- 
tion as  we  divide   space.     If   it  be  of  any  specific  body  we 
speak,  we  can,  in   reality,  separate  one  part  from  another. 
This,    however,  is  not   absolutely  to  divide  matter.     In  the 
discussion    of   his  second    proposition,     the    author    makes 
manifest  the  absurdity  of  supposing   space  really  divisible, 
since  that  would  be  to  suppose  the  parts  separated  without 
having  any  space  between  them.     Now,  in  the  same  sense  of 
divisibility,   matter  is  not  more   subject  to  it  than  space.     I 
grant  that  we  may  conceive  of  an  absolute  separation  of  sub- 
stance generally,  which  we  cannot  do  in  the  case  of  exten- 
sion.    But   that  is  not  the  question.     It  is  real  and  generic 
separation  we  have  in  view.     The  houses  on  opposite  sides 
of  a   street    stand  separate ;    is  that   to  say,   however,  that 
there  is  no  substance  between  them  ?    Is  it  not  childish  to 
suppose,  that  by  cutting  an  apple  in  two,    we  have  actually 
divided   matter  so  as  to  leave  nothing  of  a  material  kind  be- 
tween the  parts  of  the  fruit  ?    It  is  quite  common  to  say,  a 
bottle  is  empty,  after  the  liquor  it  contained  has  been  poured 
out;  and  this  may  be  a  convenient  enough  way  of  expressing 
ourselves  when  we  have  little  else  than  eatables  and  drink- 
ables to  talk  of;  but  is  a  vessel  in  this  case  really  empty  ?    is 
it  completely  exhausted  of  all  kind  of  substance  ? 

But  we  may  as  well  go  into  the  hypothesis  of  a  vacuum  at 
once,  for  to  this  point  the  argument  obviously  tends.  What, 
then,  is  a  vacuum  ?  It  is  space,  I  })resume,  without  any 
matter  being  present  at  all.  Is  such  a  state  of  things,  how- 
ever,  anywhere  to  be  found  ?  I  think  not,  and  that  it  does 
not  appear  possible  to  find  it.  What  is  commonly  called  a 
vacuum,  is  only  a  part  of  space,  say  the  interior  of  a  re- 
ceiver deprived,  in  a  great  measure,  of  atmospheric  air. 
The  extraction  of  the  atmosphere,  be  it  observed,  is  never 

G 


ipletely  effected.     In  the  use  of  tlie  pneumatic   pump, 
each  succeeding  stroke  only  brings  off  a  certain  proportion 
of  wliat  the  receiver  contains— say  one-half— so  that  the  resi- 
ilu    bung  never  more  than   half  taken  away,  the  most  con- 
stant application  of  the  best  constructed  machine  can  never 
make  the  exclusion  of  the  air  perfect.     Even   in  the  Torri- 
cellian operation,    the  alleged  perfection  of  the  vacuum  de- 
pends upon  the  crude  notion  of  there  being  neither  air  nor 
|H  -     ;      he  fluid  by  which  it  is  formed,  which  is  not  the  fact. 
\.i..    iter  all,  supposing  the  air  entirely  shut  out,  is  there  no 
c  !      I  sp-cies  of  matter   left  behind?     Where  is  light,   and 
X  l!   re  heat?    As  light,  however,  may  be  excluded  to  a  con- 
le  extent,   I  would  only  ask  whether  heat  be  a  sub- 
stance or  only  a  property  of  substance  ?    Taking  the  thing 
at  the  worst,   the  presence  of  heat  indicates,  of  course,  the 
presence  of  some  substance,  of  which  it  is,  in  such  instance, 
a  property.     This  conclusion  is  inevitable,  unless  a  quality  of 
a  thing  may  be  present,   where   the  thing  itself  is   not.     It 
must  here  be  remembered,    that  the  greatest  degree  of  cold 
ever  experienced,  only  indicates  a  lower  degree  of  heat  than 
h  It!   previously  been  known— not  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
en  (Hint  of  heat  to  be  further  reduced. 

Should  it  be  demanded— as  it  is  always  commendable  to 
do  on  such  occasions— what  the  substance  is  which  we  deem 
to  1k^  present  in  what  is  usually  denominated  a  vacuum,— we 
,,,,,  reply— the  electric  fluid.  No  substance  is  capable  of 
excluding  it.  As  water  seeks  its  level,  the  fluid  in  question 
presses  everywhere,  that  it  may  be  everywhere  present;  and 
with  tbo  tendency,  it  penetrates,  in  a  manner  the  most  irre- 
M  to:  ,     vrry  thing  that  can  be  opposed  to  its  course. 

I  I  of  there  being  a  vacuum  in  nature,  is  as  idle  as 

t  prove  one  by  artificial  means.     1'  e  demon- 

sii  o  o  oo.oi,  u  any  case,  succeed.  Some  of  our  astrono- 
iiH  r^,  I  iticularlv  of  the  Newtonian  sect,  were  obliged  in  a 
ii.anner  to  adopt  this  doctrine,  in  order  to  back  out  their 
theological  assumptions.  They  supposed  the  planets  to  have 
b  <  1  ioirled  from  the  hand  of  a  god,  like  bowls  by  a  garae- 
ind  that  no  new  impetus  of  a  supernatural  kind  being 


tO 


53 

observed,  the  motion  of  these  vast  bodies  must  be  perpetu- 
ally retarded,  unless  a  perfect  vacuum  had  been  wisely  pro- 
vided for  them  to  revolve  in.  But  the  dogma  is  now  scat- 
tered to  the  winds.  The  single  phenomenon  of  comets 
describing,  at  each  successive  revolution,  progressively 
diminished  orbits,  settles  the  point.  Were  there  no  sub- 
stance present  to  resist  their  motion,  we  must  conclude,  upon 
the  principles  of  the  truly  great  Newton,  that  the  centrifugal 
force  would  necessarily  and  for  ever  counterbalance  the 
attractive. 

There  is,  however,  more  extensive  evidence  than  this. 
Among  the  sublime  discoveries  which  have  rendered  the 
name  of  Herschel  illustrious,  none  is  more  sadly  interesting, 
than  that  of  a  prevailing  tendency  to  contraction  observed  in 
the  multitudinous  systems  of  the  universe.  In  the  nebulae — 
in  the  Magellanic  clouds — and  even  the  milky  way,  the  same 
unceasing  compression  is  observed,  and  of  course  the 
same  evidence  is  offered  of  the  presence  of  a  resisting  me- 
dium. 

The  contemplation  of  this  probable,  though  remote  con- 
summation of  all  existing  relations,  may  excuse  a  remark  or 
two  relative  to  an  infinite  series  of  beings,  if  secondary 
planets  are  ultimately  destined  to  fall  in  upon  their  primaries, 
and  these  together  upon  the  central  bodies  to  which  they  are 
subordinate,  changes  upon  a  vast  scale  must  result,  and  new 
formations  follow.  The  laws  occasioning  these  chr  -. 
acting  eternally,  must  be  the  source  of  eternal  revolutions. 
Where,  then,  in  these  circumstances,  are  we  to  look  for  a 
beginning?  In  the  most  unceasing  endeavours  we  may 
make  to  reach  the  starting  point  of  nature's  operations,  we 
shall  find  our  labours  vain  ;  and  every  attempt  of  this  sort 
as  completely  foiled  as  in  seeking  for  their  end. 

Although,  however,  we  were  fully  warranted  in  i 
the  system  of  change  which  brought  along  with  it  these 
gloomy  forebodings,  of  all  the  greatness  and  glory  of  ninn 
being  sunk  in  everlasting  forgetfulness — although  it  were 
argued,  and  that  successfully,  that  the  deductions  made  from 
the  data  stated  regarding  the  ethereal  fluid  are  yet  undeter- 


niined,  — we  are  not  left  without  ample  grounds,  in  as  far  as 
our  researches  reach,  for  holding  the  doctrine  of  a  plenum. 
Wherever  we  turn  our  eyes,  we  observe  matter  in  existence. 
I>  V  nd  the  sphere  of  human  observation  we  know  nothing. 
li  science  cannot  demonstrate  that  matter  is  infinite  in  ex- 
tension, much  less  can  Mr  Gillespie  demonstrate  that  it  is 
iiui.  vu.     His  conclusion,  therefore,  falls  to  the  ground. 

T  need  say  little,  I  dare  say,  respecting  the  argument 
di  iivod  from  the  motion  of  material  bodies:  it  amounts  to 
iu)tf!i!ig.  The  different  parts  of  matter  only  change  places  ; 
unless,  therefore,  substance  lose  its  extension,  —  nay,  its 
verv  existence — by  being  moved,  there  can  be  no  foundation 
r*t  (It  iracting  from  its  extension,    finite  or   infinite,   on  that 

iPM    nut. 

I  have  thus  gone  more  fully  than  I  intended,  or  even  an- 
ticipated, into  an  examination  of  the  scholium  to  Mr  Gil- 
lespie's fourth  proposition.  The  sum  and  substance  of  it  is 
liiis — (and  indeed  it  is  but  a  contemptible  fallacy) — Because 
matter  does  not  agree  in  character  and  properties  with  a 
mere  abstraction, — that  is,  because  it  is  not  what  it  is  not — it 
cannot  be  the  substratum  of  infinite  extension;  it  cannot  be 
the  sine  qua  non  of  all  things  ;   it  cannot  be  the  self-existent 

being  ! 

Upon  the  fifth  and  last  proposition  of  this  part  of  the 
work,  that  "  there  is  necessarily  but  one  being  of  infinity  of 
expansion,"  it  is  hardly  worth  our  pains  to  remark.  The 
existence  of  Mr  Gillespie's  being  of  infinity  of  extension 
havino-  lailed  under  proof,  any  consideration  relative  to  its 
supposed  exclusiveness  of  all  other  necessary  existences, 
cannot  be  of  much  avail.  Even  admitting  his  substratum  of 
space,  however,  why  may  there  not  be  two,  or  twenty,  as 
well  as  one  ?  No  reason  can  be  assigned  why  infinity  of  ex- 
pansion (which  the  author  now  appropriates  to  space,  as  he 
does  extension  to  matter,)  should  have  an  immaterial  som^- 
thino  It,  keep  it  in  existence,  that  would  not  prove  that  that 
something  should  have  something  else  to  keep  it  in  existence 

as  well. 

But  it  is  needless  to   fight  with  shadows  which  may  be 


55 


raised  as  flist  as  they  are  demolished,  '^''.^^iy  are  the  illusions 
of  a  subtle  imagination,  fabricated  to  support  what  cannot  be 
maintained  on  fair  and  tangible  grounds.  The  supposition 
of  a  plurality  of  necessary  beings,  against  which  our  theorist 
so  strongly  inveighs,  springs  from  his  own  theogonal  geo- 
logy. This  spurious,  this  imaginary  sort  of  science,  should 
either  not  have  been  resorted  to,  or  no  objection  should  be 
taken  to  its  inevitable  consequences. 


CHAP.  VIII. 
False  Reasoning  of  Mr  Gillespie  ;  Second  Part  of  his  Work, 

The  second  part  of  the  work  before  us,  approaches  as  near 
as  possible  to  similarity  with  the  first.  "  Infinity  of  dura- 
tion is  necessarily  existing  ;  infinity  of  duration  is  necessarily 
indivisible;  infinity  of  duration  is  necessarily  immoveable; 
there  is  necessarily  a  being  of  infinity  of  duration  :  the  being 
of  infinity  of  duration  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity; 
there  is  necessarily  but  one  being  of  infinity  of  duration." — 
These  are  the  propositions — these  the  dogmas  that  are  now 
brought  forward  for  discussion.  And  wherein  do  they  differ 
from  those  already  examined  and  exploded  ?  In  nothing  but 
the  substitution  of  infinity  of  duration  for  that  of  extension. 
The  same  process  is  repeated  ;  the  same  reasoning  gone 
through,  almost  to  the  very  letter. 

It  may  have  been  necessary,  from  the  method  of  demon- 
stration adopted,  to  come  over  the  same  ground  and  reiter- 
ate the  same  deductions  on  the  slightest  alteration  in  the 
subject  of  proof.  As  in  mathematical  affairs  the  validity  of 
the  argument  a  priori  may  depend  upon  the  minuteness  and 
accuracy  of  detail,  regardless  of  the  repulsiveness  of  a  slavish 
tautology.  There  is  no  reason,  however,  why  we  should 
follow  so  uninviting  an  example.  It  will  be  sufficient  to 
show  that  the  refutation  of  the  doctrines  sought  to  be  esta- 


S6 


-;ii 


\\ 


fii 


Lin 


blished  in  the  former  case,   applies  with  equal  force  to  those 
iioponnrled  in  the  latter. 

I        0  ti    this  application   cannot  be  hard  to  accomplish. 
It,     n  there  be   any   difference    between   the    author's 

n  ir  in   the  different  parts,   it  is  worse  in  the  second 

th  n  ^5.     Although   extension  may  be  conceived  of  as 

bstiiiction,  it  is  also  conceivable  as  one  of  the  pro- 
if  not  the  only  indispensible  property  of  matter. 
ue  entertain  any  such  notion  respecting  duration? 
heard  of  duration  being  a  property  of  matter? 
iH  hypothesis  of  substance  being  infinitely  extended, 
gard  it  as  "  the  substratum  of  infinity  of  exten- 
at  least  we  understand  what  is  meant  by  such  a  cir- 
being  predicated  of  substance.  But  how  are  we 
:  I  what  is  meant  by  anything  being  the  substra- 
ihe  infinity  of  duration  ?  Yet  that  something  is  such 
a  substratum  is  what  is  broadly  declared  to  be  the  fact. — 
This  is  what  we  are  unhesitatingly  required  to  admit,  or  else 
give  in  to  the  monstrous  proposition,  that  duration  is  itself  a 

substance  ! 

If  the  author  will  consult ''  An  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena 
of  f Ih  I  luman  Mind,"  published  some  few  years  ago  by  Mr 
yiiVu  lie  will  find  even  the  first  proposition  relative  to  dura- 
ti  111  (|iH  tioned  by  that  philosopher.  We  cannot  indeed 
^u}  I  MS  ihiration  to  have  had  a  commencement,  nor  imagine 
a  t  riiiination  for  it;  but  the  writer  whose  name  has  been 
mentioned,  concludes  that  the  past  being  already  out  of  ex- 
istence, and  the  future  not  being  yet  in  existence,  there  can 
h,  11  )  (!  I  ration  in  existence  at  all.  To  consider  the  matter 
!^  ;    -^laps  to  consider  it  too  curiously  ;  for  whatever  is 

^  it  may  require  the  labour  of  an  age  to  effect,  is 
cessive  instants  of  time  as  they  pass,  however 
iiose  instants  may  be  reckoned,  and  however,  as  of 
I   >v  fiMist   proportionably  be,   rapid  m  liicir  succes- 
An  ih       I  would  infer  i^.  tliu  infinity  of  time,  if  not 


mil.';'' 

SlOIl. 


more  m 


consideration 


! finite  space,  is  at  all 


\\  i 


atum  or  support 


57 


for  its  existence  ?  Why  suppose  that  it  cannot  exist  of  itself 
and  independently  of  all  substance  ?  Or,  making  this  sup- 
position, why  lay  down  as  a  fundamental  principle,  the  abso- 
lute and  metaphysically  necessary  existence  of  infinity  of  du- 
ration ?  To  reconcile  these  suppositions  is  essential  to  the 
validity  of  Mr  Gillespie's  argument;  but  is  there  any  way  of 
reconciling  them  ?     The  thing  is  impossible. 

But  about  duration,  or,  as  the  author  has  it,  infinity  of 
duration  beiiiff  a  substance — what  could  have  driven  him  to 
a  hypothesis  so  outrageously  extravagant  ?  Nothing,  I  am 
persuaded,  but  the  sheer  desperation  of  a  dauntless  advocate 
in  a  sinking  cause.  I  do  not  mean  that  at  the  present  day 
theism  is  going  down — perhaps  it  may  never  go  down  ;  for  it 
is  wondrously  well  borne  up  by  the  inflated  supports  of  pas- 
sion, self-interest,  and  prejudice,  which  preserve  it  from  its 
otherwise  certain  fate.  All  I  mean  is,  that  casting  aside  its 
unworthy,  yet  popular  dependencies,  and  relying  on  reason 
alone, — not  the  best  argument  in  all  the  moods  and  figures 
of  the  schools,  could  keep  it  from  finding  the  bottom. 

If  duration  were  substantial,  it  would  have  to  be  a  series 
of  substances,  and  so  resemble  the  ghosts  in  Macbeth's  vi- 
sion,— another  and  another  coming  into  view  and  pa^siiig 
out  in  quick  succession — till  we  should  be  glad  to  get  quit  of 
the  phantoms,  and  exclaim  with  the  tyrant,  "  Til  see  no 
more."  Hov/  else  should  we  have  any  notion  of  what  is  in- 
dicated by  the  substance  of  duration  ?  Can  we  conceive  of  a 
substance  to  be  in  existence  and  out  of  existence  at  the  surie 
time?  If  not,  we  may  take  leave  to  ask  if  the  substance  f 
any  part  of  duration  already  past  be  yet  in  being,  while  ac- 
cording to  our  vulgar  conceptions,  unsubstantial  durati  o 
itself  is  not?  Or  can  we  recal  the  hours  of  yesterday^  aiid 
constantly  grow  younger  instead  of  growing  old? — But  it  is 
in  vain  to  attempt  reducing  the  vagaries  of  a  subtle  imagina- 
tion to  consistency,  it  e  order  of  natural  relations.  ^  r 
endeavours  not  unfre^u    aly  involve  us  in  a  labyrinth  *  i 

theoretical  absurdities  we  would  thereby  Uin  ivel.   Wi 
go  on,  by  way  of  illustration,  to  suppo-  -laii 

— and  figure,   and  colour,  and  all  the  of  it ;  or  to 


58 

tend  that  duration  was  of  a  particular  density,  or  bore  the 
shape  of  an  aged  man  with  an  hour-glass  and  scythe.  The 
shorter  way,  however,  is  to  conclude  at  once,  that  when  du- 
liit!!!]  becomes  a  substance  it  ceases  to  be  duration. 

In  supporting  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  the  being  of  in- 
finite duration,  an  argument  is  introduced  in  scholium  first  to 
the  fourth  proposition,  going  to  show,  that  a  succession  of 
beings  cannot  be  the  subject  of  what  is  there  predicated. 
11.  rrason  assigned  for  this  deduction  is,  that  the  parts  of 
i!h  lu  cession  are  divisible  from  each  other,  and  moveable 
.!  -^themselves.  Now,  this  is  what  may  be  called  hunt- 
in^  in  a  wrong  scent,  or  reasoning  according  to  the 
luuacy  logically  denominated  ignoratio  elenchi ;  for  the 
separation  of  things  from  each  other,  as  well  as  their 
motions,  relate  to  space,  and  not  to  duration  at  all.  If, 
indeed,  it  could  be  made  to  appear  that  a  cause  could 
be  separated  at  pleasure  from  its  effect;  say,  the  report 
o!  I  piece  of  ordnance  from  the  explosion  of  the  charge,  it 
'  '  e  something  to  the  point.  It  would  be  showing,  at 
any  rate,  that,  in  as  far  as  duration  was  concerned,  a  separa- 
tion between  the  parts  of  a  succession,  might  actually  take 
place, — to  which  the  argument  in  hand  has  no  reference. 
This  would  be  a  most  convenient  discovery;  as,  upon  the 
most  distant  intimation  of  any  impending  calamity,  we  might 
possibly  divide  the  effect  so  far  in  the  order  of  time  from  the 
cause,  as  to  keep  ourselves  clear  of  the  consequences.  A  ball 
hvvi\  ai  J  man  might,  in  all  likelihood,  be  arrested  in  its  pro- 
ir  without  the  assistance  of  Father  Murphy,  who  was  an 
;!  ;  in    these  matters;  or,   even  after  being  shot  through 

!!i  head,  he  might  be  prevented  fi'om  suffering  any  mischief 
iiW  I  \  IS  found  convenient  to  allow  the  parts  of  the  succes- 
sion {.{  events  thus  separated,  to  close.  This  brings  to  our 
remembrance  the  curious  fact  of  Dean  Swift  having  put  off 
a  lunar  eclipse  ft >r  twenty-four  hours  or  better,  because  he 
was  too  unwell  at  the  time  to  describe  it  to  some  of  hiscoun- 
u  V  friends;  or  the  poet's  description  of  the  lion — 

"  Who  look'd  so  horrible  and  wondrous  grim, 
That  his  own  shadow  durst  not  follow  him." 


I 


59 

Of  the  same  nonsensical  character  is  the  idea  of  motion 
among  the  parts  of  a  succession.  If  the  motion  relates  to 
duration  or  the  order  of  time,  a  son  may  exist  antecedent  to 
his  father ;  a  plant  previous  to  the  seed  from  which  it  sprun^r ; 
and  all  the  agents  employed  in  the  production  either  of  na- 
ture or  art,  after  these  same  productions,  or  thousands  of 
years  before  them.  Caesar  and  Napoleon,  with  their  r  > 
spective  eras,  may  be  made  to  change  places,  or  perhaps 
made  not  yet  to  have  been  brought  into  existence. — Lul— 
something  too  much  of  this.  If  the  argument  have  reference 
to  the  division  and  motion  of  things  in  space,  it  is  too  blun- 
dering for  serious  consideration ;  if  to  the  divisibility  and 
moveability  of  things  and  events  as  relative  to  duration,  it  is 
too  absurd. 


CHAP.  IX. 

Fallaciousness  of  the  third  part  of  Mr   Gillespie's 

"  Argument,*' 

There  is  very  little  to  be  met  with,  so  curious  in  its  rea- 
soning, as  this  part  of  the  "  Argument."  We  have  seen 
that  the  first  pretends  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  being  of 
infinite  extension,  and  the  second  that  of  a  being  of  infinite 
duration.  In  the  present  instance^  these  hypothetical  beings 
are  attempted  to  be  made  out,  not  different,  but  iden- 
tical. 

In  one  sense,  it  is  true,  we  should  have  little  objection  to 
the  doctrine  here  inculcated.  Matter,  for  example,  is  cer- 
tainly eternal ;  and  on  the  ground  of  there  being  no  vacuum 
in  any  part  of  space,  it  must  be  regarded  as  infinite  in  ex- 
tension ;  and  hence  we  have  a  being  whose  extent  and  dura- 
tion both  reach  to  infinity.  But  matter  would  not  there- 
fore be  the  substratum  either  of  the  one  or  the  other:  that 
is  to  say,  it  is   not  necessary — not  absolutely  necessary-    i!    t 

H 


60 


t  ¥  Ml   extension,   or  space 


sliouJi!    !ni\'e 
a iiu  ! n 


I  r:i! 


n  f 


of'  n 


any   substratum  or 

)  its  existence  whaUM  I  ;    niu  in  rpspect  of  duration, 

nprehend  what  a     iib  tratum  ut   it  means.     This 

f  hmtruage  in  an  acco}  lation  beyond  the  reach 

*    iision,   is  an  adequate  reason,  according  to 

>M  common  sense,  and   of  Mr   Gillespie  too, 

.>ction  of  the  reasoning  depending  upon  it.      What- 

significd  by  the  word,  however,  it  must  be  some- 

1;:  ..ntl'rom  matter,  since  duration  does  not  depend 

on  iiuitter  for  its  existence. 

But  the  author's  ''Being  of  infinity  of  expansion  and 
uvfiritv  ol  duration"  does  not  suit  this  plain  and  rational 
V.  V  of  the  subject.  Taking  the  substratum  of  extension  to 
b,  n  'hing  more  than  the  thing  or  substance  extended, 
"^irdto  mathematical  necessity  in  the  matter,)  we 
Iv  see  room  for  one,  while  Mr  Oillespie  introduces 
hen  amalgamates  them  into  unity. 
I  infinity  of  expansion  subsists  by  itself,"  says  he, 
t  is  a  being:  and  infinity  of  duration  subsists  by 
then  it  is  a  being ;  or,  infinity  of  expansion  sub- 
it  a  substratum  or  being  ;  and  infinity  of  dura- 
.t^  not  without  a  substratum  or  being. 
'  verv  part  of  infinity  of  expansion  is  in  every 
r  duration;  that  is,  every  part  of  the  being 
nsion,  is  in  every  part  of  the  being  of 
jtion  ;  part  in   all   the   cases,   in  the   sense  of 

^tion  only. — To  wit,   the  whole  of  the  being 

of  inlinu'  of  expansion,  is  in  the  whole  of  the  being  of  in- 
finity of  duration:  whole,  but  as  n  figure.  And  this  bting, 
most  manifestly,  impossible,  if  the  being  of  infinity  of  ex- 
pansion and  the  being  of  infinity  of  duration  be  different:  it 
ijcn-^.  iriU  t>)llows  that  they  are  identical. 

.•lIuMU  si-condly,  infinity  oi  cx|;.:..n!i  subsists  not  without 
ftgubNiiHUHH  or  being;   and  infinity 
withoiif  :i   .::-^^.<'-ni  Of  lieiug.     Anti 

:,„:i   of  ini- 
\\  of  tlie    I 


I  \\ It li 

ii 


pat 
of 

ii," 
par 


Juration  subsists  not 
:'ry  pan  -?  .  a':--*  i- 


I  '  \  s. 


<<  i 


5    ,1 


'V 


61 


That  is,  the  whole  of  the  substratum  of  infinity  of  expansion, 
is  in   the   whole   of  the   substratum  of  infinity  of  duration. 


1  , 


ti 


lis  being  most  manifestly  impossible,  if  iJi 


ratuni 
ing 


or  being  of  infinity  of  expansion,  and  the  substrai 
of  infinity  of  duration,  be  different;  it  follows  l  sarily 
that  they  are  identical ;  to  wit,  the  substratum  or  being  of 
infinity  of  expansion,  is  also  the  substratum  or  being  of  in- 
finity of  duration,"  &c.  &c. 

The  sum  and  substance  of  all  this  technical  argumenta- 
tion, is,  that  a  plurality  of  substances  possessing  any  kind  of 
infinity,  cannot  coexist;  but  expansion  and  duration  having 
each  a  substratum,  they  may  be  reduced  to  one,  which  can 
be  made  to  serve  for  both.  Now,  supposing  Mr  Gillespie  to 
have  proved  the  existence  of  his  substrata,  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  principle  upon  which  he  builds  his  conclusion  is 
correct.  For  if  we  cannot  conceive  any  limit  either  to  dura- 
tion or  space,  they  must  equally  be  infinite.  But  there  is 
nothing  absurd  in  holdin^:  these  two  infinities  to  exist  to- 
gether ;  and  why?  Because  they  are  of  totally  different 
kinds.  They  are  as  different  as  time  and  place,  which  peo- 
ple, in  their  most  common  intercourse,  regard  as  entirely 
distinct.  Indeed,  these  infinities  are  nothing  else  than  time 
and  place  extended  beyond  all  bounds.  The  latter  is  com- 
plete;  is  always  open  to  our  survey;  and  in  as  far  as  the 
mind  can  grasp  it,  it  remains  at  all  times  within  our  review. 
But  the  former  is  essentially  evanescent,  for  even  while  yet 
speaking  of  time,  it  has  already  fled, — a  new  portion  come 
into  existence  and  again  gone  out.  Duration  never  can  be 
complete;  we  never  can  recal  the  past,  and  the  future,  as 
such,  is  eternally  the  future. 

If  therefore  the  infinity  of  duration  and  that  of  exfMmsioii 
be  so  dissimilar  in  their  nature  as  not  to  clash  or  be  in  the 
slightest  degree  incompatible — why  should  not  their  sub- 
strata be  equa^^i  different  and  equally  independent  of  each 
other  ?  Any  argument  that  should  prove  the  infinities  spe- 
cified to  be  distinct  in  their  character,  ought  to  prove  their 
substances  no  less  distinct:  and  that  which  should  niki  mit 
the  identity  of  substance  in  such  cases,  ought  in  likr 


Ii  i  J  c  r 


to   make    oi 


the    coiupi^  f< 
r:!i  H' , ;   ■  •■     ^ 


6^ 

identity  of  the  abstractions  to 

I    idly  do  to  tell  us,  that  every 
partofthesul-n    {  iHte  expansion  is  in  every  part 

of  the  substratum  ot  iiitinite  duration,  because  this  is  not 
exactly  the  i^irt  \uuough  (to  shorten  and  f\i miliar ise  the 
phraseology,  wlucii,  without  seeking  any  advantage  from  it, 
we  have  occasionally  done,)  space  has  existed  in  every  point 
of  time  already  past,  it  does  not  now  exist  in  bygone  dura- 
tion, but  only  in  what  is  present,  and  never  can  be  supposed 

to  overtake  the  future. 

This  doctrine,  however,  would  not  quadrate  with  Mr 
Gillespie's  theory.  It  involves,  according  to  his  own  de- 
ducticH!  .  the  existence  of  at  least  two  infinite  and  independ- 
ent is,  which  is  by  half  too  many  for  his  purpose. 
He  e  inconvenience—the  obtrusive  redundancy  was  to 

be  rid  of  on  any  terms  and  at  all  hazards;  and  hence 
has  evidently  been  adopted,  the  awkward  scheme  of  amalga- 
mating the  substrata  of  space  and  duration,  and  mak- 
ing only  one  of  them,  for  which  there  seems  to  be  as  little 
necessity  as  there  is  for  the  existence  of  the  substrata  them- 
selves. 

Besides,— what  are  we  to  make  of  another  coexistence  of 
substances,  which  does  not  appear  to  have  suggested  itself 
to  the  author's  mind  ?  To  his  own  thinking,  he  has  made 
out  but  one  substance  or  being  of  infinite  expansion  and  du- 
ration, but  how  is  he  to  dispose  of  the  actual  existence  of 
matter?  The  want  of  mathematical  necessity  for  its  exist- 
ence is  not  sufficient  to  strike  it  out  of  the  category  of  pre- 
sent existences.  To  render  the  argument  of  any  avail,  the 
ideal  system  of  the  bishop  of  Cloyne  ought  to  have  been  in- 
corporated with  it ;  for  even  with  Mr  Gillespie's  one  infinite 
substance,  the  real  existence  of  matter  brings  along  with  it 
he  is  so  much  afraid  of— namely,  the  absurdity  of  two 
at  the  same  time  occupying  the  same  space.     On  this 

iiul   let   it  be    remembered   that  it  is   not   requisite    we 
demonstrate   the  infinite   extension   of  the  material 

^rse.     In  as  far  as  kdoes  extend,  it  occupies  space ;  and, 
tlie  infinitdv  extended  substance  occupying,  of  course,  the 


\\  I 


DC 


ur 


63 


!U 


iU- 


whole  of  space,  must  occupy  that  of  the  material  universe  as 
well  as  any  other, — if  any  other  there  be. 

Let  us  suppose  for  a  moment,  the  being  of  a  substance  of 
infinite  expansion,  the  intelligent  agent  in  the  production  of 
all  things — and  all  this  is  contended  for  in  the  "  Arguments" 
— what  was  it  to  do  when  performing  the  miraculous 
incomprehensible  feat  of  creating  the  universe  out  of 
thing?  Was  it  to  annihilate  so  much  of  its  own  substance 
as  would  be  necessary  to  make  room  for  matter,  in  order  to 
give  it  verge  and  scope  enough  ?  If  not,  either  matter  could 
not  be  brought  into  being,  or  we  must  suffer  ourselves  to  be 
driven  to  the  conclusion  already  shown  to  be  necessary  in 
admitting  the  very  palpable  doctrine  of  the  actual  existence 
of  matter. 

The  orthodox  dogma  of  the  immateriality  of  god — what- 
ever may  be  the  other  difficulties  it  has  to  contend  with — has 
this  advantage,  that  it  brings  not  two  substances  into  a  com- 
pound occupancy  of  space.  But  independent  of  this  advan- 
tage, it  does  not  pile  stratum  super  stratum,  Pelion  upon 
Ossa,  and  then  contend  that  after  all,  they  are  of  perfect 
unity  and  simplicity  :  that  they  cannot  be  divided  even  m 
thought,  while  the  greatest  pains  are  in  the  act  of  being 
taken  in  order  to  bring  us  to  consider  them  in  a  different 
light. 

But  here,  perhaps,  I  have  gone  somewhat  too  far ;  for 
upon  second  thoughts  it  strikes  me  that  there  is  not  a  little 
analogy  between  Mr  Gillespie's  system  and  the  orthodox. 
In  the  one  case  w^e  have  three  substances  in  the  godhead  ;  in 
the  other,  two.  In  both,  the  substances  are  held  to  be  one 
and  indivisible,  the  same  in  essence,  equal  in  power  and 
glory.  No  less  than  the  old  dogma,  is  the  new  one  entitled 
to  the  most  implicit  credit,  and  to  rank  high  among  the  sa- 
cred mysteries.  It  might  very  effectively,  indeed,  be  made 
to  serve  as  the  basis  of  a  confession  of  faith,  as  pompous  and 
anathemal  as  the  creed  of  saint  Athanasius.  "  If  any  man 
would  be  a  sound  theist,"  it  might  run,  "  he  must  above  all 
things  believe  in  the  mystery  of  the  dual-unity.  Now  the 
mystery  of  the  dual-unity  is  this,   that  there  are  two  beings 


4JX  I 


64 

in  one  being,  and  one  being  iii  iwd  Ijeings.  Extension  is 
necessarily  existent,  and  duration  is  necessarily  existent,  yet 
there  are  not  two  necessary  existents,  but  one  necessary 
III.  Extension  is  infinite,  and  duration  is  infinite,  yet 
in  lio!  two  infinites,  but  one  infinite.  Infinity  of  ex- 
lu  ;  •  I  Mipport  or  substratum,  or  is  itself  a  sub- 
sian.  f  duration  has  a  support  or  substra- 

fuisi,  or  is  itself  a  substance;  yet  there  are  not  two 
Mib  ti  ita  ur  substances,  but  one  substratum  or  substance. 
I  he  sLibstrattim  of  infinity  of  expansion  is  of  unity  and  sim- 
plicity, and  the  substratum  of  infinity  of  duration  is  of  unity 
and  simplicity;  yet  there  are  not  two  unities  and  simplicities, 
but  one  unity  and  simplicity.  The  substratum  of  infinity  of 
expaiisHai  is  but  one,  and  the  substratum  of  infinity  of 
duration   i.   but  one,  yet  there  are  not  two  ones,  but  one 

out'.'' 

This  would  sound  well,  and  give  a  gorgeous  finish  to  the 
1  >nk  of  Mr  Gillespie's  work  ;  and  if  it  had  an  appro- 

]  .  .    inkling  of  vivid  denunciation  against  unbelievers,  it 

^  be  all  the  more   characteristic  for  the  addition,  and 
I  he   more  authoritative   too;  for  as  it  stands,  the 

s        m  is  destitute  of  rational   support  of  any  kind;  and  I 
I   i       SUV  it  will  be  confessed  that  for  a  theologian  to  have 
U;icking  at  all,  is  better  than  to  have  none. 


65 


I 


CHAP.  X. 

Mr  Gillespie's  Second  Book — A  Departure  from  his  own 

"  Argument,^' 

Mr  Gillespie  professes  to  establish  a  proof  of  the  being 
and  attributes  of  God  a  priori.  It  is  only  through  the  first 
grand  division  of  his  work,  however,  that  he  is  able  to  keep 
it  up  :  in  the  second  Book,  as  it  is  called,  he  deviates  en- 
tirely from  that  line  of  argument.  But  this  is  the  fault  more 
of  subject  than  of  the  author.  The  points  contended  for, 
are,  "  the  one  simple  being  of  infinity  of  expansion  and  du- 
ration is  necessarily  intelligent  and  all-knowing ;"  that  it  is 
"  necessarily  all-powerful,"  and  "  necessarily  free."  Now, 
it  will  not  be  any  way  difficult  to  show,  that  these  attributes 
are  not,  and  cannot  be,  proved  in  the  manner  announced  in 
the  title-page  of  this  author's  performance. 

First,  The  principles  laid  down  in  his  reasonings  for  the 
necessary  intelligence,  power,  and  freedom  of  deity,  are 
founded  in  experience;  and  next — as  by  consequence  it 
must  follow — these  principles  cannot  be  brought  within  the 
range  of  the  general  argument. 

*'  There  is  intelligence."  This  is  the  way  in  which  our 
theologian  goes  to  work, — this  the  foundation-stone  upon 
which  it  is  attempted  to  erect  the  new  fabric  of  necessary  and 
infinite  intelligence.  The  same  procedure  is  observed  with 
regard  to  freedom  of  agency  and  almighty  power, — with  this 
difference,  that  the  principle  is  not  expressed  but  assumed. 
But  while  no  one  denies  the  existence  of  power,  or  intelli- 
gence, or  agency — (whether  free  or  not  need  not  here  be  dis- 
puted)— we  may  ask  by  what  means  we  become  acquainted 
with  their  existence  ?  Is  it  by  abstract  principles? — by  the 
mathematical  and  absolute  relation  of  things  ? — No,  but  by 
consciousness  and  observation. 


■'% 


Tile 


66 

Im-,!  mode  of  making  these  matters  plain   and  pal- 
pable to  those  unaccustomed  to  metaphysical  discussions,  is 
to  illustrate  them  by  a  specific  case  in  point.     Suppose,  then, 
that  two  vessels  were   presented  to   the  most  shrewd  yet  un- 
knowing inhabitant  of  Loo-choo,  for  exa;iple  one  charged 
with  oxygen  gas,  and  the  other  with  carbonic  acid  gas,— how 
is  he  to  tell  the  difference  between  them,  or  whether  the  ves- 
sels are  not  full  of  mere  atmospheric  air  ?    Would  he  be  able 
li  iiciuuastrate  their  various   characters  without  any  trial  or 
experiment ;  showing  that  the  latter  naturally  extinguishes 
combustion,  and  that  the  former,  in  certain  cases,  creates  it? 
\\    re  he  even   to  make  the    attempt,  by  what  sort  of  rea- 
buiiiiig,  I  should  be  glad  to  know,  would  he  proceed  to  prove 
ihv  focts?    By  what  logic   endeavour  to  establish  their  rela- 
tion  to  other  facts,  and  the  constitution  and  nature  of  things  ? 
Or    suppose    that     Mr    Gillespie    himself  were    shown   a 
newly-discovered  sort    of  animal,   would  he  be  able  to  de- 
scribe—nay,  demonstrate— its  intelligence,  power,  and  kind 
^f  .,^,encv,— its  character,   habits,    and    everything   else  re- 
specting it,— independent  of  his  previous  knowledge  of  natu- 
ral  history  and   comparative    anatomy— independent  of  all 
analogy  and  experience  ?— Would  he  make  the  slightest  pre- 
It  iH  e'to  do  this   by  purely  abstract   deduction,  and  by  that 
alone  ?    If  so,  he  must  be  far  exalted  above  all  earthly  wis- 
dom, or  fallen  below  any  desire  for  its  acquirement.     If  not, 
what  show  of  respect  for  his  own  ideas  of  sound  argu- 
u  can  he  pretend   to  demonstrate  that  any  thing,  espe- 
vliathe  never  saw,  is  necessarily  all-powerful,  necessa- 
ligent,  and  necessarily  free  ? 

ily  free  !— Why,  who  ever  heard  of  such  a  thing 
V  freedom  ?  Does  not  the  paradox  convey  a  suf- 
■  contradiction  to  confute  itself?  "  If,"  in  the 
'bach,  "to  he  under  necessity  is  to  be  free, 
..  It  to  be  coerced?  And— of  what  sort  of  freedom  is 
vhich  results  from  necessity?"  To  maintain  the  abso- 
lute necessity  of  power  and  intelligence  is  not  much  better. 
Neither  of  these  is  just  so  paradoxical  as  the  necessity  ot 
freedom;  but  both  are  equally  opposed  to  mathematical  ne- 


l)\ 


n  \ 


\ 


it  IS 


67 

cessity,  and  as  much  so  as  that  more  curiously  sounding 
doctrine.  In  short,  the  principle  of  the  particular  argu- 
ments introduced  in  support  of  the  first  part  of  his  second 
book,  is  announced  by  Mr  Gillespie  himself  simply  as  a 
/act ;  and  we  have  seen,  I  presume,  from  the  reasoning  of 
the  reviewers  given  in  the  preface  to  this  refutation,  that  no 
matter  of  fact  can  be  proved  by  the  argument  a  priori. 

But  if  the  author  thought  intelligence,  and  power,  and 
freedom  of  agency,  necessary,  in  his  own  sense  of  the  word, 
why  did  he  not  include  them   in  the  class  of  his  necessary 
existences?    Wherefore  should  he  not  have  contended  that 
they  are  substances?  that  they  are  infinite?    of  unity  and 
simplicity,  and  so  forth  ?    If  the  doctrines  he  would  teach 
be  consistent  with   his  own  method  of  reasoning,  why  did 
he  not  propound  them  in  regular  demonstrative  form,  ac- 
companying each    proposition    with    arguments   similar  to 
those    he   adduces  in    demonstration  of   the    existence   of 
extension    and    duration  ?      What    could    have    prevented 
him  from  repeating  the  same  exact  process  in  every  indi- 
vidual case?      He  is  lavish  enough  of  his  demonstrations, 
and   repetitions   too,  where  they  were  by  no   means  so  ur- 
gently called  for  as  in  these  instances.     How,  then,  should 
he  have  been  so  niggard  of  them  now  ? — now  when  the  at- 
tributes so  essential    to  the   character   of   divinity   are    in 
question  ;    and   when    he    could    so    easily    establish    them 
upon  grounds   that   cannot    be    shaken?    These  attributes 
certainly  offer  a  much  wider  opening  for  the  introduction  of 
substrata  than    the   objects    chosen    for   this    new-fangled 
scheme  of  giving  body  to  that  which    stands    in  need  of 
none.     The  reason,  I  am  afraid,  is,   that  he  was  perfectly 
aware  of  the  unsoundness  of  his  theory,  and  dared  not  ven- 
ture upon  the  hopeless  labour  of  making  it  out  in  the  form 
which    he   evidently   loves   best;    for  we  cannot   think  so 
meanly  of  Mr  Gillespie's  abilities  as  to  suppose  him  blind  to 
the  advantage  of  a  purely  abstract  deduction  when  it  would 
have   stood  in  so   much  stead,  and  have  been   most  of  all 
available. 

After  all,  however,  it  is  perhaps  more  than  questionable 

I 


68 

if  theology  can  be  rationally   advantaged    by    any  theory 
whatever!     It  is  such  a  plexus  of  absurdities,  that,  once  en- 
tangled in  its  meshes,  we  cannot  get  clearly  out.     Supposing, 
for  instance,    the   necessary  existence  of    intelligence,  and 
power,  and  so  forth,   what  does  it  make  for  the  existence  of 
a  supreme  intelligence  ?— Nothing  ;  absolutely  nothing.    For 
in  that  case  they  must  exist  either  by  physical  necessity  or 
that  which  is  strictly  abstract.     If  the  former— facts  bemg 
the  ground-work  of  our  reasoning— we  must  conclude,  that 
not  only  matter,  but  every  particular  thing,  and  every  phe- 
nomenon  we  observe,  as  well  as  those  indicated,  exist  and 
result  by  the  same  necessity  :   that  the  universe  and  all  the 
operations  of  nature  are  necessary— and  then,   where  would 
there  be  any  occasion  for  a  deity  at  all  ?     If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  qualities  specified  are  supposed  to  exist  by  mathe- 
matical necessity,  it  would  be  impossible  to  conceive  of  their 
nonexistence,  or  even  their  absence  from  any  part  of  space : 
uud  to  affirm  such  absence,   would  be  as  flat  a  contradiction 
as  to  deny  a  subject  to  be  predicable  of  itself.     But  further, 
the  supposition   would    bring    a    conclusion  along  with   it 
equally  fatal  to  the  great  question  at  issue.     Because  the  ne- 
cessary existence   of  power,    intelligence,    and    freedom  of 
agency,  implies  their  existence  in  all  places  alike.     To  ima- 
gine otherwise  would  be  the  same  as  to  imagine  space  un- 
equally distributed  ;— a  greater  quantity  of  space    in    one 
cubic  foot  of  extension  than  in  another— than  which  nothing 
can  be  more  absurd.     But  intelligence  existing  in  all  places 
alike,   precludes  the  possibility  of  that,   or  power,   or  any- 
thing else  which  exists  by  metaphysical  necessity,   existing 
in  degrees— either  inferior  or  superior. 

vShould  it  be  argued— as  it  probably  may,  for  there  is  no- 
thing too  extraordinary  for  theorists,  especially  of  the  theisti- 
cal  s^chool,  to  argue,— that  the  moral  attributes  more  imme- 
diately under  notice  do  exist  in  this  way,  but  that  being  infi- 
nitely superior  to  human  power,  intelligence,  and  so  on,  can- 
not be  regarded  as  of  the  same  order ;  that,  in  fact,  the 
latter  depend  upon  the  former,  which  could  exist  without 
them,— I  would  reply,  that  the  hypothesis  rests  upon  nothing 


69 

but  assertion ;  assertion,  too,  as  irrational  as  it  would  be  to 
maintain  that  boundless  space,  being  infinitely  superior  to 
limited  space,  must  be  sui  generis,  and  quite  capable  of 
retaining  its  attribute  of  infinity,  although  any  portion  of 
space  were  struck  out  of  existence. 

There  may  be  a  want  of  similarity  in  the  things  here  made 
the  basis  of  the  parallel.  That  fault,  however,  does  not 
militate  against  the  validity  of  the  conclusion.  Abstractions 
and  realities,  it  is  true,  cannot  well  be  compared  or  made 
subjects  of  the  same  process  of  reasoning ;  but  men  have 
often  to  encounter  the  foe  with  his  own  weapon.  At  all 
events,  who  is  it  that  sets  at  nought  this  irrefragable  truth  ? 
and  who  has  most  to  fear  its  being  adopted,  is  the  test  of  his 
reasoning  ?— the  theist  or  the  antitheist?— Reply  were  super- 
fluous.  If,  upon  the  application  of  this  powerful  talisman  to 
the  half  careless,  and  perhaps  wholly  gratuitous  rejoinder 
just  given  to  a  supposed  objection,  fall  to  the  ground,  the 
cumbrous  but  ill-constructed  fabric  of  the  argument  a  priori 
comes  lumbering  down  along  with  it. 


CHAP.  XI. 

Fallacy  of  the  "  Argument "  in  favour  of  a  supreine 

intelligence* 


In  introducing  into  his  "  Argument"  anything  as  proof  for 
divine  intelligence,  power,  &c.  Mr  Gillespie  has  certainly 
assumed  most  unwarrantable  prerogatives.  Dr  Clarke, 
with  much  more  consistency  and  candour,  gives  up  the  a 
priori  mode  of  deduction  the  moment  that  the  wisdom,  and 
justice,  and  goodness  of  deity  became  the  subjects  of  evi- 
dence. Prove  them  abstractly  he  saw  that  he  could  uot ; 
and  although,  in  form,  he  does  not  exclude  these  attributes 
from  his   *«  Demonstration,"  he  excludes  them  in  fact,  by 


70 

his  avowed  adoption  of  experimental  reasoning.  Was  this 
r  ^c  iTnworthy  of  beinir   followed?    or   were  the   talents 

tation  of  the  reverend  doctor  not  sufficiently  respec- 
quire  the  assignment  of  some  reason  for  adhering 
nt  line  of  conduct?  It  is  surely  more  honourable 
a  position  which  it  is  impossible  to  retain,  than 
!  t  il  lor  it  in  the  certain  prospect  of  defeat.  But  his  suc- 
cessor is  a  brave  and  determined  adversary.  He  seizes  upon 
every  point,  whether  tenable  or  not,  and  if  he  cannot  make 
his  stand  good,  he  at  least  offers  as  much  resistance  as  pos- 
sible to  any  one  who  would  dislodge  him  out  of  it.  Be  this 
as  h  ni;i\,  lit)  rtc!v;Htta<£e  shall  be  taken  of  his  illo<<ical  course, 
ill  ci  to  blink  the  present  part  of  the  argument.  From 
the  I  ondence  giving  rise  to  this  discussion,  it  appears 

thai  Mr  lu.c^pieis  particularly  anxious  that  the  evidence 
ii)  Fii})}H)r[  of  a  supreme  intelligence  should  not  be  lost  sight 
of.  Hi.  wishes  are,  of  course,  to  be  respected;  but  what  has 
been  stated  in  the  chapter  immediately  preceding  must  show 
him,  I  presume,  that  this  is  a  concession  which  he  had  no 
rii^ht  to  demand. 

His  argument  is  as  follows: — "  Intelligence  either  began 
to  be,  or  it  never  began  to  be.  That  it  never  began  to  be  is 
evident  in  this,  that  if  it  began  to  be,  it  must  have  had  a 
cause ;  for  whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause.  And 
the  cause  of  intelligence  must  be  of  intelligence ;  for  what  is 
not  of  intelligence  cannot  make  intelligence  begin  to  be. 
K  V,  telligence  being  before  intelligence  begins  to  be,  is  a 
I  ction.     And  this  absurdity  following  from  the  sup- 

position that  intelligence  began  to  be,  it  is  proved  that  intel- 
lisrence  never  began  to  be." 

The  pith  of  this  argument  lies  in  the  proposition,  that, 
the  cause  of  intelligence  must  be  of  intelligence.  Now,  I 
intend  to  show,  that  the  principle  here  laid  down  is  not  to  be 
(lep*  nt!'  (1  upon,  in  which  case  tliu  argument  proves  nothing  ; 

,1  .'  \  tlsat,  admitting  the  soundness  of  the  principle,  it 
'.  ,  ;  ,  a  1  to  the  introduction  of  an  infinite  series  of  intelli- 
„,   Ai  .    \ii  ili  would  be  to  prove  too  much. 

First,  then,    I   would  ask   what  intelligence  is  ?    Is  it  a 


L 


71 

being— a  substance— a  thing  that  exists  by  itself?  Or  is  it 
not,  on  the  contrary,  a  characteristic  property  of  a  certain 
order  of  beings^  dependent  upon  the  exercise  of  their  exter- 
nal senses,  and,  by  consequence,  their  organization?  We 
cannot  even  conceive  how  it  should  exist,  independent  of 
these  circumstances.  "  To  have  intelligence,  it  is  necessary 
to  have  ideas  :  to  have  ideas,  it  is  necessary  to  have  senses  : 
and  to  have  senses,  it  is  necessary  to  be  material."  Intelli- 
gence, therefore,  speaking  generally,  is  nothing  more  than 
an  accidental  property  of  matter.  It  may  be  physically  ne- 
cessary to  the  beings  wherein  it  is  found  to  exist, — yet,  like 
organ!  'm,  feeling  and  life  in  the  same  bodies — nay,  like 
form.  .  &c.  in  vegetable  substances,  and  even  in  many 

of  those  of  the  mineral  world, — its  production  cannot  be 
excluded  from  the  class  of  effects  resulting  from  material 
agency.  This  is  strictly  consistent  with  all  facts — all  obser- 
vation ;  and  no  doctrine  of  an  opposite  description  has  ever 
been  made  consistent  with  either. 

But  is  it  a  law  in  physics  that  no  new  property  can  arise 
among  substances  in  combination  ?  that  nothing  can  result 
from  any  combination,  except  what  had  previously  existed 
in  these  substances? 

If  this  were  the  case,  chemical  science  would  be  at  an 
end  ;  or  rather,  it  never  could  have  had  a  beginnino-;  for  its 
chief  object  and  greatest  glory  is  to  discover  new  properties 
and  powers  in  matter,  and  render  these  subservient  to  useful 
purposes.  Let  us,  however,  to  use  Lord  Bacon's  expressive 
language,  "  put  the  question  to  Nature."  Is  combustion, 
for  instance,  never  produced  in  any  case,  but  by  substances 
previously  in  a  state  of  combustion  ?  The  very  common, 
but  interesting  phenomenon  of  fire  issuing  from  the  collision 
of  cold  bodies,  say  flint  and  steel,  is  a  sufficient  reply. 
Another  is,  that  oxygen  and  hydrogen,  on  being  subjected 
to  the  agency  of  a  sufficiently  powerful  heat,  explode  and 
resolve  into  water — a  substance  so  hostile  in  its  nature  to 
the  element  from  which  in  this  case  it  sprung,  that  it  is  often 
employed  to  put  down  its  fearful  ravages.  A  multitude  of 
examples  of  a  similar  description  might  be  adduced ;  such 


72 

as  the  ignition  of  iodine  upon  its  contact  with  water ;  the 
,  XI  ibition  of  phosphoric  light  by  agitating  the  brine  of  the 
n(  111:  the  production  of  colour  by  means  of  niixnig  li- 
quids possessing  none  themselves ;  as  well  as  the  phenome- 
non of  solidity  resulting  from  a  compound  of  substances  in 
the  fluid  state,— but  to  enlarge  would  only  be  to  occupy 
time  in  detailing  what  is  too  well  known  to  require  re- 
hearsal. 

«  Intellio-ence,  it  may  be  said,  is  not  a  spark  ot  tire ; 
neither  is  il  colour  nor  solidity/^  True ;  but  if  the  doctrine 
that  would  deduce  the  character  of  a  cause  from  that  ot  an 
effect  be  found  incorrect  in  other  instances,  wherefore  should 
it  be  correct  in  this?  Moreover,  to  evince  intelligence  in  an 
aaent  producing  any  thing,  it  is  not  at  all  requisite  that  the 
same  quality  should  be  transferred  to  the  thing  produced. 
A  steam-engine-a  ship— a  house-a  watch— all  destitute  of 
intelligence,  yet  clearly  show  intelligence  to  have  been  en- 
gaged in  their  construction.  If  this  property,  then,  exists  in 
the  cause,  and  not  in  the  effect,  why  may  it  not  exist  m 
the  effect  without  being  in  the  cause? 

Throughout  the  whole  range  of  our  observation,  indeed, 
there  is  not  such  a  thing  to  be  found  as  intelligence  really 
producing  intelligence.  It  discovers  properties  and  powers 
in  the  various  species  of  matter ;  it  adapts  these  to  its  own 
pnrposes,  and  contrives  new  modes  of  applying  them  to 
I  hDse  ends.  In  short,  intelligence  is  not  procreative  :  it  does 
not  generate  anything  of  its  own  kind :  its  operations  are 
entirely  confined  to  the  improvement  of  things  and  circum- 
stances as  found  to  exist,  which  may  have  a  tendency  to 
exhaust,  but  certainly  not  to  reproduce  it. 

Even  in  the  generation  of  the  human  animal,  what  do  we 
discover?  Not  the  operation  of  intelligence  adopting  a  spe- 
cific procedure  in  order  to  compass  an  end,  but  what  I  have 
heard  physiologists  denominate  a  process  of  animal  chemis- 
try. Intelligence  is  not,  and  cannot,  be  present  in  the  first 
stage  of  this  process.  Organization  must,  at  least,  be  com- 
pleted ;  and  hence  the  quality  in  question  is  evidently  the 
result  of   mere  physical  agency.       If  intelligence  be  thus 


73 

produced  in  one  instance,  nay,   in  many  instances,   as  far  as 
observation  goes, — why  not  in  all  ? 

"  But,  original  intelligence,"— I  think  I  hear  it  vehement- 
ly demanded, —"how   came  intelligence  originally  ?  — By 
physical  agency  too  ?"— In  these  questions,   and  such  like, 
now  grown  very  commonplace,  much  is  usually  taken  for 
granted,  and  not  a  little  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  reconcile 
with  philosophy.     It  is  first  assumed,  that  at  some  time  or 
other,  a  pair  of  human  beings,  the  progenitors  of  the  order, 
were  brought  into  existence,  and  had  the  gift  of  intelligence 
bestowed  upon  them ;  and  then  that  all  who  do  not  agree  to 
the  truth  of  this  theory,   are  obliged  to  satisfy  the  advocates 
of   it  with  a  solution  of  the  occurrence  assumed  !    In  the 
mouth  of  the  theist,  then,   what  are  all  queries  of  the  sort, 
but  a  begging  of  the  whole  question?    What  is  it  but  to  take 
for  granted  the  existence  of  a  supernatural  being,  capable  of 
performing  all  the  impossibilities  ascribed  to  the  god  of  the 
common  faith?    To  analyze  these  points  in  their  various 
bearings,  would  be  to  discuss  the  extensive  and  complicated 
doctrine  of  final   causes,   which  would  be  prejudiced  by  any 
partial  view  of  it  that  could  be  taken  here.     It  will  be  suffi- 
cient to   remark,    that,    supposing  the  existence  of  a  god, 
vested  with  all  power  and  all  wisdom,  he  must  either  be  sup- 
posed  to   execute  his  works  by  mechanical  means — such  as 
are  employed  by  the  artist  who  models  the  clay  with  his  own 
hands — or  to  have  impressed  upon  matter  such  properties  as 
would   tend  to  the  effectuation  of  his  purposes  by  o-eneral 
laws.     But  the  former  supposition,  besides  being  o-ross  and 
degrading,   and  nowhere  capable  of  support  from  anything 
like  rational  principle,   is  inadmissible  on  the  ground  that  it 
indicates  an  estimate  of  the  divine  attributes  infinitely  be- 
neath the  standard  specified.     The  question,  therefore,  to  be 
settled  is,  (and  be  it  always  and  most  especially  remembered 
that  everything  at  issue  between  the  theist  and  antitheist  re- 
solves itself  into   this   question,) — whether  is  it  more  con- 
sistent with  science  and  philosophy,   to  imagine  matter  ori- 
ginally existing  without  properties,  and  then— making  up 
for  this  deficiency— to    introduce  a  being  whose  existence  is 


74 

only  supposed  for  argument's  sake,  for  tlie  purpose  of  giving 
away  what  it  has  never  been  proved  he  had  to  give,  namely, 
the  properties  of  matter  to  matter  without  properties ;— or, 
to  allow  these  properties  to  exist  inherently  in  that  which  we 
cannot  exclude  from  our  perceptions,  which  would  be  no- 
thing— which  would  even  be  inconceivable  without  such  pro- 
perties. 

1\.  ask  any  man  which  of  the  alternatives  is  the  most  con- 

.i.t        with  reason,   would  be  offering  an  insult  to  that  very 

It  may  be  very  gratifying  to  people  who  have  em- 

-ed  a  favorite  theory  respecting  the  origin  of  intelligence, 

lu  u.x.  those  who-although   they  could— do  not  choose  to 

theorize  upon  subjects  where  experience  alone  is  an  adequate 

guide,   how  they  account  for   the  phenomenon  in  question  ; 

bi  iss  of  absurdity  into  which   these  theorists  have 

ft.  .  too  open  and  palpable  not  to  serve  as  a  warning 

,    .a,.i  the  fx)olish   and   empty  pride  of  thinking  to  account 

i;  r  everything,  and  particularly  for  a  matter  upon  which  all 

re  equally  ignorant.     It  may  be  a  humbling  duty  to 

..         wlcdge  ignorance;    but  it  is  surely  more  philosophical 

to  in   rnAt  ingenuously,  than  to  vaunt  of  a  species  of  know. 

h  cir.   which  it  is  impossible  for  any  one  case  to  possess. 

On  the  question  of  the  origin   of  intelligence,   then,   the 
theolo-ian  stands  upon   much   more  untenable  ground  than 
his   unbelieving  opponent.     The   one,   in  the  very   last  re- 
source,  would  only  be   disposed   to   admit  physical   causes 
operating  of  themselves,   and  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
substances  operating ;  while  the  other  insists  upon  nothing 
else  than  the  same  causes,  only  encumbered  with  an  unne- 
cessary and  good-for-nothing  superintendent.     But  even  Mr 
Gillespie's  reasoning  is  totally  unfit  to  establish  his  theory  of 
eternal  intelligence.     For  by  a  parity  of  reasoning,  we  may 
assert  that  matter  exists;  that  it  must  either  have  existed  al- 
.  ,v.   or  have   been   derived  from   something  material;  tor 
i  -     h  is  material  must  be  of  matter,  and,  consequently, 

I    ^  r  is   necessarily  eternal.     The   last,  indeed,   is  by 

i  best  argument  of  the  two,  inasmuch  as  causation  has 

H        .  r  bearing  upon  things  or  substances  than  upon  mere 


75 

properties.  Take  his  reasoning  in  this  case  throughout,  sub- 
stituting matter  for  intelligence,  and  we  have  a  powerful 
lever  operating  upon  the  fulcrum  of  his  own  principles  for 
overturning  all  that  he  has  brought  against  the  self-exist- 
ence of  the  material  universe,  independent  of  what  has  pre- 
viously been  advanced  upon  the  subject. 

But,  again,   if  the  argument  were   admitted  to  be  sound 
that  would  deduce  the  existence  of  supernatural  intellinfence 
irom  the  fact  of  human  and  perhaps  other  intelligeiici  -   t  \ 
isting— say  that  of  the  dog,   the  elephant,  &c.--a  thousaiui 
sequences  would  rush  in  with   the  admission  in   "  the  inosi 
admired  disorder,"  reducing  natural  theology  to    a  confused 
heap  of  contradictions  and  unmitigated  folly.     The  form  and 
organization  of  the  elephant,  it  might  be  alleged,  is  eternal; 
because  these  are  at  present  found  to  exist,  and  must  there- 
fore have  had  a  cause.     But  that  which  bears  the  form  and 
organization   specified  must  come  of  an   agent  of  the  same 
structure;  for  no  effect  can  result  out  of  a  cause  of  a  differ- 
ent description.     Hence  the  great  first  cause  of  all  things 
would  require   by  the  argument  to  be  of  all   forms,  all  pas- 
sions, all  dispositions  and  characters,  even  the  most  contra- 
dictory and  incompatible.     I  seek  not  to  expose  the  naked- 
ness of  such  a  system,    by  distinct  allusions  to  the  baser,  as 
well  as  the  more  exalted,  of  the  animal  functions,  and  all  the 
considerations  that   belong  to   them ;  yet   I  think  it  at  least 
pardonable,  to  state  a  case  strictly  analogous  to  the  author's 
Own,  but  operating  to  the  detriment  of  the  divine  character, 
that  he  may  either  see  more  clearly  the  fallaciousness  of  all 
such  reasoning  as  that  which  he  has  employed  in  endeavour- 
ing to  establish  a  supreme  intelligence,  or  in   the  last  resort, 
admit  the  conclusion,  together  with  those  just  hinted  at. 

"  Moral  Depravity  exists.     And  Moral  Depravity  either 
began  to  be.     i  it    never  began  to  be. — That  it  never  began 
to  be  is   evident  in  this,  that  if  it  began  to  be,  it  must  have 
had    a  cause;  for  whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause, 
\  16  cause  of  Moral   Depravity  must  be  of  Moral  Dr- 

pra\i?\!   for  what  is  not  of  Moral  Dp-  '    v'm 
'  I     al  Depravity  begin  to   be.     Now,    Moral  Di 

K 


a 


luU 

I 

fix(  II 


76 

ing  before  Moral  Depravity  began  to  be.   is  a  contradiction. 
Ami  this  absurdity  following  from  tin    supposition  that  Mo- 
,  ,!  1  )ci,ravitv  began  to  be,  it  is  proveii  that  Moral  Depravity 
,„  V,  ,  began' to  be:  to  wit,  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration.     And 
;,.  M        ^Depravity  is   of  Infinity  of   Duration,   and  it  sup- 
Being;   And  no  succession  of  beings  is  of  infinity  of 
,:   It°necessarily  follows,  that  there  is  one  Being  of 
01  Duration  which  is  of  Moral  Depravity." 
'  iection  therefore,  to  an  ever-during  intelligence,  is 
„^,,,  .,, id  settled  upon  the  surest  basis:    but  we  have  yet  to 
take  notice   of  what  the   author's  argument  would  lead  to, 
,  .    :     vitiiuu.di  we  were  to  grant  the  existence  of  superhuman 
j   :        ence,°as  necessary  to  account  for  the  existence  ot  that 
,,  s  human.     It  may  be  stated  in  a  very  few  words. 

In  accountino-  for  the  existence  of  human  intelligence,  it 
a  !„  necessary  to  look  to  a  higher  intelligence  as  the  origin 
of  ,1.  we  must  account  for  the  existence  of  the  latter  in  pre- 
ciseiy  the  same  manner.  We  may  turn  the  table  of  ques- 
tions upon  the  theist,  and  ask  how  this  last  has  come  into 
,  .  tence-^  by  supernatural  causes,  too?-The  conclusionis 
inevitable;  and  then  the  next?  who  gave  intelligence  to 
.lv,.>  Something,  of  course,  still  higher  in  the  order  of  m- 
telliffence,  and  still  more  remote  in  its  agency.  If  we  could 
-.  ,  even  here,  there  might  be  some  little  satistaction  re- 
.r/lni?  from  the  inquiry;  but  that  is  impossible.  We  can 
lun.  r-'ither  here  nor  anywhere  else.  The  motive  that  acted 
,n  taking  of  the  first  step,  urges  to  a  second,  a  third,  and  a 
thousandth ;  and  all,  too,  with  undiminished  force  and 
enercv.  Once  begin  the  series,  and  there  can  be  no  such 
thing  as  a  termination  to  it.     It  would  be  a  substratum  of 

infinity  of  duration. 

T-  ib.ro   nny  sound  reason,  any  rule  in  logic,   to  impugn 

tb^  racy  of  this  conclusion?    Shall  we  be  told  that  the 

intelligence  to  which  we  owe  the  little  share  of  it  we  possess, 

,,     .finitr.  underived,  and  necessarily  existing  ?   Some  proof 

,.0  better  than   an   assertion;  for   assertion  it  cer- 

(1  that,   too,   a  grntuitous  one.     It  is  more ;  it  is 

.1  the  question  at  issue.     How  know  we  that  the 


77 

intelliorence  to  which  that  of  the  human  race  is  ascribed  is 
infinite  ?  By  the  character  of  its  effects  ?  The  imperfec- 
tions of  these,  alas  !  would  justify  us  in  coming  to  a  very 
different  determination.  The  weakness  and  waywardness  of 
the  human  intellect,  and  the  sad  perversity  of  judgment 
with  which  the  best  are  often  afflicted,  have  become  prover- 
bial amonnf  the  reli^jious  themselves;  and  vet,  from  effects 
such  as  these,  which  they  deplore  so  much,  and  complain  of 
so  loudly  when  it  suits  them  to  complain,  these  very  people 
would  have  us  to  believe  that  the  cause  is  absolutely  infi- 
nite ! 

The  barrier  which  Mr  Gillespie  would  place  in  opposition 
to  this  retrogradation  of  causes,  fails  in  the  application. 
Reference  is  made  to  an  argument  he  had  previously  employed 
to  show  that  there  cannot  be  an  infinite  succession  of  beings 
— which  we  have  seen  to  be  founded  on  the  inadequate  no- 
tion of  matter  being  divisible.  If,  then,  in  attempting  to 
trace  the  source  of  human  intelligence,  we  are  unable  to  take 
a  single  step  beyond  physical  causes,  without  landing  our- 
selves in  irremediable  absurdity,  what  is  the  duty  which  phi- 
losophy imposes  upon  us? — Most  obviously  and  imperatively 
this — to  avoid  the  course  that  leads  to  consequences  so  irra- 
tional. 


CHAP.  XII. 


hnpossihility  of  ascribing  moral  attributes  to  the  subject  of 

Mr  Gillespie's  reasoning. 

One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  we  have  to  surmount  in  fol- 
lowing Mr  Gillespie  in  his  conclusions,  is,  that  of  applying 
the  predicates  in  his  second  book  to  the  subject,  or  rather 
subjects,  treated  of  throughout  the  first.  How  infinite  ex- 
tension, or  infinite  duration,  or  a  compound  of  both — if  a 
compound  of  this  nature  can  be  imagined — or  how  even  a 
substratum  of  these  attractions — supposing  such  substratum 


/8  ^ 

--can  aflfbrd  a  medium  for  the  existence  of  intelligence, 
|><)wer  an  1  freedom  of  agency,  passes  all  understanding.  If 
!!  \i  r  |)ossible  to  conceive  of  the  absence  or  nonexistence 
if  these  powers  or  properties,  as  it  is  with  respect  to  dura- 
tion and  space,  there  would  be  something  in  the  argument. 
But  this,  not  being  so  much  as  pretended,  we  are  left  to  ex- 
|M  !  i  uce  and  observation  in  forming  our  judgment  of  the 
modes  of  existence  peculiar  to  those  properties  and  powers. 
Aiicl  u  hat  do  these  unerring  monitors  teach  ?  Not  that 
agency  and  power  and  intelligence  belong  to  "  the  one  sim- 
ple Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration,"  as  is  here 
!i!  liriained,  but  to  material  bodies  of  a  specific  character  and 
OF'!         ition,  and  to  nothing  else. 

C  n  we  describe  how  it  is  possible  for  intelligence  to  per- 
d  all  space,  all  duration,  and  of  course  to  reside  in  every 
{  1(1  of  matter.  We  have  heard  of  the  far-fetched  specula- 
tions of  the  Hermetists  and  others  relative  to  vitality  and 
sensation  existing  to  a  certain  extent  in  everything.  Wild 
and  fantastic  as  such  hypotheses  are,  however,  and  much  as 
they  may  deserve  the  ridicule  with  which  they  have  often 
lieti!  treated;  they  are  neither  half  so  wild  nor  fantastic,  nor 
l)v  iiiy  means  so  ridiculous,  as  the  notion  of  space  and  dura- 
!  beino-  of  necessity  "intelligent  and  all-knowing."  Only 
th  i  .  of  time  and  space  necessarily  possessing  omniscience, 
iiuil  liien  say  if  any  thing  can  more  surely  evince  the  dis- 
tressing extremities  to  which  a  man  of  learning  may  be 
driven  by  an  undue  attachment  to  a  favorite  theory.  Mr 
Gillespie  talks  of  a  substance,  it  is  true,  a  being  of  infinity  of 
expansion,  &c. ;  but  why  has  he  neglected  to  tell  us  of  what 
sort  this  substance  is?  If  it  be  not  matter, — if  not  accessi- 
ble to  any  of  the  senses — how  does  he  know  that  it  exists  ? 
By  what  process  has  he  acquired  the  information  to  which 
he  makes  so  strong  pretensions?  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  I  think, 
bOiiH  \  here  remarks,  that  space  is  the  censorium  of  god, 
which  indeed  proves  nothing  more  than  that  even  the  great- 
est men  talk  like  men  in  a  dream,  the  moment  they  begin  to 
dogmatize  in  matters  of  theology ;  but  the  hypothesis  now 
Hi  qii   s5    )n  goes  turther,   and  makes  space  into  a  god  alto- 


79 

gather;  or  at  most,  deifies  a  vague  something,  unknown  and 
uncognisable  either  to  sense  or  reason. 

But  whether  we  contemplate  duration  and  extension,  or 
the  nondescript  substance  necessary  to  keep  these  abstrac- 
tions from  falling  out  of  existence,  how  can  we  suppose  it  to 
have  found  its  intelligence  ?  Necessary  it  cannot  have  been. 
By  what  means,  then,  was  it  fallen  in  with  ?  Prior  to  the 
existence  of  all  created  things  (to  speak  after  the  manner  of 
the  faithful),  what  could  possibly  conduce  to  such  an  end  ? 
No  cause  being  in  existence  but  the  supposed  necessary 
substratum,  and  this  being  of  absolute  unity  and  simplicity, 
intelligence  could  never  follow  as  an  effect.  It  is  futile, 
however,  to  trace  out,  through  all  its  ramifications,  the  ex- 
travagance of  the  notion  of  attributing  the  high  faculty  of 
unlimited  knowledge  to  a  figment  of  the  fancy.  All  we  can 
say  of  it  is  summed  up  in  this,  that  the  notion  is  incompre- 
hensible. 

The  remaining  characteristics  said  to  belong  to  the  deity 
of  the  a  priori  school,  are  almighty  power  and  freedom  of 
agency.  **  The  one  simple  being  of  infinity  of  expansion 
and  duration,"  **  is  necessarily  all  powerful,  and  "necessa- 
rily free."  These  attributes  are  inseparably  connected. 
Power  cannot  be  evinced  without  agency  of  some  sort,  and 
agency  of  no  kind  can  be  supposed  to  exist  independent  of 
power.  The  question  is,  however,  how  either  of  these  pre- 
dicates can  be  made  applicable  to  their  common  subject. 

The  method  of  making  out  the  proof  adopted  by  the 
author  in  these  cases,  is  singular  in  the  extreme.  "  Al- 
mighty power,"  he  says,  "  will  be  7nade  out,  if  it  be  proved 
that  the  being,  &c.  has  some  power,  and  if  there  be  no- 
thing external  to  this  being  to  restrain  his  acting."  Aofl 
"  it  will  be  proved  that  that  being  has  some  power,  if  n  1 1 
proved  that  he  made  matter  begin  to  be:''  and  the  freedom  of 
agency  "  will  be  made  out,  if  it  be  proved,  that  the  be  i  -  ul 
infinity  of  expansion  and  duration  made  motion  begin  to 
be"  : — so  that  to  be  convinced  of  the  rectitude  and  truth  of 
the  propositions  set  forth,  we  have  only  to  make  up  our 
minds  to  the  admission  of  a  palpable — an  inconceivable  im- 


80 


81 


\M') 


>  ;  t  Why,   how  sliuuld   matter  be   created  out    if 

riolhinLi        By    what    power?     By    what    means?    By    what 
a     h  It  is  easy  for  any  one  to  tell  us,  that  the  material 

lu  .  finite  in  extent,  and  therefore,  according  to  ma- 

tiHiiiiira!  reasoning,  is  not  necessarily  existent ;  but  it  is 
not  so  easy  to  show  why  mathematical  reasoning  should  be 
made  applicable  to  realexistences,  to  facts  and  the  nature  of 
thinirs.  All  the  a  priori  sophistry  and  nonsense  which  we 
heai^  of  the  universe  being  limited  in  extent— although  it 
wi  li  capable  of  proof;  which  it  is  not— can  never  substan- 
tiate the  gross  and  profoundly  irrational  dogma  of  creation. 
This  is  not  precisely  the  place  to  detect  and  lay  bare  all  the 
absurdities  of  that  dogma  (which  could  easily  be  done  to  its 
inmost  core) ;  but  suppose  we  take  for  granted  the  possibi- 
lity of  the  thing,  and  of  course  suppose  the  existence  of 
the  he'incT  of  infinity  of  duration  and  expansion  to  do  it, — 
/,  ."It  to  be  done  ?    Did  ever  Mr  Gillespie's  prejudices 

ail    u   luin  to  ask  himself  such  a  question  ?     His  conclusions 
:r         1   tor  him  in  the  negative. 

We  are  to  remember  that  his  being  of  infinite  duration 
and  expansion  is  of  perfect  unity  and  simplicity  ;  that  is,  that 
it  i.  incapable  of  motion,  either  in  whole  or  in  any  of  its 
p  ,5  Its  incapability  of  motion,    indeed,    is    repeatedly 

insisted  on  as  one  of  its  great  excellencies.  How,  then,  is 
it  possible  for  such  a  being  to  act  in  any  manner,  free  or 
constrained,  or  be  proved  to  have  any  power  at  all  ?  One  of 
ovir  rrreatest  authorities  in  matters  of  science  and  philoso- 
.,hyl.not  in  his  dreaming  moods,  but  in  the  shrewdest  ex- 
ercise of  his  acute  judgment,— has  laid  it  down  as  an  indis- 
putable fact,  that,  without  substance,  power  cannot  possi- 
bly subsist.  This  authority  is  quoted  by  Mr  Gillespie  him- 
self Ho  might  have  added  with  equal  truth— and  probably 
would  liave  ''added,  had  he  contemplated  the  necessity  of 
such  a  remark,— that,  without  motion,  no  power  could  be 
demonstrated,  and  no  agency  exist.  But,  fortunately,  the 
>  f  no  name,  however  illustrious,  is  necessary  to 
1  truth  so  evident. 
,,  and  substance  of  Mr  Gillespie's  whole  argument 


in  contradiction  to  this  principle,   is, — that  the  essential  at- 
tributes of  unity  and  simplicity  are  proved   by  the  fact,  of 
the  substance  of  infinite   extension  and  duration   being  im- 
moveable ;  and   that  the   grand   and  necessary   attribute   of 
almighty  power  is  proved   from  the   fact  of  the   said    sub- 
stance being  moveable, — that  is,  of  its  acting ;  aye,  and  not 
merely  acting   in    the    ordinary    way,    but   performing    liie 
greatest  of  all  actions, — the  mighty  act  of  creation,  and  the 
scarcely  less  nn'ghty  act  of  putting  all  created  things  in  mo- 
tion : — This  savours  rather   too  much  of  a  contradiction  in 
terms  to  require  any  comment.     It  is  somewhat  wonderful, 
however,  that  in  framing  his  argument  for  the  substratum  of 
duration  and  extension  being  the  originator  of  motion,   the 
author  should  not  have  glanced  at  tliat  in  favour  of  divine 
intelligence,  only  two  or  three  pages  back.   How  is  it,  if  intelli- 
gence must  come  of  intelligence,  that  motion  must  not  come 
of  motion  ?    And  if  motion  must  come  of  motion — what  be- 
comes of  the  argument  for  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  space 
and  duration,   and  their   sul^stratum,    and,  of  course,   that 
against  the  self-existence  of  matter  ? 


\%  t 


CHAP.  XIII. 

Retrospective  and  Concluding  Remarks. 

What,   now,    is    the    utmost   value    we  can   set  upon    the 
argument  a  priori  for  the    being   and   attributes   of  God  ? 
Does  it  possess  any  value  whatever?    If  it  does,  it  has  yet 
to  be  shown,  for  in  the   hands  of  the  great   Rector   ol    '<• 
James's,   it  only  proves   that   something  must   have  exi 
from  all  eternity;    and  in  those  of  a  learned  and  fn)i' 
logician  of  our  northern  metropolis,  nothing  more  tiiau 
necessary  existence  of  infinite  space  and  duration  :   n 
which  propositions  were  ever  disputed,   or  make  any  i 
in  reality  for  the  question.     This  has  already  been   id 


iCilH,,.:    Ol 
ft    ■■  ^)- 


i 


{ 


8^2 

t  K  iiih  e\  IK  ti  ill  the  fbregoiiig  analysis  of  their  reasonings: 
vri  It  ina\  i  t)e  amiss  to  concentrate  into  one  view  the 
<  in 'f  features,  the  shortcomings,  and  anomalies  of  this  ex- 
ij  lordinary  attempt  to  prop  up,  upon  rational  principles, 
uh  1  h  IS  nothing  to  do  with  such  principles,  but  which  must 
forever  remain  a  mere  matter  of  faith. 

The  "Something"  of  Dr  Clarke  is  doubtless  intended  to 
be  understood  as  a  thing  different  and  distinct  from  matter. 
Bnt  how  does  he  go  about  the  demonstration  that  it  is  so? 
I  J  finds  something— that  is,  matter — in  existence  at  pre- 
sent ;  and  hence  infers  that  something,  whether  matter  or 
1  Sling  else,  has  always  existed.  Then,  by  showing  that 
in  iU(  i  nay  be  conceived  not  to  exist,  concludes  that  it  is  not 
tiic  aiuays  existing  something.  But  mark  the  fallacy  of  his 
deduction  !  The  existence  of  matter  is  evidently  the  basis 
upon  which  his  argument  rests;  so  that  by  throwing  matter 
out  of  his  reckoning,  he  cuts  away  the  foundation  from 
under  his  own  reasoning. 

Allowing  this  undermining  of  his  own  position  to  pass, 
'  ver,  he  seems  to  forget  that  the  very  objection  which  he 
.  to  the  necessary  existence  of  matter,  operates  with  at 
1  equal  force  against  that  of  the  something  for  whose 
he  seeks  to  rob  the  material  universe  of  its  essential 
r^ies.  It  is  as  easy  to  conceive  of  the  nonexistence  of 
inng  supposed,  as  to  conceive  of  the  nonexistence  of 
which  we  are  ourselves  made  up,  together  with  the 
ve  inhabit,  and  the  countless  suns  and  systems  occu- 
^pace  in  all  directions.  The  latter  has,  besides,  this 
use  advantage  even  at  the  worst,  that  if  not  mathema- 
ecessary  any  more  than  the  former,  it  is  physically 
y,  to  which  important  attribute  the  other  can  make 
.  iier  of  claim. 
ID  nvDid  these  errors,  and  to  make  sure  of  the  necessity 
mucli  desired,  Mr  Gillespie  lays  hold  of  the  only  two 
things  to  which  it  (  an  ii  all  be  made  applicable — duration 
and  space — and  gives  them  substance,  or  a  substantial  sup- 
lHii !,  Uiiii  Uv  mov  have  wherewithal  to  designate  a  being — u 
necessary  1h   r.^  t  f    infinitv  of  extension  and  duration.     But 


11  V, 


;i> 


83 

in  this  case,  as  in  the  preceding,  there  i^  an  odd.forgetful- 
ness  of  fir^t  principles.  Infinite  extension  and  infinite  dura- 
tion are  either  necessary  of  themselves — absolutely  so,  or 
they  are  not.  If  necessary  of  themselves,  then  is  the  intro- 
duction of  Mr  Gillespie's  substance  or  substratum  gratuitous 
and  absurd;  if  not  necessary, — the  primary  propositions  in 
the  argument  are  false  and  groundless. 

Both  these  writers  thus  fiiil,  as  well  as  Mr  Jack — signally 
fail — in  bringing  out  anything  tangible — any  being  or  agent 
whose  existence  can  be  brought  within  the  grasp  of  our  com- 
prehension.    None  of  them  seems  able   to  afford  a  single 
word  of  explanation  or  description  relative  to  the  nature  and 
specific   qualities   of  their   assumed   somethings.     All   have 
evidently  the  shadow  of  an  abstraction  in  their  eye,  instead 
of  a  real,  an  efficient  and  absolute  deity.    Dr  Clarke,  indeed, 
at  once  admits  and  declares  the  impossibility  of  our  ever  be- 
ing able  to  comprehend  anything  about  it;  and  Mr  Gillespie 
is  reduced  to   the  dire  necessity  of  doing  what  is  not  much 
better.     He  can  only  insist  dogmatically  upon  duration  and 
extension  being  recognized  as  substances,    and  in   self-satis- 
fied proof,  challenges  any  one,  in  the  most  braggart  and  im- 
perious tone,  to  show  why  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
substances  !     Eheu  !   eheu  !  and  this,   they  say,  is  reasoning 
— this,  what  they  are   not  ashamed  to  call  by  the   honored 
name  of  demonstration  !      Reasonino^  and  demonstration   it 
may  be,    the  best   that,  in   the   circumstances,    could  be  af- 
forded :  but   only  think  of  the   consummate   irrationality  of 
any  system  depending  upon  such  logic  for  its  support. 

These  are  the  particular  fallacies  which  characterize  the 
reasoners  for  the  being  of  a  God  according  to  the  argument 
a  priori.  But  the  grand  error,  the  master  fallacy  of  all, 
consists  of  the  mere  construction  put  upon  a  word — a  word, 
too,  that  is  never  out  of  their  mouth — Necessity.  Yield 
them  this,  and  they  work  miracles  with  it.  It  is  their  ma^^^ic 
rod  by  whose  power  they  banish  the  material  universe  from 
the  class  of  self-existences,  and  foist  a  nonentitv  into  its 
place.  They  turn  it  into  a  weapon  of  warfare  too,  and  their 
forte  lies  in  the  dexterous  use  they  can  make  of  it.     They 

L 


84 

fmht  with  it  to  the  last ;  and  even  after  it  has  broken  in 
their  hands,  they  either  beg  the  advantage,  or  desperately 
contrive  to  make  passes  and  guards  with  the  fragments  of 
their  broken  reed.  Deprive  them  of  this  purely  abstract 
necessity,  and  their  argument  becomes  of  none  effect.  AH 
their  quaint  and  technical  reasonings;  all  their  sage  conclu- 
sions, resolve  themselves  into  worse  than  empty  and  unmean- 
ing form.  And,  that  mathematical  rules  do  not  apply  to  phy- 
sics and  morals,  does  not  require  much  reflection  to  per- 
ceive:  and  if  it  did,  relevant  grounds  for  the  exclusion  of 
that  sort  of  necessity  from  questions  of  this  nature,  have  not 
been  left  to  the  present  late  stage  of  the  discussion. 

The  last,  but  by  no  means  the  most  insignificant  error  re- 
sulting)^ from  the  use  of  a  priori  reasoning  is,  that  it  shuts  the 
theist  out,  as  has  been  but  recently  shown,  from  the  possi- 
bility of  proving  anything  relative  to  the  divine  character. 
Power,  intelligence,  wisdom,  justice,  goodness,  truth,  and  so 
on,— may,  without  the  least  difficulty,  be  conceived  absent 
from  any  part  of  infinite  extension  or  duration,  and  conse- 
quently from  all ;  but  as  nothing  exists  by  the  necessity  of 
this  aro-ument,  whose  absence  from  any  point  of  time  or  space 
may  be  so  much  as  imagined,  the  existence  of  these  attri- 
butes, or  of  any  such,  can  never  be  held  necessary  a  priori. 

SeeminMy  aware  of  having  thus  foreclosed  themselves  by 
their  own  act  from   all   consideration  of  the   second  part  of 
the  subject,  the  advocates  of  theism  shift  their  ground,  and 
now  attempt  making  it  out  by  the  argument  drawn  from  ex- 
perience.    This  is  as  if  we  were  to  attempt  to  prove,  by  re- 
gular  process,   the    postulate  of  there  being  a  line  carried 
over  the  British  channel  in  the  form  of  an  arc  ;  and  then,  be- 
cause arches  extended  over  water  are  usually  called  bridges, 
to   conclude  that   the    one    stretching    between   Calais   and 
D     er  must  be  a  good  substantial  bridge  of  granite,  if  not 
adamant,  capable  of  sustaining  carriages  of  any  burden,  and 
passengers  to  any  amount.    Or,  as  if  any  of  us  were  to  be 
tried  at    the   bar  of  justice,   and  found  guilty  of  robbery, 
murder,  and  every  kind  of  crime,  not  because  we  had  com- 
mitted, or  ever   thought   of  committing  them,   but  because, 


85 

according  to  certain  dogmas,  we  are  all  "sinners  in  the 
abstract,"  and  therefore  obnoxious  to  the  utmost  penalty 
of  human  laws  as  well  as  divine.  The  man  who  should 
submit  without  complaint  to  so  hard  a  fate  on  so  slight  yet 
subtle  grounds,  might,  with  perfect  consistency,  allow  the 
force  of  the  a  priori  argument  eked  out  by  that  of  expe- 
rience, but  not  otherwise.  Whatever  dissatisfaction  any 
one  might  have  to  express,  would  lie  as  an  objection  to  the 
niotley  and  incoherent  juncture  of  the  arguments  now  re- 
feired  to. 

But,    humouring   the    theologian    in    all   his  quirks,     and 
yielding  him  every  advantage,  what  does  he  make  of  intelli- 
gence,   power,    and    all   that?     He    takes   for   granted    the 
astounding  fact  of  the  material  universe  having  been  created 
out  of  nothing,  and  thence   infers,    that   that  which  created 
matter,  and  intelligence,  and  motion — namely,  space  and  du- 
ration—must possess  power,  and  agency,  and  intelligence,  to 
an  illimitable  extent,  notwithstanding  the  nature  of  the  thing 
rendering  impossible  the  possession  of  any  such  qualities,— 
or  indeed  any  quality,  other  than  extension  : — More  shortly 
thus, — The  necessary  existence   of  infinite  time    and  space 
)>rove  the   fact  of  creation;  and   the  fact  of  creation  proves 
the    possession  of    intelligence,     power,    and    freedom    of 
agency,  by  infinite  time  and  space.     If  this  be  not  reasoning 
in  a  circle,    it  is  a  very  clever  approach  to  it.      It  is  twisting 
the  ends  of  things  so  as  to  make   them  meet   somehow  :  it 
is  an  attempt  to  establish  as  truth,   at  the  expence  of  nature 
and  philosophy,  that  which  is  contradicted  both  by  philoso- 
phy and  nature,  as  well  as  by  immutable  truth. 

Destitute  of  moral  attributes,  then,  destitute  of  cognisable 
properties  and  even  of  substance,  what  are  we  to  denominate 
the  subject  of  abstract  theological  reasoning  ?  It  would  be 
ridiculous  to  call  it  god  ;  it  would  be  foolish  to  call  it  matter 
or  give  it  the  name  of  anything  we  know.  Not  more  empty 
and  fleeting  is  the  filmy  cloud  that  meets  the  eye  of  the 
mariner  as  it  floats  upon  the  distant  horizon ;  and  not  more 
capable  of  realising  the  dreams  respecting  it,  than  is  that  de- 
ceitful appearance  of  land  calculated  to  fulfil  the  ardent  anti- 


86 


cipations  of  home,  comforts,  friends,  and  enjoyments,  whicli 
it  suggests.  The  garden  of  the  Hesperides,  with  its  golden 
fruit,  may  as  soon  be  expected  to  spring  up  from  the  vapour 
of  the  Atlantic,  as  that  the  mere  abstraction  brought  out  by 
the  argument  a  priori,  should  be  proved  a  deity  by  its  sus- 
tainment  of  the  divine  character. 

Meagre  and  unsatisfactory  as  this  whole  argument  is,  how- 
ever, we   are  made  to   understand  that   the   other  arguments 
for  the  being  and  attributes  of  a  god  are  much  inferior  to  it. 
It  is  confidently  held  forth  as  the  greatest,  the  best,  and  most 
complete  of  alf,  and  the  only  one  which  is  perfectly  conclu- 
sive.    If  this  be  sooth,--and  it  is  not  here  that  the  statement 
ninv  be  questioned— theology  has  miserably  little  to  boast  of. 
What  can  be   said  of  its   first   principles,   but  that  they  are 
trite  and  inapplicable?  what  of  its  reasons,  but  that  they  are 
crank  and  unnatural,    to   say   nothing  of  their  dryness   and 
total  want  of  interest— devoid  either  of  truth  or  comprehen- 
sibilitv?  and  what  of  its  inferences,   but  that   they  are  far- 
fetched and  tortuous,  and  of  course  amply  illogical?     Theo- 
logy must  be  sorely  distressed  for  standing  ground,  if  this  be 
its^'strongest  position— its  fortress— its  rock— its  high  tower. 
The  ignorant,    and  those  who   make  but   slender  pretensions 
to  reasoning,  fly  to  the  first  and  most  obvious  thing  they  can 
find  to  prove  the  existence  oUheir  god.     They  appeal  to  the 
thunder,  the  earthquake,  the  tornado.     They  appeal  to  ship- 
wrecks, conflagrations,    and  the   thousand  disasters   that  fall 
indiscriminately  on   the   unfortunate,  as  well  as  all  the  evils 
that  flesh  is  heir  to,  and  ask  if  these  are  not  the  domgs  of  an 
infinitely  just  and   benevolent  deity.     The  half  reasoner;  he 
who  would  be  considered  a  votary  of  physical  science  as  well 
as  of  divinity  ;  who  divides  his  homage   between  the  two  ;  or 
who  rather— if  not  holding  to  the  one   and   despising  tlie 
other— would  reconcile   religion  to  philosophy  by  rendering 
the  latter  subservient  to  the  former  as  the  object  of  his  great- 
est solicitude,— appeals  to  a  constitution  of  things  and  an  or- 
der of  nature  destitute  of  all  moral  regard,  but  where,  on  the 
contrary,  innocence  and  guilt  are  completely  confounded,  as 
if  by  a  blind  and  unintelligent  fatality.     But  now  comes  the 


87 

mathematician  to  quash  all  these  appeals  as  having  reference 
to  limited  power  and  limited  intellect ;  as  having  reference  to 
something  which  (for  aught  that  appears  to  the  contrary)  may 
not  have  always  existed — nay,  which  at  this  moment  may 
have  dropped  altogether  out  of  being.  His  objections  to  the 
reasoning  of  his  friends  are  certainly  cogent  and  strong,  and 
hence  his  mode  of  proof  may,  after  all,  be  justly  entitled  to 
the  decision  he  awards  in  its  favor.  But  until  he  can  anni- 
hilate the  universe  by  some  other  means  than  the  equivoca- 
tion of  a  word ;  until  he  can  demonstrate  the  self-existent 
substance  by  a  process  more  worthy  of  respect  than  a  ridicu- 
lous bravado;  and  until  he  is  able  to  show  that  all  the  attri- 
butes he  would  fain  ascribe  to  the  object  of  his  search,  are  as 
necessarily  applicable  to  that  object  as  the  relation  between 
twice  two  and  four  : — till  he  accomplish  all  this,  he  labors 
but  in  vain  :  he  only  sows  the  wind  and  reaps  the  whirlwind. 


FINIS. 


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ERRATA. 

ne  23,  for  "  obscurity,"  read  "  absurdity." 

ne  6  from  bottom,  for  *'  he,"  read  "  be." 

ne  13,  for  *'  is,"  read  "as." 

ne  22,  dele  "  case." 

ne  16,  after  matter,  supply  ? 


9 

J 


